o. 26

October-December 1958

SOVIET SURVEY

A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends

ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY

LABOUR

CAPITAL

LEISURE

NAUM JASNY
enny Plain, Twopence Coloured

ALEC NOVE
The State and the Wage-Earner

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ationality and the Market

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hirty Years of Soviet Industrialisation

THREE SHILLINGS

UNDER FIRE

Comments on Western authors in the Soviet press

George Orwell

'George Orwell (Eric Blair), who died in 1950, was a reactionary English novelist; as a civil servant, he implemented with all his heart and soul the colonial policy of Great Britain; he fought on the side of the enemies of the Spanish republic at the time of Franco's plot; author of loathsome libels on socialism in which slander is spiced with a good deal of sadism and pornography' (*Zvezda*, 1958, 7).

André Malraux

'Malraux, as we have seen, regards as "great formalities" the humanist traditions of poor Europe, love of man, the criteria of good and evil. He advocates the cult of bonapartism... Malraux is one of those who have used their pen to prepare the French to spit upon the foundations of human sentiment. Is it not all reminiscent of the ideological complex of Goebbels' "supermen" . . . ?' (*Pravda*, 27 September, 1958).

Albert Camus

' "I have not sufficient faith in reason to subscribe to progress or any other philosophy of history," proclaims the French writer, Albert Camus, in his book, *The Rebel*. And in fact, though his stories and novels are permeated by the theme of rebellion, it finds its expression above all in the denial of reason, of progress, and not just of "any" philosophy of history, but of the Marxist.

In the autumn of last year the Swedish Academy honoured Albert Camus with a Nobel Prize, giving as the reason that his works "illuminate with thoughtful perspicacity problems which are present in our days in the consciousness of men." This, applied to Albert Camus, sounds at least paradoxical. All illumination presupposes a source of light, and before one can bring light to the people, one must oneself have it. For all that, Albert Camus has this to say about himself and his understanding of the rôle of the writer in our time: "The truth," he says, "at least as I feel it, is that the artist wanders in darkness, groping, like a man in the street; he is unable to detach himself from the misery of the world and still desires passionately solitude and tranquillity; he dreams about justice and at the same time he is a source of injustice; the chariot, in comparison with which he is small, carries him along, but he believes that he holds the reins." This statement, however brief, gives the starting point of Camus' works and the key to his moral code, which has been rewarded by the Nobel Prize. Camus compares the artist groping in darkness, not by accident, with a simple passer-by, a "man in the street." Here we have expressed one of his most important ideas, that men are linked with each other only by "darkness," by the gloom in which they are all sunk and before which they are all helpless. This is how one must understand also the seemingly strange view that justice and the source of injustice are both within the artist. This is a characteristic touch of the philosophy of "common guilt," of the general "involvement in evil," expressed in a whole series of works by Camus. Such a "theory" is very convenient for those who support the evil ruling in the contemporary bourgeois world, for those for whom this evil is a source of prosperity. When all are guilty there are no guilty men and there is nobody to fight against . . . . The works of Camus, his moral and philosophical code, are a striking example of how, with the help of subjectivist weapons, bourgeois ideology defends itself from the advanced materialist teachings on social development, which are becoming recognised ever more widely . . .' (*Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 25 September, 1958).

Alfred Meyer

'The falsification of the ideas of scientific socialism by the bourgeois ideologists is nowadays more subtle and refined than ever before . . Meyer's new book, *Leninism*, is published by the Russian Research Center at Harvard University which is subsidised by the Carnegie Corporation. Thus Meyer's book may be regarded as an example of the execution by contemporary anti-Marxists of the social commands of the American monopolists.

Let us see how Meyer has fulfilled this command. It is noteworthy that Meyer, setting out to analyse the history and the theory of Leninism, tries to avoid the duty of defining the philosophical and methodological foundations of Leninism. He

(*Continued on page three of cover*)

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itor : *Walter Z. Laqueur*

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Editorial

SOCIOLOGY AND COMMUNISM, 1957—58

THE current position of the social sciences, and of sociology in particular, is both a barometer of the political weather in the Soviet bloc, and an indication of the changes which are taking place within it. In the last few years the connection between sociological problems and doctrinal interests has been noted not only by the young revisionists but also by the older ideological functionaries who gave it far more attention than it attracts in the West. A closer look at the destinies of the social sciences in the Communist countries in this period, and of the doctrinal implications of the disputes between their representatives and Party spokesmen, throws light on some fundamental attitudes. The ramifications of such dialectical contests extend all over the vast stage between the Yang-tse and the Elbe. In this small but instructive aspect of a wider drama the Soviet and Polish protagonists have so far played the main part.

THE Soviet attitude to sociology has changed during the last three years. The significance of the change can be assessed only against the complicated background of wider changes in the Soviet system. Although the hopes of political relaxation released by the 20th Congress were soon damped, and now on the eve of the 21st Congress, Party controls have been strengthened and re-consolidated, there has nevertheless been a vast movement of economic and administrative reform.

In 1956 it was hoped that Soviet social scientists might produce 'profound analytical works based on reliable factual material'.[1] The hope remained unfulfilled. But while, earlier, the use of the word 'sociology' was frowned upon in the Soviet Union, a Soviet Sociological Association has now been formed, and Soviet participation in the fourth World Congress of Sociology in Milan in 1959 will not be handicapped by formal deficiencies, as it was at the third Congress in Amsterdam in 1956. Does this confirm the hopeful speculation of a Western student that Fedoseyev's assessme of the Amsterdam Congress (*Pravda*, 19 Octob 1956) may have reflected a 'genuine poli resolution for Soviet sociology?'[2]

In a way it does. But the real question is ho genuine this new Soviet sociology is going to b The reasons for establishing the Soviet Sociolo cal Association are no doubt complex, but son of them are connected less with the intention study social processes in the Soviet Union tha with the 'struggle on the ideological front'. Th evidence for this is provided in the statutes of th new organization, in the activities of Sov social scientists, in the tasks assigned to them the Party, and in the character of the personaliti involved. On all these counts caution is justifie the new status of sociology in the Soviet Uni may be more a matter of shadow than of su stance, as far as scientific work is concerne which does not mean that the change is witho significance.

In the statutes of the new Association only o paragraph is concerned with research; t remaining nine refer in one form or another relations with international sociological orga zations and to participation in internation conferences and congresses. One of the aims the new Association is 'the propagation abro of materials about the development of sociolo in the USSR.' These aims are, of course, co mendable, but the 'external' emphasis is n accidental. It reflects the current Soviet p occupation with the ideological field, whe 'peaceful competition' is officially rejected. It interesting that P. N. Fedoseyev, who led t Soviet delegation at the Amsterdam Congre and is a member of the Presidium of the ne Association, was the sociologist who recent opened the attack on the Yugoslav Party pr gramme. Another member of the Soviet deleg tion at Amsterdam, A. Rumyantsev, has beco the editor of the new international Communi journal, *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. The

[1] F. Burlatski and G. Shakhnazarov, 'Social Sciences and Life,' *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 24 March 1956.

[2] Arvid Brodersen, 'Soviet Social Science and Our Ow *Social Research*, Autumn 1957.

ıal functions suggest that the 'propagation ›road of materials about the development of ›viet sociology' may not refer primarily to ientific research *sine ira et studio*. However, ıatever the motives, the increased contacts th Western social scientists envisaged in the ogramme of the Association are welcome. ter all, the effect of such contacts are unlikely be entirely one-sided.

Discussions in the social science departments the Academy of Sciences and of the Academy Social Sciences have in the last year or so been minated by the twin topics of the 'theoretical oblems of building Communism in the SSR' and of the 'struggle against revisionism.' June 1957, at one such session, Fedoseyev acked 'the vulgar sociological point of view of e revisionists' and extolled 'the leading activity the Party based on the deep, scientific know-lge of the material life of society and in parti-lar of the laws of social development under cialism'.[3] At another session, in October 1957, derided 'the futility of the attempts of urgeois sociologists to deny the progressive ›vement of the history of human society and to vile the social order born of the great October volution'.[4] At the same meeting, the editor of *›prosy Filosofii*, M. D. Kammari, who was also esent at Amsterdam, spoke about 'the Leninist th to the brotherhood of peoples.' The other ›ics examined by speakers at these conferences veal how unchanging is the approach imposed on Soviet social scientists. They included 'Marx-ı and Revisionism on the rôle of the State and Party in the transition period from capitalism socialism,' the 'philosophical twists of the goslav revisionists,' the 'unmasking of the isionist falsifications on the dictatorship of proletariat,' the 'struggle against revisionism China,' the 'struggle against the nationalist ision of the principles of proletarian inter-ionalism,' the 'struggle of the French C.P. inst contemporary French revisionism' l other similarly hackneyed 'sociological' ›blems.[5] The vocabulary, the formulas, and focus of attention are obviously traditional.

At the session of the departments of social sciences of the Academy of Sciences, its Deputy President, Academician K. V. Ostrovitianov, declared that 'one of the most important tasks of Soviet scientists, in the first place social scientists, is the struggle against revisionism, the main danger to the Communist and working-class movement in the contemporary situation'.[6]

Unlike other speakers, Academician Nemchinov (who also attended the Amsterdam congress), showed no complacency in his opening address to the March 1958 session of the departments of social sciences of the Academy of Sciences. He remarked there that 'the practical tendency in the majority of investigations remains quite weak'.[7] Other speakers at the same meeting, which was devoted to the assessment of 'the work of the Institute of Philosophy and other institutes of social sciences of the Academy of Sciences,' showed less concern with empirical research than with the tasks, currently demanded of them, of unmasking this or unmasking that. Thus Kammari complained about 'the slowness of our Institutes in exposing those foreign scientists and revisionists who, deliberately and tendentiously, distort the Soviet reality.' That did not prevent him from praising his own Institute, where 'the struggle against bourgeois philosophy and sociology was intensified in 1957. In that year *Voprosy Filosofii* printed 20 serious articles on these special themes, compared with 11 in 1956'.[8]

IN 1958, for the first time, the Institute of Philosophy announced that it will accept *aspirants* specialising in 'contemporary *foreign* philosophy and sociology.' Domestic specialisations do not however include sociology. Whether the new Sociological Association will eventually acquire its own parish among other Institutes of the Academy of Sciences is a delicate question, involving considerations such as the relation between historical materialism and sociology, the delineation of the borderline between Marxist philosophy and sociology, in short a Soviet definition of Marxist sociology. But even if a new administrative division of

Voprosy Istorii, 1958, 9, p. 181.

Vestnik Akademii Nauk, 1957, 12, p. 49.

Voprosy Filosofii, 1958, 4, p.[5]170.

[6] *Voprosy Istorii*, 1958, 9, p. 171.

[7] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, 1958, 5, p. 114.

[8] *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1958, 7, p. 151.

disciplines should be made, it would not mean the emergence of genuinely independent sociology, so long as the interpretation and definition of social processes remains a Party monopoly. But obviously these considerations are not an obstacle to some *prepodavateli Marksizma-Leninizma* (lecturers in Marxism-Leninism) passing under the new name of sociologists, if they were to be so nominated. The members of the presidium of the Sociological Association are a mixed crowd collected from the Institutes of Philosophy, Economics and Law, and from among these lecturers.

What kind of study and research is to be undertaken under this new name? The answer was given by Fedoseyev in his paper at the sociological seminar organised in Moscow by UNESCO and the ISA in January 1958. In what was very much an *apologia pro domo sua*, Fedoseyev said:

> In answer to our critics who assert that Marxists do not occupy themselves with the concrete problems of sociology, we must point out that, together with the general theoretical examination of the problems of historical materialism, we are doing intensive work in the fields of political economy, law, ethnography, ethics, aesthetics, etc.
>
> General sociological problems are illuminated in the books published by the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, *Historical Materialism*, *The rôle of the popular masses and of personality in history*, and other generalising works . . .
>
> Courses in general sociology (historical materialism) have been introduced in the USSR in all higher educational establishments . . . In addition to this, the study of concrete sociological problems is conducted on the lines of economic, legal, ethnographic, historical and other social disciplines . . . At the philosophical faculties of the universities special courses and seminars are held on such sociological themes as 'Forms of social consciousness,' 'The theory of scientific communism,' 'History of ethical teachings,' etc. Students' conferences and theoretical discussions are held which pre-suppose a high level of activity and a free exchange of opinions.[9]

[9] *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1958, 4, p. 5-7.

Since neither sociological studies nor the fre exchange of opinions (on this or any other topic are conspicous features of Soviet life, it was no surprising that Western participants in th seminar were not deeply impressed by Fedoseyev' lecture.

IF the development of sociology in the USS is unlikely to contribute much to the under standing of Soviet social processes, other con nected disciplines can register some genuin advances.

The conditions of work of Soviet ethnographe have improved since the 20th Congress. As on of them put it:

> The atmosphere of the cult of personalit of Stalin was hampering free debate on man scientific problems, as any criticism o Stalin's pronouncements was extremel difficult, even if they were made quit casually. With this obstacle removed, fu freedom of discussion on controversia questions in ethnography and relate sciences has been established.[10]

This is no doubt an exaggeration. The column of *Sovetskaia Etnografiya* still show that Sovie ethnographers cannot transcend doctrinal an political limitations in their studies, much les engage in unfettered discussion. Their studie are still ethnographic rather than anthropolo gical (in the sense of social anthropology), an the material they gather is still 'factographical' an strait-jacketed by the current interpretation o the dogma. Their focus of interest is not autono mous but dictated by the Party. At the join meeting of the Institute of History of Materia Culture and the Institute of Ethnography held i Moscow in April 1958 there were 75 papers o ethnography. 'They have shown that investiga tions into the development of national forms o culture in the epoch of the construction of com munism are at the centre of attention of Sovie ethnographers'.[11] Complaints that 'there are n textbooks of ethnography' still abound.[12]

Perhaps more important than the qualifie

[10] S. A. Tokarev, 'Soviet ethnography during 40 years' *Vestnik Istorii Mirovoi Kultury*, 1958, 2, p. 93.

[11] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, 1958, 6, p. 126.

[12] S. A. Tokarev, *Etnografiya Narodov SSSR* (Moscow 1958), Introduction.

gains of ethnography are the advances registered n statistics and demography.

Both these auxiliary disciplines had long been tifled by doctrinal interference with the theory nd the necessities of propaganda. There is little o be reported on the theoretical level, but there re positive signs of a methodological thaw and f a more vigorous practical activity. Indeed, t appears that Soviet statisticians and demographers (as well as economists) are deliberately hunning the theoretical field, and concentrating n *praxis*, where they are given greater leeway. What is permitted is circumscribed by Party considerations, but the range of activities is xpanding. The presentation of statistics is still lictated by propagandistic motives, but it has rown in quantity. This applies more to economic than to social statistics. The long-promised tatistical symposium on 'Labour in the USSR' as still not been published.

Statisticians have discussed some methodological problems which were previously frozen. This ame out clearly during the two conferences of tatisticians held in 1957. A new system of tatistical reporting was discussed, and many riticisms of current practice were made by arious participants, particularly by S. G. trumilin, who doubted whether the statistical nethods used were giving an adequate picture of he Soviet economy, and Sh. Ya. Turetsky, who nce again raised his favourite point that the so-alled 'constant prices' have a distorting effect n Soviet indices of production. Among the roposals made for reform was the recommendtion to develop the theory of sampling (in which Russian statistics has an original native radition).[13]

Contact with the outside world has also been naintained. A delegation of Soviet statisticians ttended the 30th session of the International tatistical Institute in Stockholm in August 1957.

The most important event in Soviet demography is undoubtedly the decision to hold a opulation Census on 15 January 1959, after a wenty-years interval. While it will undoubtedly rovide important data on Soviet population, ot available at present, the proposed census has nany drawbacks. The census form omits many questions which would have given valuable information on the Soviet social structure. It certainly does not justify the praise bestowed in an editorial of *Voprosy Filosofii* (1958, 1):

> The resolute elimination of the consequences of the personality cult and the initiation of free, creative scientific discussions has set in motion all scientific and philosophical work, given a mighty impulse and stimulus to the development of science, and opened up still more brilliant prospects for it. The cultural and scientific contacts of Soviet scientists with the scientists of foreign countries are developing on an unprecedented scale. We are receiving more foreign literature. Statistical data necessary for scientific work and sociological generalisations are being published more systematically. The general census of 1959 will undoubtedly provide the richest possible material for generalisations. It is now up to us.

While it is true that since 1956 Soviet contacts with foreign social scientists have been extended, although still largely limited to participation in various international conferences, the flow of ideas, which depends mainly on internal publishing policy and censorship, is still restricted. This does not mean, of course, that participation in international meetings is without significance. Outside influences may not penetrate very deeply, as the participants are carefully selected, but even so something does get through. Between September 1957 and September 1958 alone, Soviet delegates attended six international social science gatherings: The XVII Congress of the International Sociological Institute in September 1957 in Beirut; the sociological seminar organised by UNESCO in January 1958 in Moscow; the World Congress on problems of the family in June 1958 in Paris; the International Congress on industrial management in June 1958 in Brussels; the XVIII Congress of the International Sociological Institute in September 1958 in Nuremberg, and the UNESCO seminar on the social conquences of the use of nuclear energy in September 1958 in Paris.

That such participation is not without effect can be gauged by a remark of one of the Soviet delegates to the Congress of the ISI, who wrote in his report: 'The Congress gave us an opportunity

[13] *Vestnik Statistiki*, 1957, 4 and 6.

to learn some conceptions of contemporary sociology on many important problems.'[14] One cannot help noticing the use of the word 'contemporary' instead of the usual adjective 'bourgeois' in connection with Western sociology. The writer, Yu. N. Semenov, had already shown in earlier articles, wholly free of abuse, a knowledge of Western sociology uncommon among Soviet writers.[15]

At the sociology seminar organised by UNESCO and ISA in Moscow in January 1958 the Western participants could see for themselves the state of Soviet 'sociology,' the standard of the Soviet papers (to say that it was pitiful is an understatement),[16] and the blank incomprehension of the questions under discussion. It is not surprising that one session became fairly heated, though this did not shake the imperturbable certainty of the *prepodavateli*. Theirs is a mechanical task of lecturing on given themes according to current instructions; they are not inclined to explore social reality. In this sense they are conservative and rightly feel that intellectual adventure may disturb their lives and affect their jobs (which, indeed, has happened in Poland). According to the accounts of Western participants, this was not true of all of them. Some younger university teachers who attended the seminar showed an interest in Western thought and an eagerness to learn.

One other effect of these encounters can be seen. The Soviet side is compelled to admit the existence of certain problems which have been deliberately and carefully ignored in Soviet publications for years. This is clearly visible in the report on the seminar in *Voprosy Filosofii* (1958, 4). It refers to the bourgeois sociologists present as engaged in an 'apologia of contemporary capitalism,' but it also mentions such subjects as social mobility and inequality of incomes in Soviet society, a theme which disappeared from Soviet publications after Stalin's speech on *uravnilovka* in 1930. According to *Voprosy Filosofii*, 'Academician Ostrovityanov noted a tendency towards a decrease in the pay and income differentials between various strata of the Soviet population.'[17]

IF Soviet organisational ties with 'bourgeois sociology' have grown stronger, the attitude towards 'bourgeois sociologists' has not changed much, although it is applied with more discrimination, if without relevance to sociology.

> For all the anti-scientific and reactionary character of micro-sociology, the position of many of its representatives (particularly G. Moreno and G. Gurvich) on the problems of war and peace deserves approval . . . The leader of the French group of micro-sociologists, G. Gurvich, is well known as an active participant of the struggle of the French people for peace, who firmly condemns the imperialist policy of the preparation of new wars. We also know Gurvich as a warm partisan of the development of friendly relations between France and the Soviet Union.[18]

Another Western sociologist who gets high marks in the Soviet press is C. Wright Mills. He is even called 'a progressive American sociologist' although those who write about him presumably know how heretical his real opinions are by Soviet criteria. But this is overlooked. Neither his anti-Stalinist socialist views, nor his pre-occupation with elites in his approach to social analysis are mentioned. Instead, the Soviet press eagerly seized upon *The Power Elite* as fresh material to substantiate the myth about Wall Street and the 'small clique of millionaires who rule America.' Wright Mills' book may lend itself to such treatment more easily than others, but his thesis is certainly not fairly reported.[19]

Other sociologists do not get off so lightly. This is not surprising in view of the rôle attributed to 'bourgeois sociology' by Fedoseyev himself:

> The idealist philosophical-sociological views are the foundation of imperialist foreign policy. The last word of idealism in contemporary bourgeois sociology is a theory of

[14] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, 1958, 12, p. 126.

[15] Cf. *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1956, 3, p. 246. His article on Western sociology in *Kommunist*, 1958, 3, is already in different style, although relatively well-informed.

[16] Cf. for instance P. N. Fedoseyev, 'The problem of peaceful coexistence in sociological investigations and in the teaching of sociology,' *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1958, 4.

[17] *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1958, 4, p. 180.

[18] *Chto takoe mikrosotsiologiya ?* (Moscow, 1958).

[19] Cf. *Pravda*, 21 December 1956; *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya*, 1957, 2, pp. 146-148; *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn*, 1957, 5, p. 71.

force, according to which the basic means of solving social, including international, problems, is the use of military-political force.[20] mong those who have been propagating such eories, according to Fedoseyev, are John ewey, Harold Lasswell, Hans Morgenthau, eorge F. Kennan, A. J. Toynbee, and others ho might be surprised to find ascribed to them e view that 'violence is the midwife of history.' However, in his lecture on 'The problem of aceful coexistence in sociological investigations d in the teaching of sociology'[21] he found some deeming features in the West. They are repreted *inter alia* by such 'sociologists' as Corliss mont, Cyrus Eaton, and Andrew Rothstein. us, whatever the tactical moves vis-à-vis ourgeois sociology' the main concern remains litical, and the criteria for evaluating 'bourgeois ciologists' are political too.

GIVEN participation in sociological conferences, membership of the ISA, and pointment of sociologists, one problem still mains: what is it all about?

In no other system is the definition of the bject matter of sociology so fraught with litical implications. The search is circumribed by the orthodox definition still in force. e latest edition of the *Political Dictionary* ited by B. N. Ponomarev (Moscow, 1958, p. 2), gives the same definition as previous itions, identifying sociology with 'historical aterialism—the real science of society and the vs of its development.'[22] How can the old neral definition be translated into the language new study and research? Fedoseyev's formula vague:

> Marxist-Leninist sociology, which is based on the totality of all social sciences, combines organically the investigation of the general laws of historical development, with a concrete analysis of various aspects of social life, in the concrete circumstances of each country.

But he also wrote that 'Marxists do not accept a sociology which occupies itself with society in general and rules over all other social sciences.'[23]

These divergent statements echo the old controversies about sociology, but they do not really tell us what Soviet sociology deals with. The debate has gone on in the columns of *Voprosy Filosofii*, which started it with an article by Jurgen Kuczynski, who after the war became Professor of Economics at the Humboldt University in Eastern Germany. Kuczynski had for some time been showing 'revisionist' tendencies. In May 1957 the Party organ, *Einheit*, published an article by him entitled 'A Battle of Ideas; Dogmatism and "Liberal Criticism" ' in which, with all due circumlocutions, he pleaded for greater freedom of thought. A long discussion followed, with 22 contributions, ending in Kuczynski's qualified recantation. Ulbricht himself attacked him 'for denying the leading rôle of the Party.' In his recantation (printed in *Einheit* in February 1958) Kuczynski admitted his mistake of considering dogmatism and revisionism equally dangerous, denied the most damaging charges (implying an anti-Party stand), and condemned the idea of 'ideological coexistence.'

In May 1957 *Voprosy Filosofii* published Kuczynski's 'Sociological Laws.' The discussion was opened a year later, in May 1958. Kuczynski began his argument by distinguishing between the various levels on which different laws operate. The laws of dialectic apply to them all, but specific laws apply only to specific fields: in nature—the law of the conservation of energy, in society—the law of transition from capitalism to socialism, in thought—dialectical logic.

> But, apart from these, there is also a series of laws, which express relations between these three spheres, and also between parts of these spheres. Where the relations between the sphere of society as a whole and the spheres of nature and thought are considered, we are dealing with laws of historical materialism. But when we are analysing relations between parts of the social sphere and one of the other spheres, or relations between different parts of the social sphere then, I suggest, we have to call the laws of such relations sociological.

P. Fedoseyev, 'Sociological theories and the foreign icy of imperialism,' in *Voprosy vneshnei politiki SSSR i remmennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii*, (Moscow, 8), pp. 312-329.

Voprosy Filosofii, 1958, 4, pp. 3-14.

Cf. *Politicheskii Slovar*, (Moscow, 1940), p. 531 and *tki Filosofskii Slovar*, (Moscow, 1955), pp. 451-452.

[23] *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1958, 4, pp. 4 and 5.

This challenges the Soviet definition of sociology by distinguishing between sociology and historical materialism. He continues:

> One important problem of sociological investigation is the dual character of productive forces, which, on the one hand, are socially neutral (socialist locomotives do not exist), and on the other determine the social structure . . . If we want to develop various aspects of the science, called by Lenin 'social science' . . . it is not sufficient to have a good knowledge of theory and of the concrete development of the productive forces, to be an expert on political economy and economic history, to be a historian investigating the theory and the history of the superstructure . . . one must also be a good sociologist.

Kuczynski draws a distinction between the laws of political economy and sociological laws. Sociology, he says:

> is a completely independent science. Moreover, in the process of social development there are times when circumstances make sociological laws superior to economic laws. Such circumstances exist in the period of transition from one social order to another.

Kuczynski concludes:

> Where are the sociological investigations on the rôle of the intelligentsia at the stage of imperialism and in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism? Bourgeois sociology develops in many books false, lying, and reactionary views on this problem, and Marxists-Leninists have not devoted to it even one book, being satisfied with short commentaries on important remarks by Lenin and on individual resolutions of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' parties . . . We are dealing here with a serious shortcoming of our scientists which does harm to the Party and the state. To overcome this it is necessary to work on concrete problems of sociology. Therefore the question of the development o sociology is quite topical.

This heretical dish spiced with an orthodo sauce did not please the Agitprop *gourmets* A year later *Voprosy Filosofii* (1958, 5) pub lished a reply entitled 'Historical Materialism and Sociology.' Kuczynski was attacked fo trying 'to prove the necessity for materialis sociology in a completely inadmissible way, i fact, by liquidating historical materialism as a science.' According to this article, the fact 'tha historical materialism is Marxist sociology follow from its subject, from its essence.' Having identifie the two, it accepts the necessity of 'concrete sociology, existing on the basis of historica materialism.' One subject proposed for socio logical research is worth noting: 'Concrete inves tigations into the formation of the new classes of socialist society never previously seen i history.'

In short, sociology is at the same time historica materialism and *is based* on it, and its task in a classless (communist) society is to investigate its classes.

'The subject-matter of Marxist sociology' i the title of another article in *Voprosy Filosofi* (1958, 8), attacking Kuczynski's theses. He i again reminded that 'one should not oppose an separate the laws of historical materialism an sociological laws.' As to the subject-matter o Marxist sociology, 'its main task was and re mains the question of social classes and of th class-struggle.' The writer goes on to complai that 'unfortunately, Soviet sociologists are no doing enough work on the problem of the class processes of bourgeois society . . . Such investi gations should arm the Communist parties i their struggle against right-wing socialist an revisionist theories.'

The Kuczynski controversy shows that th debate is not really about the definition o Marxist sociology, but about the Party's com petence to define social problems. Any data o information on social matters must be subject t Party interpretation. Independent thought o such matters, with no Party tutelage, is con demned as 'revisionist.'

NTERPRETING SOVIET STATISTICS

Naum Jasny

HAVE been asked how a reasonably correct picture of the Soviet economy can be obtained pite of the inadequacy—to use a neutral d—of the relevant statistical material.

ne answer is: why, it is simple. You examine fully the statistics that are released, correct e false and inaccurate statistics that it is ible to correct, discard those which are nd repair, putting in their place and in the which have been deliberately left, your own nates—made with the help of correct and ected official statistics and other suitable ence—and you then get a set of statistics itting more or less definite conclusions.

takes time, certainly. This is better counted ears rather than weeks or months. The ent writer has been at it for more than 15 s and cannot yet see the end.

ne quality that the analyst needs, sometimes red to as 'the feel for figures,' is a con- tive mind which, coupled with a sense of ty, can, by a process that is both conscious intuitive, fit together the single bricks to e a more or less comprehensive structure.

is essential to approach this work with a nable lack of bias and a readiness to go own way, whatever the demands from the de. Those with a bloodless indifference to sides in the present titanic conflict will likely lack other indispensable qualifications he task. They may well be opportunists, nding to public pressures. Only that st will be successful who is able not merely ject demands from the outside, but also to uer his own inclination to see black or pink, e case may be.

rors, and indeed relatively great errors, are table in an analysis in which one is compelled e such a crooked item as Soviet statistics. best to acknowledge such errors frankly, to em entirely out of one's system, so that they ot affect—and distort—further work.

These tiresome preliminaries settled, it is possible to get a fairly correct idea of what is going on. But there is a vast difference between the knowledge of the analyst and the knowledge which has become common property. Soviet problems are usually presented in a context of heated controversy; it is at times extremely difficult to get correct findings accepted, and in this way their usefulness is diminished.

In spite of the immense amount of research into the Soviet economy being done in the United States, the sputniks came as a complete surprise except to a very few. The explanation lies largely in the bias both of those who are unwilling to give the Soviet régime due credit for its achievements, and those whose sympathies tend in the opposite direction. In either case the prevalence of wishful thinking, and the readiness of the opportunist to fall in with it, can clearly have deplorable results.

DURING many years of Stalin's reign and for some time thereafter almost no statistics were released in the USSR. This policy was changed in 1956, and since then a great volume of statistics has been published. They are markedly selective; for example estimates of the population, both total and sub-divided into rural and urban, were published in 1956, but the age and sex composition was withheld. Among the items not covered at all or only inadequately covered by Soviet statistics are such important items as nominal wages and indices of farm production, not to speak of practically everything connected with the armed forces. A reasonably correct official price index exists only for the retail prices of consumer goods in 1947-57, with 1940 as the base year; lack of information about prices will, it is expected—and with justification—prevent even a superficial analysis of the most important economic items, such as the budget.

The nature of Soviet statistics is in itself controversial. One extreme, and perhaps the less dangerous one, is represented by those who believe that *all* Soviet statistics are falsified. The other camp insists that Soviet statistics are not false, but that their acknowledged defects arise from methodological deficiencies. In fact, Soviet statistics cover the full range from correct to falsified, with every kind of intermediate grade in between. Concealment of the methods of calculating the data, and of all the details of the calculations (for national income, for example, only one figure is announced for each year), frequent unannounced changes in concepts and coverage, and last but not least, the marked element of distortion introduced by the language used in commenting on the statistics, immensely enhance the difficulties.

The degree of distortion in Soviet statistics depends in the first place on the importance that an item has in Soviet propaganda and on the extent to which reality departs from the Soviet rulers' wishes or from what they want the reality to be believed to be. Other differences in reliability are related to the time factor. Correct statistics have a much greater propaganda value than false statistics; hence the release of false statistics declines in periods favourable for the régime, and soars in unfavourable periods.

The idea that all Soviet statistics are a falsification is obviously absurd. It is held mainly by strangers in the field of statistics, or by those with an anti-Soviet attitude who give free rein to their fantasy in describing what is going on (or not going on) in the USSR. This is of course much easier than making the sustained effort needed to separate the wheat from the chaff in Soviet data.

The idea that Soviet statistics do not contain falsifications—the other extreme—could have grown up only at a time when the study of the Soviet economy in the West was in its early stages. It is for reasons unconnected with research that the idea has survived until today. If this attitude towards Soviet statistics has not made the analytical work of its adherents entirely valueless, this is because they have largely disregarded the distorted official data—sometimes to an even greater extent than the present writer does.

The bulk of Soviet statistics, so far as they ar released at all, are correct. Their shortcoming if any, consist in unexpected and unannounce changes in concepts. Transport statistics, fo example, seem to be entirely correct. Statistic of industrial production *in physical terms* ar almost completely correct as well. Soviet stati tics of acreages under cultivation and livestoc herds have never been seriously doubted (possibl only because of the inability to provide proof o their unreliability).

On the other hand, most of the statistic relating to aggregate quantities, such as th indices for national income and industria production, are incorrect. Although such dat may not cover a large number of categorie they are precisely the figures to which a state man, scholar, or journalist would in the firs place turn.

Falsification reaches astronomical dimensio in statistics of real wages and real incomes. Th great achievements of the USSR in industria isation were obtained by imposing immens sacrifices on the population. Even Khrushche admitted as much in his speech on the expansio of output of textiles and shoes in May 195 (*Pravda*, 10 May 1958). Nevertheless, Sovie statistics are made to demonstrate immens increases in real wages and real incomes of th peasants. For example, the fantastic claim wa officially made that in one year only (1948) rea wages more than doubled, although such a increase is physically impossible; the actua growth is unlikely to have exceeded 15 per cen In 1939 it was announced that real wages ha more than doubled during the second five yea plan; a rise of 25 per cent would have been mor in line with facts. To reinforce this claim th turnover in State and co-operative trade i 1928-40 (which did not increase at constan prices by much more than 50 per cent) wa advertised as having grown 4.6-fold.[1]

FALSIFICATIONS and exaggerations are in fact, strewn over the whole economy. A astonishing case was a table in an official statis

[1] In 1956, the percentage increase claimed in retail trad in 1928-40 was scaled down—without any comment—to 2.3-fold rise.

al handbook, *Socialist Agriculture*, (Moscow, 39) reproduced in 1948 by M. M. Lifits, nister of Trade, in his pamphlet *Soviet Trade*. showed a rapid rise in per capita sales of the ost important consumers' goods by the asants in 1933-38. The table left no doubt t physical quantities were involved. Only er several years of work did the present iter realise that the quantities sold were asured in rubles of rapidly declining pur-asing power.

The Soviet economy has shown great rates of owth since 1946. In the decade before the war ly the years 1934-36 were of similar nature. e period of the great purges, 1936-40, were rs of near stagnation, while the period of l-scale collectivisation connected with the ve to industralise (the years 1930-32), was aracterised by rapidly declining rates of owth. As might be expected, statistics vering the good periods showed in general y relatively moderate exaggerations and asionally there were no exaggerations at all. the other hand, the indices for the unfavour-e periods are as a rule exaggerated immensely. ng-range indices for the most important ns, such as national income, industrial output d investment, embody all—even the most pendous—exaggerations of the unfavourable iods and consequently they too are greatly ggerated.[2]

Unexpected and usually unannounced changes concepts are most frequent in regard to farm ducts. For about 20 years, until 1954, the iets operated with the so-called 'biological' 'factual' yield of grain (for a somewhat rter period for other crops); this departed m reality by quite substantial but never nounced percentages. Recently some non-at food was included in the estimates of at production to make them more presentable. e milk covered by statistics was also recently anded, without any explanation or announce-nt.

Actually the statistics for the years since 1951 are much e reliable than those for 1940-50. While the rates of vth in 1946-50 were very high, the deprivations of the ulation were immense, and this too is a factor tending roduce greatly exaggerated statistics in the USSR.

The idea that the errors in Soviet statistics are not deliberate implies that the Moscow central statistical office is staffed by infants. The people working there are better statisticians than most of those analysing Soviet statistics in the West. They know better than most Western analysts the weak spots in their statistics, the great extent of falsifications, the immense contradictions between them. Most Soviet statisticians would be only too happy to release honest statistics, but they operate on orders and have no choice. They may and no doubt do congratulate themselves on the great effectiveness of Soviet propaganda. The Soviet 1956 statistical handbook was published in many hundreds of thousands of copies in many languages—three editions in English alone. (Both I and my publisher would be satisfied if a few thousand copies of my *Commentary* on this handbook were to be sold.) The immensely distorted indices for the aggregates mentioned above are also repeated in virtually every speech and article, certainly in every book.

THE methods used in the tiresome and frustrating work of checking Soviet data vary. Here only the most important will be discussed.

The Soviet economy, as that of any other country, represents a body with an endless web of inter-connected links. Many farm products serve as the raw materials of the food industries. The output of these reaches the consumer via the retail trade. In between these two series of linked stages is the operation of the transport system. In short, there is a chain in which each stage is tied in with the preceding and the succeeding link. Other examples of such important chains of inter-connected links are: iron ore and coking coal—pig iron—steel—machinery—investment in equipment, or building materials—construction as part of investment.

In dealing with the economy of a country with good statistics, an analyst will devote attention to such chains and inter-connections only in specific cases, for example, when he is interested in the proportions of total farm output reaching the market. In general the existence of proper

tie-ins is taken for granted. In work on the Soviet economy, examination of the tie-ins (most frequently the ascertainment of their insufficiency) is a major, if not the major, tool.

The degree of inexactness varies in each chain from link to link, from zero in some cases to immense proportions in others. Proper tie-ins between the individual links may consequently be absent, sometimes glaringly absent. The table on p. 34 of *Economy of the USSR in 1956*, the official statistical handbook (this is the basic table of the handbook), gives the Major Indicators of Development of the National Economy of the USSR in 1913-56. Some of the indicators for 1956 (1913 and 1928=100) in the table are as follows:

	1913-56	1928-56
Numbers of wage and salary earners	443	446
Fixed investment of the State	—	3527
Basic funds	1480	1089
National income ..	1922	1615
Gross industrial production	3021	2288
Freight transports (5 carriers)	1136	1092

Of the six series, two, those of wage and salary earners and freight transports, are reasonably correct. The other four indices are extremely high relative to those for wage and salary earners and freight transports. The contradiction in regard to the number of wage and salary earners cannot be cleared up by general considerations. It is obvious, on the other hand, that gross industrial production could not have increased in 1928-56 more than twice as much as freight transports. The transport system is engaged primarily in transporting industrial goods and the raw materials required for them. Moreover, the five carriers for which the index is calculated do not include transport by horse, which declined greatly over the period. Similarly, home industry, which is as a rule conducted without or with relatively little use of transport by the five registered carriers, was still quite important in 1928, but has been greatly reduced since. Transports by the five carriers must consequently have grown substantially more than industrial production.

The official indices for gross industrial production and freight transports by the 5 carriers imply that raw materials and finished industrial goods were making their own way from the farm to the factory, from factory to factory, and from factory to retail stores. This does not occur even in a socialist state, and since the index for freight transports is accepted as correct, the index showing a roughly eight-fold increase in industrial production in 1928-56, calculated by D. Shimkin *et al* of the U.S. Bureau of Census as well as by this writer, appears to accord well with the roughly 11-fold increase in freight transports by the 5 carriers.

The official claim of a 16-fold growth in national income in 1928-56, makes even less sense relatively to the 11-fold increase in freight transports by the 5 carriers, than does the 23-fold increase in industrial output. Again it may be said that, all things considered, the 4.5-fold increase in national income calculated by this writer, and the even smaller percentage rises calculated by other analysts, seem to tie in well with the officially calculated 11-fold increase in freight transports by the 5 carriers.

Most of the marked discrepancies between individual links in the chains and conditions point to distortions. Few of them yield reasonably exact data, as for example, determination of the grain harvest from the utilisation end. Usually only a broad idea is obtained, indicating the direction in which research must be conducted.

STATISTICS of the national economy are normally prepared by statistical organisations. Since research on the Soviet economy in the West is mostly conducted by individuals or at best by small groups, the handling of even the available material causes great difficulties which are aggravated by the Soviet habit of concealment (wise from the Soviet point of view). A really thorough covering of the whole economy is impossible in these conditions. The choice for the Western analyst is usually between having relatively more thorough results, at prohibitive costs and with a long delay, and the use of short-cut methods (basing indices on small samples employing semi-detective methods such as pinning down the implications, not intended for

disclosure, in statements, etc.). Judiciously handled, short-cut methods yield satisfactory results, but very few analysts are able to make use of them, especially in the field of Soviet economics, and the results obtained by those who are qualified for such tasks are looked upon with more or less distrust. If this were not so, a discussion would not have been conducted in 1957-58 in the pages of *The Times* on the reliability of the funny Soviet index of industrial production (torn to shreds by Colin Clark as far back as 1939, as well as by his numerous successors thereafter).

Whatever findings on the Soviet economy are available are at best incomplete, and the disagreements between Western students in some cases substantial. The growth of national income in the five years 1951-55, for example, is estimated by this writer at 9 per cent per year (the official figure is 11.5 per cent). Probably not many of his colleagues would agree with this estimate. The estimate of 6-7 per cent per year is generally accepted in the United States.

One of the easiest tasks is a rough calculation of real paid-out wages. Nominal wages, even when they were concealed, could have been roughly estimated from one or another tied-in item, such as retail trade. Most prices of consumer goods and services can be found, too, although a great deal more time is needed for this task than most analysts are prepared to devote. A usable index for Soviet real wages was not calculated before 1951. Calculation of peasants' incomes meets with the difficulty, which cannot be entirely surmounted, of estimating the output from their private plots and livestock; there has been a complete black-out on this since 1940. With the prices used for the index of real wages, an index of retail prices can be constructed (by changing weights), but only one attempt has been made so far, and even this needs revision.

Official estimates of the real grain crops have not been disclosed even now. The present writer's estimate for the years before World War II turned out to be accurate, while those for the post-war years were too high. Still, it was useful to have the estimate of the 1950 grain crop of 85 million tons, in face of the official estimate of 124.5 million tons, although the crop later turned out to have been equal only to about 80 million tons (implied in official data), or 85 million tons (this writer's latest estimate).[3] Calculation of the grain crops does not actually meet with serious difficulties for one who is familiar with the utilisation of grain; there are only six items (food, feed, seed, technical uses, foreign trade, and waste) to consider. With the relatively small number of important farm products, and with the data on acreages and livestock herds usually available, even estimating the index for farm production available for sale and for consumption in the farm home is really not a very big task.

THE calculation most frequently attempted has been that of industrial production. It has been undertaken for both gross and net output, and both by more thorough and by short-cut methods. A full coverage is impossible because of the absence of data on the output of armaments and of the great variety of machines produced and the frequent changes in models. Impressively, the results reached by most analysts for the period 1928-50 are fairly close to each other. A successful appraisal of the growth in industrial output in 1928-37 was even reached by something resembling a trick (evaluating a contradiction between two widely-diverging estimates of the share of Soviet industrial production in total world production in the same year in two different editions of the same official statistical handbook).

There are numerous factors causing considerable difficulties in estimating construction and investment. But too great errors can be avoided, because changes in investment more or less parallel changes in construction, and for construction a good check is available in the output of building materials. The main difficulties are encountered in estimating the shift of investment from 1928, when the private sector accounted for a large part of total investment, and, say, 1932, by which time this share had dwindled greatly. There are also great distortions in the official data pertaining to changes in investment

[3] The Soviets do not mind underestimating an item for former years, if by so doing they can claim greater rates of growth in more recent years.

during the purges (1936-40) and the subsequent years until 1946, distortions which it is not easy to eliminate completely.

All estimates of Soviet national income thus far made in the West have been produced by crude methods. The results differ greatly, depending on the selection of weights. Still, with due allowance made for this fact, the estimates do give a fair order of magnitude,[4] while the official index for, say, 1928-55, is exaggerated more than two-fold.

IN conclusion, it seems to me that I may have taken too lightly those questions on which my own mind has been made up, and that therefore the task will look too easy. I really do not see how an outsider can find his way among the various estimates, official and unofficial. Machinery output represents almost 40 per cent of total Soviet industrial production. According to official calculations, the production of machinery (including other metal-processing) grew from 1950 to 1955, a period of considerably improved Soviet statistics, by as much as 120 per cent. One organisation devoted to research into the Soviet economy has given, for the output of machinery (excluding armaments) an increase of 14 per cent (1928 weights) or 23 per cent (1955 weights) in those years. Statisticians in the U.S. Bureau of Census calculated for the output of machinery, including armaments, an increase of 72 per cent for the same period. (Let it be added that the output of armaments is unlikely to have grown during the period in question much more than the average for all machinery.) There you are: 120, 72, 14 or 23. Take your choice.

[4] An account of estimates of the growth of national income and industrial output by the various western analysts, and their comparison with the official estimates, is to be found in N. Jasny, *The 1956 Soviet Statistical Handbook—A Commentary* (Michigan State Press, 1957), pp. 32-33 and 57. The interested reader is referred to this source for information on the work of other analysts who helped to raise the iron curtain on the economic front.

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THIRTY YEARS OF SOVIET INDUSTRIALISATION

Gregory Grossman

JUST thirty years ago, in October 1928, the First Five-Year Plan was launched. For three decades the resources of a vast country, the energies of a large and talented population, and the capacity of a most elaborate and centralized organisation, have been mobilised as no country has been mobilised before, for the attainment of supremacy in the twin fields of industrial power and military might. The avowed goal—to 'catch up with and overtake America' in per capita output—is now being daily proclaimed to be within easy reach; but even in the early years of the Plan Era, when it was only dimly seen, the eyes of the leaders were already fixed upon it.

Clear though the objective has been, it is not easy to measure the distance traversed by the Soviet economy in the three decades. There are, first, the façade of propaganda and the curtain of secrecy to contend with. Although comparably more statistical information has been published in the last few years than in the preceding twenty (but still less than before that), the data are far from satisfactory for purposes of careful analysis. Important gaps in information remain; much of the data are difficult to interpret for lack of explanation of their derivation; and many statistics are of questionable reliability or are even known seriously to distort what they purport to reflect. The last refers particularly to summary measures of economic growth.[1]

A second difficulty arises from the character of Soviet economic growth, namely, its great unevenness. In some areas progress has been exceedingly rapid, in others there has been very little growth or none at all, and in some respects there has even been retrogression. The economically efficient and inefficient, the technically advanced and backward, are constantly found side by side, often under the same roof. While to a certain extent this unevenness of development was unintended, generally it is the result of consciously adopted and pursued priorities; in any case it makes a balanced appraisal more difficult.

Thirdly, and closely linked, is the 'index number problem,' which makes its appearance whenever we ask—as we inevitably do—such comprehensive questions as: How much has total industrial production increased? Was there any improvement in levels of consumption, and if so, to what extent? How rapidly has the national income grown? etc. The answers to such questions depend on the relative importance, *i.e.* the 'weights' assigned to the individual components while aggregating (combining) them. Since there is usually a number of possible weighting systems, each with a logic and rationale of its own, as well as a number of mathematical formulæ to employ, different answers to the same question may be obtained depending on the method. And the more uneven the growth among the individual components, the greater the likelihood that the answers will differ significantly.

IN terms of total industrial production the Soviet Union has moved up from fifth place in 1928 (after the USA, Germany, Britain, and France, and before Italy) to second place today, although on a *per capita* basis it ranks—now as then—considerably lower than on an over-all basis. In 1928, Soviet industry produced approximately one tenth as much as American industry. Lately, taking the American recession year together with the preceding peak, the ratio has been perhaps 40-50 per cent. However, the ratio varies greatly from branch to branch: for example, with regard to machinery and munitions it is doubtless considerably higher. Today, as contrasted with three decades ago, the Soviet Union produces about the same range of

[1] The reader will find further discussion of the problems posed by the recently published Soviet statistical handbook in Naum Jasny's *The Soviet* 1956 *Statistical Handbook: A Commentary* (Michigan University Press, 1957), and in Alec Nove's article in *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1957.

industrial articles (though in different proportions) as do the more advanced western countries, and in many instances the levels of technology are also similar. Labour productivity in Soviet industry, on a man-hour basis, is substantially less than half the American level, but probably compares quite favourably with the levels in the major countries of Western Europe.

But what has been the 'tempo' of Soviet industrial growth? Western economists have analysed the official Soviet index of industrial production, and have generally concluded that because of various faults in its construction it greatly overstates the actual growth of Soviet industrial output.[2] For this reason several attempts at constructing a more reliable index of Soviet industrial production have been made in the West, based on the available information on the output of commodities in physical terms. One such recomputation, quite comprehensive in coverage and extending through 1956, was recently undertaken by D. B. Shimkin and his associates, and although methodologically this index differs from the official one, it is nonetheless interesting to examine the two side by side.[3]

Soviet Industrial Production,[4] 1928=100

	1937	1940	1948	1950	1955	1956	1957 (as % of 1956)
Total							
				Official index			
	446	646	761	1,119	2,069	2,290	110
				Shimkin's index			
	274	294	294	434	715	773	
Producers and military goods							
				Official index			
	652	1,000	1,299	2,049	3,895	4,339	111
				Shimkin's index			
	426	452	536	781	1,290	1,400	
Consumers goods							
				Official index			
	311	415	409	510	899	984	108+
				Shimkin's index			
	171	183	128	197	323	344	

Thus according to Shimkin's estimate there was a 7.7-fold increase in total industrial production between 1928 and 1956,[5] or only one-third as much as the official claim. The well-known policy of 'primacy of heavy industry' stands out in sharp relief in our table. In terms of Shimkin's index, the output of producers' and military goods increased 14-fold from 1928 to 1956; of manufactured consumers' goods—3.4-fold; however, since 1950 the two components have been growing at an equal pace.

To calculate the average annual rate of Soviet industrial growth we cannot simply consider the growth to have taken place over the 28 years that separate 1956 from 1928. First, we must eliminate the eight years (1941-1948) that elapsed until the pre-war (1940) level of industrial production was re-attained. Secondly, although *recovery* in this sense was achieved by 1948, reconstruction of damaged capacity continued on a substantial scale at least until the end of 1950, and indeed (as can be computed from our table) industrial output rose during 1949 and 1950 at about twice the annual rate that obtained in the more 'normal' years. Surely the expansion of industrial production while reconstruction is still proceeding cannot be equated with 'normal' growth, and therefore we count these two years as four. This gives us altogether 22 'effective years' of growth of industrial production, and the average annual rates implicit in Shimkin's series therefore are: 9.7 per cent for total industrial output, 12.7 per cent for producers' and military goods, and 5.8 per cent for consumers' goods.[6]

[2] Soviet economists themselves admit the upward bias of the official index, at least when they are engaged in serious discussion among themselves and not in defending the official position; cf. the proceedings of a conference published by the Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, as *Voprosy metodologii izucheniia i izmereniia proizvoditelnosti truda* (Moscow, 1956), *passim.*

[3] D. B. Shimkin and F. A. Leedy, 'Soviet Industrial Growth,' *Automotive Industries*, 1 January, 1958, p. 51. Shimkin's index is weighted (following Hodgman's pioneering work) by 1934 values-added. The official index on the other hand is a 'gross' one, *i.e.* it aggregates the values of output (at supposedly constant prices) of individual enterprises.

[4] Soviet definition of industry, which includes mining, power generation, logging, and fishing. Territorial coverage corresponds to the boundaries of the respective years.

[5] All such estimates of course are less than perfect. Shimkin's results however agree quite well, allowing for differences in method and coverage, with the results of other recomputations.

[6] Strictly speaking, a small downward adjustment in these rates should also be made to take account of the annexation of industrial capacity at the beginning and at the end of the Second World War. We omit it for the sake of simplicity and statistical 'conservatism.'

It would be wrong to think of Soviet industrialisation under the Plans as a smooth and steady process. The heroic period—heroic in the scale of its feats, sacrifices, and errors—was surely the years 1929 through 1936, when the rate of growth of industrial output averaged 12 per cent per annum (and well over this during the last four years of the period). It was in those years that the basic institutional framework of the Soviet economy was established, and the basic locational pattern laid. The next four years, 1937 through 1940, stand in sharp contrast. Years of the Great Purge and of intensified preparations for war, they show an average rate of growth (annexations apart) of probably only a few per cent a year, although the exact record is obscured by territorial change. During the last five years covered by Shimkin's index, 1952 through 1956, industrial output seems to have increased at an average rate of just about nine per cent per year. Some slowing down apparently took place in 1957, and, as we shall presently see, the Soviet planners apparently expect considerable retardation over the next ten to fifteen years.

If the long period rate of industrial growth implicit in Shimkin's index—9.7 per cent per year over 22 'effective' years—is approximately correct, then the tempo of Soviet industrial expansion has certainly been extremely high, though not entirely without precedent or parallel among non-communist countries. Over even somewhat longer periods, South Africa (1911-1950) averaged 9 or more per cent, and Japan (1910-1937)—8.5 per cent per year. Over shorter spans of time, Sweden equalled, and (significantly) Russia herself approached, the long-term Soviet rate in the late eighties and in the nineties of the last century.[7] Political and institutional differences for the moment apart, the uniqueness of the Soviet industrialisation record therefore lies not so much in the rate of growth, or even the length of the period over which it has been so far sustained, as in that it occurred simultaneously with a huge peacetime military programme, and benefited relatively little from capital inflow from abroad (taking the period as a whole).

This observation also applies to the total national product, whose growth had also been very rapid, although (over the long period) obviously not nearly as rapid as that of industry. While sectors closely linked with the industrialisation programme, such as transportation and construction, have more or less kept pace with industrial expansion, and the military sector of course grew rapidly too, agriculture and the various activities directly serving the consumer (housing, retail trade, and even education and medical care) expanded much more slowly. Agriculture, in particular, lagged badly; even with the considerable upswing that occurred after Stalin's death, it is very doubtful that agricultural production, and especially food production (for there was a shift to industrial crops), is much above the level of three decades ago in relation to the country's population.

Rapid urbanisation in a peasant country, involving as it does a radical change in the mode of life, warps our statistical yardsticks and renders any over-all judgment on trends in *per capita* consumption very difficult. (The share of the urban in the total population was 18 per cent in 1928 and is approaching 45 per cent now.) Urban consumption levels, taken separately, are probably moderately better than in 1928, though this is due not so much (if at all) to higher real wages as to the reduction in the number of dependants per wage earner. However, the composition of urban consumption has shifted greatly: housing, clothing, and foodstuffs of high nutritive value are in lower or approximately equal supply per person, while there has been a marked increase in the availability of the more 'modern' manufactured consumers' goods. So far as the peasants are concerned, the virtual silence of Soviet statistics with regard to their income, consumption, or even numbers, in itself suggests (to put it mildly) no great advance since the pre-collectivisation level.

THERE is no miracle or mystery about the speed of Soviet economic expansion. At the same time, to attribute it—as does the quasi-mystical Kremlin cliché—to the 'socialist law of proportional, planned development of the

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[7] For the underlying statistics see League of Nations, *Industrialisation and Foreign Trade* (Geneva, 1945), pp. 130ff.; Alexander Gerschenkron, 'The Rate of Industrial Growth in Russia Since 1885,' *Jour. of Econ. History*, Supplement VII, 1947, pp. 146 and 156; and Wm. W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan* (Princeton, 1954), p. 117. The Russian rate during 1890-1900 was about eight per cent per year.

national economy' is to ignore several elements of at least equal importance. It would do even greater violence to reason to assume that any underdeveloped country today can reach the front rank of industrial powers in a generation or so by faithfully following the Soviet formula for industrialisation.

In 1928, Russia had a much more favourable heritage than the typical underdeveloped country enjoys today. Although *per capita* income and industrial production were low by European (but certainly not by Asian) standards, and the population was still mostly illiterate and some 80 per cent agricultural, Russia already possessed (as we have noted earlier) the fifth largest industrial complex in the world, including a substantial heavy industry. The relation of population to natural resources—not even excluding the least adequate of these, agricultural resources—was much better than in most countries that stand at the threshold of industrialisation today. She had a relatively small but well-qualified supply of scientific and technical skill, and—within its limits—a brilliant tradition in these fields. (The Academy of Sciences was already over 200 years old.) The railway system, which for over half a century had been in the van of economic development, was small in relation to the country's vast territory, but large enough to serve as a basis for much further industrial growth. And, finally, Russia had had a centuries-long history of centralism, authoritarianism, elitism, and economic leadership by the state—which the new régime was quick to adopt, adapt, perfect, and pervert.

The three chief ingredients of the Soviet industrialisation formula have been the technology of the West, the country's natural resources, and the underemployed manpower of the village. There is of course nothing distinctly Soviet about them—these are the obvious ingredients of industrialisation in any backward, overpopulated agrarian society—although the lavish scale on which all three have been drawn is worthy of note. Rather, the Soviet experience is distinguished by (1) close centralised controls over the physical 'surplus' of agriculture and over the 'reserve army' of the rural underemployed, both implemented primarily through the collective farm system; (2) a readiness to depress consumption sharply and to keep it low until a large investment and defence potential has been created; (3) channeling the human and material resources so mobilised into the rapid expansion of heavy industry, construction, and supporting activities, and into the creation of associated technical skills; (4) once a large investment potential has been created, using a part of it to raise consumption while retaining most of it to expand heavy industry, *i.e. to enlarge the capacity for further growth* (to the extent that these resources are not diverted to military use); (5) political coercion and terror to maintain the collective farm system and low consumption levels; (6) constant over-commitment of resources, oriented towards a severe system of priorities and a succession of 'campaigns'; (7) assignment of physical targets to producers from the lowly worker up to the minister, and inducing the fulfilment of the targets by administrative pressure, propaganda, and especially by means of an elaborate system of material incentives; (8) continuous pressure from above in the face of resistance from below, for such 'progressive' measures as cost reduction, rise in labour productivity, and the introduction of new techniques and products.

The 'socialist law of development' pales before the authoritarian principles of its implementation.

CERTAIN demographic aspects of Soviet industrialisation that have received inadequate notice should not be overlooked. Considering the territorial annexations which added over 20 million people, and the high rate of natural increase in 'normal' years, the total population has increased relatively little in the past three decades; from about 152 million in mid-1928 to some 206 million in mid-1958, or by 36 per cent. The explanation of course lies with the two great demographic disasters: one associated with the collectivisation crisis of the early 'thirties, and the other with the War and the hard years immediately thereafter. Superimposed on both was the human toll of the forced labour camps. The population loss—in the sense of the difference between the number that would have obtained at the end of the period had the 'normal' yearly increment of about three million held good, and the number actually on hand—may be placed at over 10 million in the former

se and over 40 million in the latter. (Not all of ese were deaths, of course; a large part were, to say, non-births.)

The human tragedy of these events, and the onomic damage involved in the loss of life can left to the imagination. But it would be correct to assume that there was no short-run nefit to rapid industrialisation in these demo-aphic catastrophes. In fact there was such nefit on two scores: in the reduction of the rplus agrarian population, and in a shift in the e structure of the total population.

It is not unreasonable to assume that nearly e whole impact of the population deficit used by the two disasters fell on the village. ie town population could not have grown ich more than it actually did (from 28 million the eve of the First Plan to 70 million by the d of 1950), at least without diverting large ditional capital resources from pre-war indust-lisation or post-war reconstruction to town-ilding. It would be too much to contend at the presence of an additional 10 million rsons in agriculture in the 'thirties, or of (say) additional 40-50 million after the War, iny of working age, would not have had a sitive effect on agricultural output; especially ce it was primarily young adult males that re leaving the village for economic, military, or ucational purposes. But one wonders—nembering the shortage of draft power and ier non-labour limitations to agricultural oduction at the time—whether the presence of se additional millions of consumers in the lage would not have claimed more of the untry's resources than their contribution as oducers would have added. More concretely, h 50 (or 40, or 30) million more people in the lage after the War, could the rate of extraction agricultural 'surplus' have been as high as it s? If not: Could recovery in urban living ndards from the post-war low in 1946 have en as fast as it was? Could there have been as ge an urban population, and hence as rapid onstruction and further economic growth, as re was in the late 'forties and the 'fifties?[8]

The deficit of births during the War is also largely responsible for the higher ratio of the population of working age to the total population, and a correspondingly lower dependency ratio,[9] in the post-war years just elapsed.

Remembering that a low dependency ratio means not only fewer children to feed, clothe, and educate, but also more mothers released for work outside the home, we may well ask whether as large a proportion of resources could have been devoted to reconstruction and further growth as has been since the War, had the number of children been more nearly 'normal?' Or, alternatively and also plausibly, whether average consumption levels would not now be substantially lower than they actually are?

THE unborn children and the drastic excision of a large part of the agrarian overpopulation under tragic circumstances were a loan extended by time to the Soviet industrialisation drive. The loan is falling due. The children of the 'forties have begun to enter the labour force, and until the mid-sixties it will expand very little. Agriculture, charged with new urgent tasks, no longer can release millions of men; at least not quickly and cheaply, although over the longer run and with sufficient material investment it may still do so. Organisational reforms, such as the transfer of tractors and other machinery from the machine-tractor stations to the collective farms, may help, and even more radical institutional reforms may help more. 'Underemployed' elsewhere, in administration, in the forced labour camps, even in the armed forces (we are told), are being transferred to more productive work.

History is recalling other loans at the same time. Urban housing, which (aside from heavy war destruction) has been severely overcrowded and badly undermaintained for nearly thirty years,

[8] It follows from the argument in this paragraph that two demographic disasters explain a substantial part he sharp rise in the statistical urbanisation ratio. If h the total and the rural population of the USSR were v, say, 50 million larger than they are, the urban ulation would comprise not about 45 per cent of the ul as it does, but about 35 per cent.

[9] From Shimkin's estimates (*loc. cit.*, Table IV, p. 59) of the size of the working-age population—which he defines as males 15-59, and females 15-54—the following percentages of working-age population in the total population and dependency ratios (persons in the other age groups per person of working age) can be computed: 1926—55, 0.82; 1937—56, 0.785; 1950—60, 0.67; 1955—62.5, 0.6. For lack of precise data on age distribution for all years except 1926, these figures can be only approximate, but the trend is not in doubt.

is now claiming a larger share of resources.[10] Similarly, the transportation network—so far essentially the pre-revolutionary rail net—is due for large-scale re-equipment, modernisation, and extension to sustain further industrial growth.

Such are some of the major retarding factors; serious as they are, the outlook is not one-sided. The Soviet economy still has quite a bit of slack to take up and quite a few technological gaps to bridge, not to mention the new frontiers that technology is unfolding and will continue to unfold. The recently announced programme to expand greatly the production of plastics and synthetics is a case in point, as it is also an important attempt to by-pass the inadequacies of the agricultural base (*e.g.* fibres). Automation is the subject of an intense campaign and great expectations for overcoming the labour shortage rest on it. Soviet theoretical and experimental work in this field is proceeding apace, although the widespread adoption of automation faces some characteristic Soviet obstacles, such as managerial conservatism, irregularity and undependability of materials supply, poor maintenance of equipment, and insufficient standardisation of components. And lastly, the rapidly growing supply of Soviet scientific and technical manpower is certainly another favourable factor, and a well-known one.

Interesting questions can be raised about the longer-run effects of the reorganisation of industrial management introduced by Khrushchev in mid-1957, which created over a hundred regional authorities, in the place of a score of ministries each in charge of an industry. The expectation that the reform will tend to promote regional autarky has already been fully borne out. No less significant from a dynamic point of view is the fact that the reform has affected the communication pattern within branches of industry. While before such growth-inducing and growth-promoting organisations as research, development, and design institutes in a given industry were under the same ministry as the corresponding producing enterprises, now the former as well as the latter are administratively dispersed, with indications that the collaboration necessary for technical advance may at times suffer. Secondly, the ministerial channels through which pressure for cost reduction, new techniques, etc. (our point (8) above) in each industry was transmitted to and exerted upon the enterprises no longer exist. It remains to be seen whether the new administrative set-up, in which regional problems take precedence over those of any particular branch of production, can fully replace the old one in this respect.

But in any assessment of growth prospects the largest unknown of all is the diversion of resources to military use, which during the 'fifties has probably been approximately of the same order of magnitude as *net* investment (*i.e.* net addition to the capital plant). It is clear that their substantial re-channeling to benefit investment could considerably, and favourably, influence the rate of economic growth. This fact cannot be emphasised too strongly.

BUT what of the Soviets' own long-range plans? A Seven-Year Plan, covering the years 1959-1965, is currently being prepared to supersede the truncated Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960). At the same time an even longer-range programme, or series of programmes, is being worked out, the core of which is apparently the set of output targets for 1972 for eleven major industrial commodities that was disclosed by Khrushchev during the 40th anniversary celebration last year.[11] By meeting these targets, he claimed, Soviet industry would attain the 1957 American level of industrial output. He expected, to be sure, that American output would probably rise over the next fifteen years, but a few more years of Soviet growth would take care of that too.

The targets themselves, as well as Khrushchev's reference to the American level, strongly suggest

[10] The slogan is to eliminate the housing shortage in 10 to 12 years (*Pravda*, 2 August, 1957), whatever this may mean.

[11] *Pravda*, 7 November, 1957. Khrushchev spoke of a date 'some fifteen years hence,' which seems to denote 1972, although it is possible that he and his planners have 1975—the likely final year of a Plan—in mind. The targets were given in the form of ranges rather than single figures. They are, with the corresponding 1957 output in parentheses (in million metric tons, except as specified): iron ore—250-300 (84); pig iron—75-85 (37); steel—100-120 (51); coal—650-750 (463); petroleum—350-400 (98); natural gas, thousand million m³—270-320 (20); cement—90-110 (29); electric power, thousand million kw-hrs—800-900 (209.5); (so-called) woollen cloth, million meters—550-650 (282); (so-called) leather footwear, million pairs—600-700 (315); and sugar—9-10 (4.5).

at it is intended to increase over-all Soviet dustrial production two or two-and-a-half-fold er the fifteen years. Leaving aside for the oment the matter of 'catching up with Amer-a,' the most striking thing about these targets the considerable decline in the annual rate of dustrial growth that they imply: namely, 4.7 to 3 per cent per year, as compared with something e nine for the recent years.

Whether the long-range targets will be in fact hieved remains to be seen. Fifteen-year plans ve a way of going down the drain of history. et it is clear that the rate of growth, though nsiderably reduced, is planned to remain high higher than the American post-war rate of out four per cent per year, although no higher an what many a non-Communist country has hieved in recent years. The announced rgets show no retreat from the policy of imacy of heavy industry. The output of nufactured consumers' goods, the more oblematic among Khrushchev's goals in any se, is to grow more slowly than that of pro-cers' goods. Considering the difficulties in riculture (still far from overcome despite the icial optimism), and the likely population owth, it is difficult to see more than a small nual improvement in *per capita* consumption the next decade-and-a-half. Lastly, Khrush-ev's targets give no indication of an expected arp curtailment of military outlay. (In fact, certainty with regard to military requirements y be a chief reason for the targets being ted in the form of broad ranges.)

Much is made by the Kremlin of catching up th America in total industrial production. ch a simply-stated and prestige-laden objective is certainly not without its benefits as a convenient measure to the planner, a spur at home, and a valuable propaganda slogan abroad. Yet for all its significance to national pride and propaganda, industrial parity is a false objective. The statistician knows that even in scrupulous statistical hands the concept of parity of output is entirely relative to the method employed in computing it, and that at any rate such over-all comparisons are fiction, for they abstract from significant diversity and disparity. In less than scrupulous hands fiction may simply be fable.

To the statesman the concept of parity of output is perhaps even less important. National power does not rest on index points but on concrete capabilities, and in this sense parity has already been established between the two sides in at least two significant respects: in the threat to destroy the other side through military action, and (within practicable limits) in the capacity to render large-scale assistance to the underdeveloped countries. From here on the will and the skill with which policy is pursued are likely to be more decisive than the exact size of the industrial base. In other significant respects, *e.g.* living standards, parity is still far out of sight.

This is not a counsel of indifference. Of course the West must remain militarily strong and watchful. Beyond that, of course, and for many reasons, it should expand its economies at a good rate, avoid economic instability, and redress inequities. Of course it must do more to educate and train its citizens. Of course its countries must draw closer together. The Soviet challenge imparts urgency to what otherwise would be merely wisdom. So much the better.

Crossroads in the Countryside

A REVIEW OF SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

W. K.

THE Soviet Union is by common consent the second largest industrial power on earth; with stamina and steel she has outpaced all Europe and is now seriously challenging the industrial supremacy of the United States. At the same time, agriculture has remained a major industry of the country; over half the population still live in villages and nearly half the working population are employed in the farming industry. These features are the two sides of one and the same phenomenon: the building of a communist industrial society by a process of primitive accumulation throughout the countryside the like of which has not been heard of since Marx tried to assess the advent of industrialisation during the opening phases of Western capitalism.

The outcome of this process has been unique in industrial history. Whilst, elsewhere, progress in industrialisation was accompanied, if not preceded, by growing intensification of agriculture, in the Soviet Union the farming industry was left behind in the course of economic development. In Western industrialised countries one farming family produces a highly diversified diet for some ten families; against this the farmer of present-day Russia produces a rather monotonous diet for his own family and for one family of town-dwellers. Nothing illustrates better the backwardness of farming in this most developed of underdeveloped countries.

Stalin is reported never to have visited any of the centres of his principal crime against the Russian people, but since his death much of Soviet domestic policy has been focused on the condition and fate of the collective farms which provide the homestead and place of work for nearly twenty million Russian families. In fact, hardly a month passes nowadays without a major speech or decree concerned with agriculture being published through Soviet press and broadcasting channels. Of the fifteen plenary meetings of the Central Committee which have met since Stalin's death, at least ten have dealt publicly with agricultural matters, and there is reason to think that on other occasions the state of the farming industry was considered and its future decided in secret session.

As a survey of all the measures taken since 1953 would burst the covers of a book, this review must be limited largely to the dramatic decisions of this year, which went further than all previous ones taken together, and to the developments that led up to them. The reorganisation of industry had not had time to pass its test when 'the greatest and most far-reaching event in the countryside since mass collectivisation'[1] took place in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, whom Voroshilov had described as 'the master of kolkhoz and sovkhoz affairs,'[2] took matters out of the hands of officials and technicians into his own when he made known, almost casually, his proposal to sell the equipment of the Machine Tractor Stations to the collectives and to transform the MTS into repair stations. This was followed a few months later by an even more far-reaching proposal concerning the procurement and price-fixing of farm products.

KHRUSHCHEV'S suggestion, made at Minsk on 22 January, was followed a month later by a Central Committee resolution accepting his theses, and in April it was adopted by the Supreme Soviet, at the session which elected to terminate collective in the interest of single leadership. At Minsk Khrushchev had said: 'Where there are two masters, there can be no good order.'[3] These remarks were taken to refer to affairs in the villages rather than in the Kremlin. At any rate, *Pravda* did not publish them until three days after Khrushchev

[1] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 5 March 1958.

[2] *Izvestiya*, 2 February 1957.

[3] *Pravda*, 28 February 1958.

as seen on the platform of the Moscow City arty conference, sharing with Bulganin the urden of collective leadership—for the last me.

The 'nation-wide discussion' which followed the ublication of the theses on the MTS yielded, in ss than a month, three million speeches and over hundred thousand proposals, of which *Pravda*, *zvestiya*, and *Selskoe Khozyaistvo* published o less than 1,500, not counting Khrushchev's wn contribution of some 40,000 words directed the problem of the MTS. Although unaniuity was recorded in the end, there is plenty of aterial on which to base an assessment of this easure. Preliminary Western comments nged from describing it as a retreat under ressure to calling it a step forward on the ad to the ultimate transformation of the llectives into state farms. However tempting quick diagnosis may be, Soviet agricultural fairs are too complex to lend themselves adily to hasty judgment.

The plan for the reorganisation of agriculture, ough apparently launched without any eparation or forewarning, had in fact been ng overdue. It represents one more variation the long series of Khrushchev's experiments stop the rot that set in at the very foundations the farming industry some thirty years ago hen the collective replaced the individual farm. ver since the days when he was in charge of rty affairs in the Ukraine, one of Russia's ain agricultural republics, he has shown a arked inclination to intervene in the country's ost backward industry. His attempt at moulding llages into agro-towns will long be remembered urban and rural dwellers alike. Although his eas were officially dismissed, his aim of reducing e number of collectives was achieved. At the neteenth Party Congress in 1952 Malenkov, behalf of the Party, rejected Khrushchev's acro-agrarian plan as well as Andreyev's icro-agrarian concept of the family work unit; the twentieth Congress in 1956 he appeared as e man chiefly responsible, by his own admison, for the failure in agriculture, marked for olitical exile. Khrushchev emerged victorious. the intervening years the number of collectives d been reduced drastically as the result of mpulsory amalgamations to approximately 80,000; before the war there were nearly 250,000.

IT is not merely the institutional side of agriculture that has attracted Khrushchev's attention, but at first he had to share his interest with his colleagues of the collective leadership. After Stalin's death Malenkov was the first to criticise the state of agriculture, and livestock farming in particular. At the closing session of the Supreme Soviet early in August 1953 he announced a reduction in delivery quotas and agricultural taxes and the cancellation of arrears. He also stated, rather prematurely, that 'our country is assured of grain.'[4] Six months later it was in the throes of a grain crisis which led to the reclamation of some 85 million acres of virgin land and the creation of nearly a thousand new state farms.

By early 1954 Khrushchev was in full control, on behalf of Party and Government, of all agricultural affairs, administrative, technical, and political. He impressed the Party's Central Committee in the early months after Stalin's death when he delivered his monumental speech 'On Measures for the Further Advancement of Agriculture.' It was then that he first spoke of the need to shift farm production, in the interests of the well-being of the people, from bread to meat and dairy products, vegetables, and fruit. It was precisely in these sectors of agriculture that 'a disproportion had been in evidence between the rapidly growing requirements of the population and the level of production.'[5] His survey ranged over the whole industry, from raising grain yields and potato deliveries to the state of animal husbandry and party-political tasks in the countryside. One of the immediate outcomes of his initiative was the decree 'On measures for further improving the work of the MTS' which were then regarded as 'the industrial material-technical base of collective farm production.'[6]

With immediate effect, the men who had

[4] *Pravda*, 9 August 1953.

[5] *Pravda*, 15 September 1953.

[6] *Izvestiya*, 2 October 1953.

previously been seconded to work in the MTS were turned into permanent wage-earners entitled to minimum wages, pensions, and other social benefits, as well as a private plot at their place of work. Favourable wage scales were laid down, training colleges and vocational schools for MTS staff were founded, repair shops, garages, and machine sheds were set up, and the defence and aircraft industries were instructed to switch their production programme to tractors and spare parts. As so often in Soviet planning, the operation was given the shape and urgency of a military operation.

The expansion of crop production in recent years was in fact due in large measure to the work of the MTS. Deliveries, if not production plans, were regarded essentially as a function of the MTS. The payment in kind for services rendered by the MTS accounted for between one-third and one-half of total grain procurement. It was thus natural that the MTS were reinforced rather than weakened as the direct agents of Government and Party, and that certain administrative functions which had formerly been carried out by regional administrators were transferred to the MTS when they had been strengthened sufficiently as a result of the 1953 legislation.

ON the face of it, the measures taken early this year appear as a complete reversal of policy less than five years after its inauguration. They have, however, to be seen in the context of the changes that occurred simultaneously in other sectors of the farm industry, none of which escaped the attention of so restless a mind as Khrushchev's. Though the collectives were never regarded as anything but a transitional feature of Soviet society, the twenty million peasant families gathered in them had to be taken into account first of all. For thirty years they had been the key to the miracle of Soviet industrial growth, the main source of capital accumulation. If industry was to rise faster than in the United States, and the consumer was to increase his slice of the national cake, the output of the collectives had to be increased. As the time for crude forms of coercion had passed, subtler methods had to be devised. Of these there have been plenty in recent years. Price increases, tax concessions, and earn-as-you-work pay for services rendered were the main inducements to members of the collectives to increase their efforts in the communal fields.

To make sure of success, pressure was put on the village population to discourage them from spending an undue amount of their time and effort on their private plots. These had always been a bone of contention for Party doctrinaires who considered them expendable rudiments of capitalism. In the interest of increased livestock production, Khrushchev had rebuked those in the Party who thought that 'the productive livestock possessed by a collective farmer's household represents a danger to the socialist system.' But he hastened to prophesy that the time will come 'when it will be unprofitable for the collective farmer to have livestock in his personal possession.'[7]

Throughout the years the Party's policy has vacillated between restricting and encouraging the small private sector of the farm industry; in the outcome it was decimated though not liquidated. The size of the plot has been reduced from 1¼ acres before the war to less than ¾ acre per family now. Simultaneously the private rearing of livestock has been handicapped by the increase in the minimum number of labour-days that have to be worked—by men, women, and children—in the collectives. The 1956 decree on the Agricultural Artel left no doubt that in important respects the regulations of the Model Collective Farm Statute of 1935 'ran counter to the tasks of the organisational-economic strengthening of the collective farms' and that in future 'private plot husbandry must be of a subsidiary nature.'[8] When Khrushchev was engaged in his political battle with the 'anti-party group' and was anxious to increase his popularity, he shifted the emphasis once again. While promising town dwellers milk and meat supplies matching those available to American consumers he gave the villagers the undertaking to abolish by the beginning of 1958, the compulsory deliveries for the produce of the private plot so as to create a better political atmosphere in the countryside.

Together with the attack on the private plot

[7] *Pravda*, 15 September 1953.

[8] *Pravda*, 10 March 1956.

considerable expansion took place in state
irms, which have always been regarded as the
ost superior form of socialist organisation in
griculture. Whereas collectives are the main
ource of capital formation, the state assumes all
sks in the running of *sovkhozes*, pays wages
respective of farming results, and thus has to
ce losses which are met in the collectives by
eir members. In spite of these advantages,
e state farms did not play a major rôle after
e abortive attempts at their expansion in the
venties until Khrushchev introduced the large-
ale cultivation of virgin land in areas without
peasant population. 'Only through state
rms is it possible to master successfully and
a short period the primary mass of virgin
nds.'[9] In some cases, moreover, new state
rms were created from collectives, and fields
longing to collectives were transferred to exist-
g state farms. Finally, in some areas, machine
actor stations were absorbed by newly created
ate farms. After he had been appointed
inister of State Farms, Benediktov became a
ominent spokesman for this form of farm
ganisation, writing in favour of the transfer in
azakhstan of land 'formally attached to the
llectives' to the state farms.[10] His views must
ve been challenged, for in a lecture in Moscow
referred to 'hostile attempts made to dislodge
e state farm system, which however had been
feated.'[11]

THE picture of organisational changes that
emerges is varied and colourful. It suggests
eriod of experimentation rather than anything
finitive, an interpretation borne out by the
onomic changes that accompanied those of an
stitutional nature. When the Soviet leaders
cided in 1953 to change the levels and relations
farm prices, they could hardly have been
are of the consequences. The effect of a
all increase in prices might have been
edicted, but while the prices for compulsory
liveries of grain remained unchanged those of
iry products were raised 150 per cent. and
se of meat more than four hundred per cent.

Largely as a result of these measures, cash incomes of collectives doubled between 1950 and 1957 and cash payments of individual members of collectives increased from less than 1 ruble to more than 3.50 rubles per labour day. Total incomes rose, however, more modestly, probably by less than 50 per cent., since payments in kind and earnings outside the collectives either increased little or in fact declined.

The collectives were then able to improve the state of farming, to build up their reserves, to make capital investments, and to employ technical and administrative talent that was previously beyond their financial means. This is not to say that there were not, apart from a few 'millionaire farms,' many that could hardly make ends meet; some of these have meanwhile been merged into larger units.[12] In this situation the duplication of organisation had become an anomaly. A conflict of interests between the collectives, being producing entities, and the MTS, as servicing agencies, was inevitable.

At this point Khrushchev intervened. It is perhaps not without significance that he toured the country south of the 'Hungry Steppes' in 1957, after the satisfactory grain harvest of the new state farms; but when the virgin lands yielded disappointing crops a year later, he turned in the direction of the Pripet Marshes, where the traditional areas of collective farming and animal husbandry lie. At Minsk he was also near enough to the trouble spots of Eastern Europe to remind restive farming communities in the area that the dissolution of collectives is not the only way in which to approach the problems of communist farming.

Khrushchev's decision led to the transfer of some 700,000 tractors with all the auxiliary equipment and close on 3 million tractor drivers, mechanics, specialists, and clerks, of whom 2 million had been converted into MTS personnel as recently as the autumn of 1953. Their wages and social benefits remained unimpaired by the transfer. The MTS ceased forthwith to act as government crop collecting agencies and were reduced to mere repair and

[9] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1957, 7, p. 29.

[10] *Kommunist*, 1956, 18, p. 8.

[11] Moscow Radio, 26 January 1957.

[12] At the time of writing only 69,200 collectives are left in the Soviet Union.

servicing stations (RTS). The collectives were expected to buy the equipment of the MTS, the purchase of which they had financed once before with their crop deliveries. This transaction will cost nearly 20,000 million rubles or 25,000 rubles per tractor unit. As capital reserves account at present for some 25,000 million rubles and this year's harvest is likely to yield an additional 10,000 million, the financial transfer will be completed within a relatively short time. In addition the collectives have in future to pay the operating costs of the farm equipment, any necessary replacements, and purchase any new machinery that may appear on the market. Government funds for providing the MTS with finance on capital and current account will be available for other purposes. Administrative responsibilities, which formerly rested with the directors of the MTS, are transferred to the chairmen of collectives, most of whom are by now members of local Party cadres. Major decisions will not be made without consulting both Party and Government district authorities.

MUCH of what has been decreed has been proposed by Western observers for a number of years. Some have drawn the conclusion that rationality will now prevail over dogma; but this is hardly borne out by the available evidence. In fact, Khrushchev and others have been at pains to show that no doctrinal heresy will be permitted. Ownership of the means of production by the collectives, it is argued, is not in conflict with the dogma of the superiority of public property. Professor Ostrovityanov—who became widely known in the West when he tried to defend, in the columns of *The Times* (5 February 1958), the most indefensible of Soviet industrial claims—rushed once again to the rescue of the official doctrine. State and collective farm equipment, he claimed, were mere variants of socialist property. 'The adherents of the obsolete dogma that the sale of tractors to the collectives is incompatible with the interests of communist construction, wrongly interpret Lenin's article "On Co-operation."'[13] For the time being this has brought doctrinal controversy to a halt. The tractors of the collectives, paid for twice by their members, will in future be regarded as another form of public property; so will their capital reserves, in so far as they are not absorbed by the purchase of MTS equipment.

The abolition of the MTS was necessarily followed by a drastic revision of the outmoded system of procurement and price fixing which had been enforced since collectivisation was introduced in 1929. Once again Khrushchev set the tone by his proposals, made and adopted at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee in June 1958, and turned into legislation before the month had passed. The system of compulsory delivery was not abolished; but in place of the old complex system, the collectives from July 1958 are to sell the bulk of their produce in a uniform manner to state agencies, in quantities and at prices which will be planned centrally and controlled locally. There will be one buying price for each commodity, varying possibly according to season and region. In this way the attempt is being made to introduce a certain measure of market mechanism into a controlled economy. As a result the anomalies of the former price structure, the high costs of MTS services, the extravagances of the state bureaucracy, and the inequalities of collective farm income, are expected to disappear.

Nor is this all. The price system, badly out of gear ever since September 1953, has come up for review once again. The new uniform grain price at 740 rubles per ton is almost exactly the same as the weighted average of the prices obtained by the collectives in 1956 as the result of their deliveries through different channels. The prices of most other crops will also remain unchanged or nearly so. Against this, the prices of animal products, which had been raised out of all proportion in 1953 will be increased once more; most of all for beef cattle, which on the last occasion failed to respond in the expected manner. Even modest progress towards the over-ambitious targets of meat output will fail unless the emphasis is shifted from dairy to beef cattle farming. Prices appear to have been fixed this time in accord with rather than against the agricultural economists for whom Khrushchev in the past has shown little but contempt

[13] *Pravda*, 3 March 1958.

It would be wrong to conclude that Soviet farming will become rational, economic or profitable. Prices as fixed are unrealistic in more than one instance. Potatoes are too expensive to be used as feed for pigs, and cereals are so cheap by comparison that they will be used for feeding beef cattle as well as pigs. Here may well lie the cause of a new grain crisis in a year less favourable than 1958. The price of milk, which previously encouraged the manufacture of butter, is now fixed in such a manner as to increase its feeding to cattle. There are similar anomalies in the pattern of retail prices. The full play of supply and demand will of course be prevented by the continued application of delivery controls which are bound to affect, indirectly if not directly, production as well as consumption patterns. A predicament will take the place of a dilemma.

Too few details of the new price and procurement arrangements are available to permit of forecasting the future with any degree of certainty. Agriculture will not cease to finance in part the growth of industry. As Khrushchev emphasised at the meeting of the Central Committee, 'the price policy is to secure not merely an increased rate of reproduction in the collectives, but also a certain accumulation in the interest of the expansion of industrial capacities, particularly in heavy industry—the leading force of the economy.'[14]

[14] *Selskoe Khozyaistvo*, 21 June 1958.

Thus, while collectives will unquestionably benefit from the greater simplicity of the delivery system and from the higher prices of animal products, it is not possible at this stage to say if as a result of the reform the Russian peasant will be able to raise his income above the level reached in 1956 when he earned barely half the average industrial wage income. Outlay will rise with income. Fodder concentrates and petrol, two of the most important farm requisites, will be available at retail prices only, and whereas the MTS used to obtain their tractor fuel at 0.50 ruble a litre, collectives will have to pay twice as much. Moreover, where agronomists attached to the MTS were paid by the national exchequer, agricultural inspectors will in future be paid from local funds. Last, but not least, larger portions than previously will have to be diverted from cash earnings into capital reserves so as to provide for road construction and other communal services.

Whether and to what extent the consumer will have to pay for the new farm policy through increased retail prices is yet to be revealed. Nor is it clear what will be the ultimate fate of the collectives, their members, their livestock, their plots, and their markets. Once again, Soviet farming is at the crossroads and some of the signposts have yet to be set.

Ivan Sidorov draws his Pay

THE STATE AND THE WAGE-EARNER

Alec Nove

THE object of this article is briefly to examine the position of the Soviet wage-earner, dealing with such questions as: how are his wages determined, how far can he affect his earnings and conditions of work, how free is he to change his employment, how much does he earn, how far has there been any appreciable changes since Stalin's death in these aspects of his situation. It is not suggested that this list is exhaustive. Obviously, there are many other things which could be said which are relevant to the subject—for instance about housing conditions, or social insurance. However, this article will concentrate more narrowly on the worker in his capacity as a recipient of wages for the work that he does.

Let us take an imaginary Soviet worker, Ivan Sidorov. Who determines what his wage should be? The answer to this question seems simple. The state decides what the wage scale should be in the given industry for defined grades of skill. These grades range from I for the least skilled to VII (in some industries VIII or even more) at the top. There are also geographical zones, so that, for instance, a worker in more remote areas earns more than in Central Russia. If Ivan Sidorov is deemed to be in grade IV, in the central zone, in the automobile industry, then his earnings would be laid down in the appropriate wages regulation, where it is stated that persons of his grade are to earn, let us say, 500 rubles a month. This simple picture corresponds, rather curiously, to the propaganda-stories of both pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet writers. Both allege that all wages are centrally determined, though they do not derive the same conclusions from this. In a strictly formal sense both are right, but reality has been very different. There is a very powerful 'built-in' tendency towards elemental increases in wages, and the state's efforts to control this tendency have been only partially effective, so that distortions in the wages structure have repeatedly appeared. To appreciate how the various pressures and controls operate, it is necessary to look more closely at how the system really works.

Let us first take another look at Ivan Sidorov, the grade IV worker. Let us suppose that, like the majority of Soviet workers, he is paid by piece-work. He may, in certain industries, be on so-called 'progressive piece-work,' a system under which output in excess of the norm is paid at higher rates. A piece-worker in his grade, in our example, has a basic wage rate of 500 rubles a month. This should mean that his norm should be such that, by just fulfilling it, he would earn this sum. However, the actual work norm cannot be centrally prescribed, since no two factories are precisely alike. It has to be decided on the spot.

Now two other circumstances must be taken into account. The first is the chronic shortage of labour. The second is the strong pressure on the management to fulfil the plan. This involves attracting and retaining labour. The temptation immediately arises for the manager to set a relatively 'easy' norm. But Ivan can easily exceed this lower norm; he therefore earns much more than 500 rubles, without transcending the centrally regulated 'basic wage.' This tendency continues, year after year, until, as we know from numerous official reports, there ceases to be any relationship between the official wage scales and the sums actually paid out. Thus in December 1956 norms were fulfilled 155% on the average throughout the USSR, against 139% in 1950.[1] Nor is there any necessary connection between the labour norms and the output plan of the factory. It is quite common for the output plan to envisage an average overfulfilment of work norms by 50 or even 100%. Lest it be thought that a mountain is being made out of a molehill, it must be emphasised that the cumulative effect is very considerable. One has only to recall that average wages more than doubled between 1940

[1] *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1957, 7.

and 1953, although a careful compilation of every increase in *basic* wages gives us no ground for expecting an increase of more than 20—25%. The difference is very largely due to the tendencies we have been describing. It was failure to allow for these tendencies which has led some economists to under-estimate Soviet real wages.

IT is true that the authorities repeatedly urged the upward revision of norms. The 'Stakhanovite' campaigns of the 'thirties were indeed one of the means of ensuring such revisions. But it is now clear that the management, anxious not to lose their labour and to encourage it to work, did not carry out their orders, or did so only to a very limited extent. Faced with direct instructions to raise norms, or to determine them by work-study and stop-watch methods, they went through the motions of obeying, and then, quite unofficially, brought the real norms back to the level which would permit the payment of the customary wage, by such expedients as so-called 'corrective coefficients.' Thus Ivan Sidorov's scarcity value had a *de facto* influence on what he actually earned.

There is evidence, from the writer's own observations, of a deliberate use of norm-setting within the enterprise as a 'corrective' to the official wage relativities. Thus in one enterprise the average worker seemed to earn about 50% above his basic wage, but one occupation, that of unloading coal, was paid at a rate of 1,100 rubles a month although the basic rate was only 500. The explanation given was that the job was heavy and disagreeable and doubtless no one was willing to do it for under 1,000 rubles. So the management set a very 'easy' coal-shovelling norm.

Let us now suppose Sidorov to have been a time-worker, with a fixed 500-ruble wage for a standard working month. There is now no means of raising his wages by an 'easy' norm. But, with piece-workers' wages constantly creeping up, various expedients had necessarily to be employed to raise those of time-workers. The two most common were: artificial upgrading and 'phoney' bonuses. The former expedient consisted simply of 'promoting' Ivan Sidorov to a grade higher than his skill warranted. Indeed, in industry after industry the *lower* grades of skill (I and II) simply disappeared; there was no one in them. The 'phoney' bonus was paid out on a variety of pretexts, which need not be listed here.[2]

Examples of all these deviations can be found in many Soviet speeches and publications since 1953.[3] Consequently, Ivan Sidorov's wage is not settled as simply as might be expected.

The state does, of course, endeavour to stem the inflationary tide, with varying success. At certain periods, notably during the early 'thirties, things got out of hand. At others, money wages move forward only slowly. Of course, inflation —and the total standard of living—depends decisively on the goods available for consumption. The period of the most rapid rise in money wages—the early 'thirties—was also that of the most catastrophic decline in living standards in the peace-time history of the Soviet Union. This aspect of the matter must, however, be left aside here. Let us examine the state's controls over the money wages that are actually paid.

Firstly, the total size of the so-called 'wages fund' is centrally determined, and this is subdivided between industries on the basis of their estimated labour force and expected average wage. The industries (and now presumably the regional economic councils) sub-divide this between their various enterprises. The amounts laid down should not, in theory, be exceeded by an enterprise unless it exceeds its output plan. The local branches of the State Bank play an important 'police' rôle in this context; thus they must refuse to honour the enterprises' cheques to pay wages in excess of amounts permitted by the regulations.

Those powerful regulations would have been fully effective but for one weakness. Clearly, the failure of an enterprise to pay its workers would have most undesirable effects on production, and there could be *bona fide* reasons why an enterprise should be authorised to make extra payments. Therefore there always had to be a proviso that these payments could be made if approved by some higher authority—for example,

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[2] *Krokodil* recently gave a few doubtless exaggerated examples, including bonuses for tact, politeness, punctuality, and coming to work sober.

[3] See, for example, *Kommunist*, 1953, No. 11, and *Pravda*, 17 July 1955.

an economic ministry. This higher authority was primarily interested in fulfilling the output plan, and so it gave its approval almost automatically, thereby largely torpedoing the Bank's 'police' rôle. Repeatedly one can read of enterprises, or whole industries, which underfulfil their plans while over-spending their wages funds. Of course, it would be going too far to assert that the official controls were totally ineffective. They did prevent runaway inflation most of the time. It is realistic to view the process as a constant push-and-pull, of more or less strict efforts at regulation tempered by more or less successful evasion.

But evasion is not equally easy, nor is it equally tolerated by the authorities, in all sectors of the economy. And so, over the years, all kinds of anomalies developed. This was all the more difficult to check because there was no government department directly responsible for labour questions, from the abolition of the Labour commissariat in 1933 to the creation of the Committee on Labour and Wages in 1955. Matters were allowed to drift. Each economic ministry devised its own scales—subject to the general control over the wages fund. The grading and zoning arrangements differed widely, so that fitters with similar qualifications would have different basic pay rates if the factories in which they worked came under different ministries. There was no general, systematic review of the wages system between 1931 and 1956. By 1955, the situation was approximately as follows: Industrial workers, especially those on piecework, and particularly those in priority industries (engineering, mining, etc.), had gained relatively and absolutely, compared with pre-war. Those on fixed salaries, such as teachers, economists, accountants, factory foremen, and a variety of white-collar workers, had lost ground, since the government's wages controls could be much more effectively applied to them. Within the industrial working class, there was a tendency towards reduced wage differentials, with the disappearance of workers from the lowest wage categories. Foremen found themselves earning less than their skilled subordinates.

THE observant reader may have noticed a surprising similarity between these trends and those observable in Great Britain, despite the existence of a central policy in Russia and its absence here, despite the existence of trade unions here and their relatively 'phoney' status in the Soviet Union, and despite the fact that, for much of the period in question, a worker in the USSR was forbidden to change his job without permission. The law of supply and demand, when the door is barred against it, often manages to climb in through the window. But, in the USSR, some windows could be effectively barred while others could not, so that the situation was full of anomalies. Any systematic effort to bring logic into the system was bound to hurt a lot of people, which is why the confused state of the wages system has been tolerated for so long. The Soviet government can easily arrest a particular person or persons, but often fights shy of outraging the feelings of fitters or instrument mechanics as a whole, because of the likely effect on production. As trade unionists everywhere well know, it is *wage relativities*, even more than the absolute level of a given category of wages, which cause most bad feeling.

In 1955, the State Committee on Labour and Wages began to tackle the mess. It is still at work. New scales have emerged for a number of industries and occupations. Norms and basic rates have been reviewed, and both have usually been raised. Some adjustments have been made where anomalies were excessive. For example, in the building industry the norms of manual labourers were lowered, as they had become too high, while those of men on machines were increased. The absurdly exaggerated 'progressive' piece-work regulations in the coal industry, under which coal-getters got double pay for output exceeding 80% of the norm and triple pay for anything over 100%, were largely modified. The underlying object was to create a more logical wages structure without altering the general average level of wages. However, on balance it often proved simpler to raise the laggards than to cut the beneficiaries of past anomalies, and so the process of adjustment resulted in an unintended upward jump in the average. For example, wages in the building industry rose by 12% as a result of the reform, imposing an additional strain on the supplies available in retail stores.

The State Committee on Labour and Wages

has endeavoured to base differentiation between industries on objective criteria. This has become particularly necessary with increasing decentralisation of effective decisions on *actual* wage payments to republics and regional economic councils. In an interesting article in *Sotsialisticheskii Trud* (No. 2, 1958), the basis of decision in arriving at more logical interrelationships is given as follows: Taking the worst-paid industry as 1.00, industries are graded according to certain characteristics, each being given a coefficient. The net result of the calculation then serves as a guide to the average wage in that industry. The following figures are quoted from a table in the same article (the total is arrived at by multiplying together the four coefficients):

	Butter & Cheese-making	Footwear	Fisheries	Machinery	Coal-mining
Conditions of work	1.00	1.10	1.21	1.08	1.53
Average skill required	1.00	1.15	1.06	1.20	1.12
Geographical location	1.00	1.00	1.45	1.01	1.14
Relative economic importance	1.00	1.05	1.10	1.30	1.31
	1.00	1.33	2.05	1.70	2.55

Of course, this is in part a rationalisation of what already exists. True to tradition in Soviet economics, the quite important practical consideration of *supply and demand* is neglected, which means that real life will depart, in the near future as in the past, from the best laid schemes of Soviet mice, men, and planners.

Hours of labour were raised from seven to a standard eight a day, six days a week, in 1940, at the same time as the workers were forbidden to leave their employment of their own volition, or to be late or absent, subject to criminal penalties. Hours remained basically unaltered until 1956, when a gradual reduction to a 42-hour week was promised by 1960. Some of this reduction has already been granted. The law forbidding change of employment, and severely punishing unpunctuality, had a curious history. It was, of course, immensely unpopular. The reluctance of managers and judges to apply it could be seen from threats of punishment which were made against those who failed to act. After the war, it seems to have gradually withered away. In 1954, an unpublicised decree apparently confined the full vigour of the 1940 provisions to especially bad cases. The 1940 decrees ceased to be printed in law books. Finally, in 1957, the decrees were formally repealed. The imaginary Ivan Sidorov is now able to resign. However, as social insurance benefits depend on length of service, he will lose should he fall ill at his new job. His freedom of movement, like that of other Soviet citizens, depends on the willingness of the police to register him as a resident of the city he wishes to reside in. Thus a move to Moscow, Leningrad or Kiev from some provincial town may be quite impossible. However, there are usually many unfilled vacancies in less desirable places. Thus the writer of these lines has seen advertisements in western towns for jobs in the Vorkuta coalfields and the forests of Tobolsk, while a local radio programme announced a shortage of fitters at the Rostov farm machinery works. Notice boards often tell of hands wanted. The authorities admit that they are embarrassed by a high labour turnover, so that workers really do move.

ONE of the objects of the new wage regulations is to increase wage differentials once again, while at the same time raising the extremely low wages of the totally unskilled cleaners, porters, watchmen, etc. (This was done in 1956, when a minimum of 300 rubles a month was decreed for urban areas.) The very considerable 'spread' between unskilled and highly skilled labour in the same industry, is one of the principal differences between the USSR and most western countries. (In England these differentials are generally 1:1.3, while the differentials which it is intended to impose in the USSR range from 1:2 in the clothing industry to as much as 1:3.2 in mining, the average apparently being around 1:2.8.) In practice, the Soviet piece-work regulations give skilled men better chances of earning bonuses, and so the differentials are quite often even greater in practice than they are in theory, despite the tendency to undeserved upgrading of the least skilled. There appears to be some contradiction in these policies, which may perhaps be resolved by a greater increase in money wages than intended.

A word is necessary about Stakhanovism, which many think to be still a typical Soviet

phenomenon. This developed into a thoroughly unhealthy form of over-publicised record-breaking, in which a few workers were given exceptional opportunities to overfulfil their norms, often at the expense of their fellows. Not only did this lead to bad feeling, but it did not effectively stimulate genuine increases in productivity, which depend on raising the general level, not on the individual record-breaker. So, gradually, the emphasis was changed, and one hears no more of Stakhanovism today. 'Socialist competition' remains, and factories are urged to increase productivity and are rewarded for so doing. However, 'socialist competition' also became largely fictional in character, through catching the dangerous Soviet disease of bureaucratic formalism. This was due partly to the insistence on such 'competition' as a species of political obligation, and partly to the curious nature of Soviet 'trade unions,' which it is necessary briefly to discuss.

Ivan Sidorov may be presumed to be a member of his trade union, if only because it administers social insurance funds and would pay him only half his sickness and other benefits were he not a member. However, as an abundant Soviet literature shows, the trade union has quite failed to carry out its obligations to its membership. This is due not so much to lack of powers (of which more below) but simply to the lack of responsibility of the officials to the membership. The local officials, not to speak of the central committees of the unions, are in effect appointed, the process of 'election' being no more real than most other elections in the USSR. Consequently the officials of Ivan Sidorov's branch are generally cut off from the rank and file, far more than are their equivalents in the most bureaucratised union in the west. But what functions ought a Soviet trade union be performing, apart from administering social insurance funds? So far as wage-rates are concerned, the central trade union office in Moscow does have a wages department, and must be presumed to have some consultative rôle in the process of deciding what the basic rates are to be, but it has no formal powers in the matter, as far as can be ascertained. In any event, at this level the 'trade unions' are simply a branch of the government. They do have a more definite function in deciding what the grading system should be, since the 'tariff-qualification manual' (*tarifno-kvalifikatsionny spravochnik*) bears the counter-signature of a central Union Secretary.

But what about the local branches? The trade union is supposed to do several things. Firstly, it must endeavour to rally the workers behind state and party economic policies, to stimulate higher productivity, to ensure fulfilment and overfulfilment of the plan, etc., etc. With this end in view it can and does influence local piece-rates and incentive bonus arrangements, which do affect actual earnings. When mass loan subscriptions were required, it was one of the duties of the trade union secretary to see that no one evaded his 'voluntary' obligation. At the same time, the Union branch has a number of protective and welfare functions. Thus it is supposed to prevent breaches of the wage, hiring-and-firing, health and safety regulations on the part of the management. Its consent is necessary for compulsory overtime working. It is associated with decisions about how to spend the various welfare funds and in the distribution of available housing space. Thus it has the twin duty of 'mobilising' the workers behind official policy and acting on their behalf.

Naturally, these two duties often contradict one another. Equally naturally, in the absence of free elections, union officials tended to hearken only to voices from above, and the representative or welfare function was neglected. Repeatedly such journals as *Trud* reported that union officials passively tolerated serious abuses at the factory. Welfare funds were misused, housing was unfairly allocated, bonus funds were largely appropriated by managerial staff, safety regulations were ignored, and so on. But these failures had a further consequence. Because of them, the members felt no sense of belonging to a trade union at all, and therefore commonly failed to respond to the union's urgings to produce more or to indulge in socialist competition. Repeated complaints appeared in the Soviet Press, and at conferences, to the effect that 'socialist competitions' organised by trade unions were purely formal in character, that they (like much else in Soviet official life) were organised for the purpose of reporting to higher authority that orders had been obeyed,

nd not to achieve anything real at all. The oviet leaders themselves were disturbed by the neffectiveness of the unions. For what is the ood of an organisation which is so artificial or honey that it fails to fulfil its functions? From he standpoint of the régime, the unions are eeded not only for stimulating productivity, ut also for genuinely checking abuses on the pot, since the majority of such abuses benefit anagers rather than the Party or government. he trouble is, of course, that *some* 'abuses' such as, for instance, neglect of safety regutions or heavy overtime to fulfil output plans r a scarce commodity) are committed on perior orders. The balance is not easy to rike. (The word 'strike' is here used for the rst and only time, and not in the usual 'trade nion' sense, in which it is, of course, unthinkble.)

In any event, the authorities have sought to reathe some life into Soviet trade unions. A umber of officials have been sacked, numerous solutions adopted. The columns of *Trud*, the nion daily paper, have, from 1956, been much ore frankly denouncing abuses of many kinds. ll these are still reflections of orders from above. enuine trade union activity at branch level, on en the most restricted scale, has yet to be own to work. None the less, the post-Stalin eriod has been one in which tongues have agged more freely, complaints have been iced more openly, and this general trend has fected also Ivan Sidorov's right to complain out bad ventilation and unfair withholding of s bonus entitlement.

T is only fair to add that at all times, the Stalin era included, the worker had considerable hts to act on his own behalf. The rules have t greatly altered in recent years, though a cree in January 1957 simplified the procedures. ppose that Ivan Sidorov believes that he is not ceiving his full pay entitlement, or considers mself unjustly demoted or dismissed. His first course is to appeal to the enterprise's Conicts Commission, on which the management d the trade union are represented. If he sagrees with the Commission's decision, he can peal to the local trade union committee, hich can (if it so decides) take up the matter or ake representations to higher authority. If he remains dissatisfied, he can appeal to the courts, on the grounds that he is the victim of some illegal act. Labour cases do frequently come before the courts. For example, courts have on many occasions ordered the reinstatement of a wrongfully dismissed worker. By and large, if labour laws and regulations affecting him personally were broken, the worker was by no means helpless. He did have real protection in many instances. One recalls the situation in the British army: the colonel can sentence a soldier-tradesman to 14 days' C.B., but he cannot take away his trade qualification. In much the same way, it was often easier to arrest Ivan Sidorov than to reduce his grading from category IV to III.

An interesting new development, which dates from July 1958, is the conversion of the relatively ineffective 'production councils' into permanent bodies, in order, as the *Pravda* editorial puts it, to 'associate the toilers with the administration of production.' Experiments on these lines have been carried out in some enterprises since the December 1957 plenum of the central committee. The new bodies are to be elected by the workshops, offices and departments of the enterprises, and are to be closely associated with 'devising and discussing current and prospective plan projects and suggestions for improving planning within the enterprise . . . . . to hear reports from the management about current operations and economic results . . . . . the organisation of production, labour, wages, technical norms, the introduction of new technique, mechanisation, and much else' (*Pravda*, 22 July 1958). Naturally, they are to work for the overfulfilment of the plan, the encouragement of socialist competition, and so on. Equally naturally, the local and factory Party organisations will have much to say about what the 'production councils' actually do.

Only a week before the publication of the decree on production councils, *Pravda* printed a new decree which considerably strengthened the position of trade union factory committees in dealing with a variety of labour questions, including piece-work norms, bonuses, disputes, hiring and firing, etc., as well as the organisation of socialist competition. These functions to a great extent overlap those to be carried out

by the new production councils, and the division of responsibility remains obscure.

How far will this new organisational arrangement alter the situation of Ivan Sidorov? Will he and his fellows be able to influence their work conditions any more than hitherto? It seems to be far too soon to say anything definite on this point. It is by no means clear, either, what influence the regional economic councils will have on the whole complex of issues affecting wages and conditions of work. No doubt neither the regional councils nor the production councils will have power to alter basic wage rates, for these remain a central responsibility. But, as we have seen in practice, actual pay depends greatly on local decision. Without speculating about the future, however, it may be worth considering the purpose behind the latest measure. Three possible explanations may be mentioned. One is that the Party really does desire to associate the workers more closely with the management of the enterprise, in the hope of encouraging harder work and facilitating the utilisation of new ideas. Another is that, by this means, the leaders may hope to steal the 'workers' control' thunder from the 'revisionists' of Yugoslavia and Poland. Still another is this: the Party is seeking to diminish the privileges and power of the managerial strata, and, by giving powers to the 'production conferences,' the managers can be subjected to closer control from 'below,' in a manner which can be tightly regulated by the Party and which, when circumstances call for it, enables the Party to use opinions of the workers to curb undesirable managerial independence. Perhaps the truth contains all three of these elements.

Finally, to return to Ivan Sidorov. What would his earnings be? Obviously, these depend on a number of factors: his grade, the zone in which he is situated, the industry in which he works, his piece-rate norm and bonus-earning opportunities, and so on. The *average* earnings are more or less known, though systematic wage statistics are still unpublished. In 1953, according to the economics textbook, the average wage was 201% of 1940, which meant that it was close to 8,120 rubles per annum. In 1954, if the second edition of the textbook is to be believed, it rose to 206% of 1940, *i.e.* about 8,360 rubles. We know from the former head of the Gosplan of the RSFSR (Russia proper), Baibakov, that the 1958 planned average for 28 million persons in this republic was 9,170 rubles. The average relates to all kinds of state-employed persons from managers to rural night watchmen inclusive. The RSFSR includes some of the highest and lowest paid personnel, as well as the best-paid and least-well paid geographical zones. It seems probable that the national average is only a little less than that for the RSFSR. As a grade IV fitter, Ivan Sidorov is likely to earn somewhere close to the national average, perhaps 730 rubles a month, which means that his purchasing power is still modest, although he is doubtless conscious of some improvement over recent years.

RATIONALITY AND THE MARKET PRINCIPLE*

Planners and Models

Peter Wiles

FOR whatever reasons rationality is unfashionable in the West, it is one of the biggest issues under communism. This could not be doubted by any economist who had shared the writer's privilege of touring Poland just before October, 1956, when speech was already free, in the company of Polish economists. Arbitrary waste, forgetting that resources are scarce and have important alternative uses, reduce the national income both in the consumption and in the investment sectors, and *seem* to be preventable without serious changes in the system.

Yet in fact neither Marx nor Marxism sets out any means for the rational allocation of scarce resources; to raise this question at once casts doubt upon the labour theory of value and draws the attention of communists to the work of Western 'bourgeois' economists. Moreover, inasmuch as rationality demands at least some extension of the workings of the free market, it threatens the very existence of the state's economic bureaucracy, and thus may be held either to threaten the structure of communist society itself or, with greater sophistication, to resolve the controversy between state and party in favour of the latter (this at any rate is how the Yugoslav Communists have used the free market).

That Soviet central planning has certain intrinsic advantages in the field of economic growth is fairly generally accepted among specialists. For if a system consists in the setting of production targets it can be used to put the force of law permanently behind increased production. None of the other growth advantages so often attributed to the Soviet system is attributable to the current central direction of price, output and location (which is what we normally mean by 'central planning'). Nevertheless the growth potentialities of free market socialism have not been sufficiently explored. During the latter years of the N.E.P.—let alone the first years, which were of course years of pure reconstruction —industrial production grew more rapidly than during the first Five Year Plan and about as rapidly as during the second. During this same period, real wages were higher than at any time until about 1957, and growing rapidly. The rate of Polish economic growth has increased since October, 1956, and this not simply because agriculture, which almost everybody would admit fares better under free market socialism, has improved in performance, but also because industry is not, as one might suppose, lagging, if one includes the output of the newly permitted small private industry and the greatly expanded black market. Of Yugoslavia I speak with much less confidence, but note that its official claims are not below those of other communist countries.[1]

ALL this tends to show that even in matters of economic growth, free market socialism is at any rate a strong competitor with irrational central planning, and after all why should it not be? An 'irrational' increase in the general volume of investment is one thing—and irrational of course only in the sense that the planners refuse to accept the foreshortened time horizon of the private saver and the deflationary troubles that unco-ordinated investment and saving may

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[1] It is fair to point out that Russian industrial production in 1916 reached a level only surpassed in 1928, so that the whole period of the N.E.P. *might* be dismissed as post-war reconstruction, a fact normally obscured by the habit of quoting 1913 as a point of comparison. Furthermore, Polish socialist industry has by no means fully gone over to free market socialism.

bring; irrational micro-economic allocations are quite another thing. In the field of micro-economics there is no reason to contrast 'static' with 'dynamic' or the short run with the long run; the 'classical' position is with few exceptions perfectly valid. It only enhances the rate of growth if allocations *within* the investment and the consumption sectors are made in the most rational manner. It is the *institutions* and *attitudes* making for rationality (balanced budgets, fear of inflation, small business, perfect competition, low profits, hesitation to invest at all, dislike of standardisation) that tend to economic stagnation. The thing itself, could we but abstract from these institutions and attitudes, makes for greater growth.[2]

Rationality logically requires a 'law of value'. In this context, there is no such thing as a 'planning principle' which can be opposed to the 'law of value.' Rational allocation means a choice between alternatives. This means deciding about the output proportions of dissimilar things. This means that the dissimilar things must be reduced to a common measure, but that measure is, by definition, value—that is how the word value is always used. The violation of the law of value *means* an undesirable allocation of scarce resources between competing ends, though of course the question remains open, whose values? There has then to be *a* law of value if we are not to be purely arbitrary, though as we shall see, this does not mean that there has to be a market in the ordinary sense of the word. There might be merely a notional, or electronic, market.

Consumer's sovereignty is not the same thing as consumer's satisfaction. For, first, the consumer's sovereignty obstructs a standardisation of products which would cheapen them and thus increase his satisfaction. It also leads to a rate of saving in accordance with the individual's own unforced private time preference scale, but this has no relation at all to the rate of growth in the economy as a whole that the same consumer might desire; as we can see when, in the polling booth, he votes for policies involving very high investment. In other words, he even votes his own sovereignty away in order to increase his satisfaction. Consumer's satisfaction in turn—indeed anybody's satisfaction—is not the same thing as a rational allocation of resources. The possibility of the private consumer being irrational is of course an accepted cliché of Western economics. But none of this makes planners' preferences rational. It is astonishing that people with an intimate and accurate knowledge of how the Soviet system works should consider the possibility of operating on the assumption that planners' preferences are in fact rational in a Communist economy. The location of economic activity, the choice between railways and canals and the official preference for a certain kind of architecture are all demonstrably irrational.

Even the choice between investment as a whole and consumption as a whole, where it is customary to give a centrally planned system best, is also demonstrably irrational, since twice in Soviet history it has led to famine, and once in Poland to serious rioting that shook the régime; besides being a permanent contributory factor to the extreme discontent of the subject masses in all Communist countries. Moreover its intellectual basis is, to say the least, shaky. Thus Imre Nagy found it necessary, as prime minister in 1954, to condemn the practice of making heavy industry expand by a greater percentage each year. In other words Hungarian planners had a law of the *acceleration* of heavy industrial production. The economist sits in judgment upon the planner no less than upon the consumer and will only dignify his system of revealed preferences with the name of a rational system of values if those preferences do not contradict each other, do not lead to major political catastrophes, and seem in themselves to be based upon some reasoning process rather than pure chance.

The revealed preferences of Communist planners have not these attributes. But an economy can be, either because of its consumers or because of its planners, irrational and yet grow very quickly and achieve striking successes. Irrationality is a serious fault, but not a fatal one. The question to which this paper is addressed is not the only nor even the basic question in economics. Permanently irrational systems exist and flourish like the green bay tree—or indeed like the wicked—before our eyes. Economics must develop tools with which to deal with them. We must consider them soberly and—in every sense of that much over-used word—rationally.

[2] Space precludes the expansion of this point. See my 'Growth Versus Choice,' *Economic Journal*, June 1956, and Mr. Klappholz's criticism in the issue of June 1957.

Finally, a system of 'mixed rationality' can be onceived of: in which the macro-economic ecisions are taken by central planners and the ıicro-economic decisions by consumers, and oth sets or one set or neither run according to rational system of values. Such indeed is the ugoslav—or for that matter, the British—conomy (the distinction between private and ublic ownership, *i.e.* between capitalism and ocialism, according to the most convenient efinitions of those words, is irrelevant to our iscussion; and it is above all else the failure to ccept this that bedevils Soviet discussion.[3] olitically, of course, there is some connection: ı that full central planning can hardly live with apitalism except during a war. On the other de, there is no such difficulty: the Yugoslav ocialist markets might well be freer and more erfect than, say, the French capitalist markets).

THE Communist countries have tried out many 'models' of a socialist economy, nd others yet untried are theoretically possible. Iodels may differ in many respects; I am oncerned here with the differences between ıodels with respect to the system of allocating arce resources.

(1) perfect central allocation in physical terms ithout money. Labour is directed, wages are nrelated to effort and consumers are given pre-etermined bundles of goods. This is the ideal at hich the Party originally aimed. After it had ailed, but not until then, it was dubbed 'War ommunism' and abandoned.

(2) the same, but with money. The money in ıis case would be a purely accounting device and ave no significance for resource allocation, even ı the markets for consumer goods and labour, hich of course are supposed to be directed nder system (1). I introduce model (2) simply to oint out that money can be passive throughout. assive money corresponds essentially to what ıe Soviet economists call ruble control. The urpose of passive money is to throw up useful checks on plan fulfilment. Prices expressed in it may be irrational to the extreme limits of fantasy, for all anyone cares, since they affect no economic decisions.

(3) the so-called 'centralised market' economy. In this system all decisions as to *intermediate* resource allocations are centralised in a planning office, but the choices of consumers and workers and of the public bodies that allocate land and capital are taken on purely free market principles; and it is the business of the central planners simply to react faithfully to these decisions taken by the ultimate consumers and factors of production. In other words industry is one big public monopoly, distributing its resources on free market *principles* but by central methods of *administration* in response to market forces.

(4) 'Inverted 3.' Here the initiative lies with the central planners whose decisions as to the allocation of intermediate resources are the determinants of the whole. Within this sector money is passive, but outside it, it remains active as in model (3); only it is now used by the central planners to persuade the consumers at one end and the factors of production at the other to conform to the predetermined plan. This is achieved of course by suitable wage differentials and by a varying rate of turnover tax. (4) then is the nearest of the pure models to Soviet actuality since 1928, when there was a reversion to central planning but money was retained and rationing and direction of labour rejected as Trotskyite heresies. However, there has been rationing from time to time and various forms of concealed, and sometimes not so concealed, direction of labour; also capital and land are centrally allocated, which again impairs the purity of the model. Moreover, in the central planning of consumer goods output the Gosplan undoubtedly pays attention to consumer demand as expressed in the shops, so that elements of model (3) are also present, although they are based on irrational prices.

(5) the pattern of final production only is decided by the central planners, and sold off to consumers as in (4). Managers choose what intermediate goods they want to fulfil their plans, and bid for them in the open market. Intermediate goods are thus assimilated to labour in (4). In this way what is doubtless itself an irrational plan is fulfilled by the most rational allocation of resources: there

[3] Thus Soviet authors often show some appreciation of ıe allocation problem under 'commodity turnover' (capi-list exchange), and the rôle of the law of value in solving But they believe that 'product exchange' (socialist ex-ıange) must be quite different; and, unable to show why · how, simply make a muddle. In this respect they ıderstand our system better than their own.

are not too many canals, or too many big tractors. And the chosen method of rationally allocating resources is the free market. The final product-mix may (a) be made administratively binding on managers by direct orders or (b) be made monetarily attractive to them by a special system of prices ex-factory.

(6) full market. By this is meant the pure competitive system with decision-making decentralised to socialist firms. Capital and land are owned by various public bodies which invest them on free market principles. Price-making also is decentralised and competitive; markets should be as perfect as possible. This is also in essence the Yugoslav model, though the imperfections in Yugoslav markets are very great by capitalist standards, and it is not clear to what extent Yugoslav Communists accept the ideology of it. They were in fact forced into it in a fit of absence of mind; aiming at workers' control and the withering away of the state, they found themselves compelled to abolish the central planning bureaucracy and this in turn compelled them to introduce a free market.

THERE are of course innumerable mixed systems possible, nor is it even pretended that the six here presented exhaust the list. In a mixed system, the boundary between the two types of model commonly runs along some easily recognised divide. Thus the 'model boundary' is often between investment decisions and current production decisions. In the Soviet Union, investment is almost always on model (4) while current production contains large elements of (3) and (nowadays, with locally fixed prices) even (6). In Poland, which is in so many respects a liberalised Soviet Union rather than an imitation Yugoslavia, investment tends to be (3) or (4) and current production (5) or (6). This particular model boundary can hardly be drawn in Yugoslavia, where investment projects are rather carefully attuned to the (admittedly, very highly imperfect) market. Note that we are not talking here of the overall total of investment, but of choices between particular investment projects.

The boundary may run between macro- and micro-economic decisions. The overall total of investment in Yugoslavia is certainly not subject to the free market, since a high percentage of business saving out of profits is imposed by law. No Communist economy hands over this essential decision to the free market.

Finally, of course, the economy is divided into a co-operative and a nationalised sector and the 'model boundary' as described above may run between them. May, but not must, for in the Soviet Union co-operative and state trade are subject to precisely the same régime and co-operative and state manufacturing to all but the same régime.

ALL these models can allocate resources rationally. In some the planners can either impose their own system of values (if that is indeed rational), or in type (3) they can impose the consumer's values, or even, in types (1), (2) and (4), they can estimate the consumers' value system successfully and impose it by administrative means. And naturally the economies of mixed models will produce resource-allocations of mixed rationality.

Now to satisfy consumers' preferences by models (1), (2) and (4) is notoriously of the utmost difficulty. It requires the setting up of a notional market inside some electronic machine, *and the feeding of it with data.* The problem of infinitely many equations is probably no longer beyond solution. But the collection of the data concerning the alternative uses of millions of articles and the orders of priority of these uses in the minds of millions of consumers, and concerning the supplies of millions of factors of production and the technically possible alternative ways of using them—this task would still exhaust a very significant proportion of the labour force. Certainly nothing like it has been attempted in the USSR. Of course the 'method of balances'—a crude sort of input/output analysis *in natura*—has nothing to do with this problem, any more than has the input/output analysis itself. Easier, no doubt, to set up a system of planners' preferences; but even that is immensely complicated. For suppose a single set of proportions of final goods is indeed chosen, there are still infinitely many ways of producing it, only one of which will maximise the actual outputs. The problem of data collection is only halved. And how is one to justify this set of proportions of final goods in the first place? Who said it was rational, and how would he prove it? Suppose some other planner contradicted him, how would they argue it out? The concept of a

itional set of planners' *micro-economic* prefer-ices would appear to be almost self-contradic-ory.

Can prices ever correspond to planners' eferences? How would an economy be ganised in which this correspondence obtained? learly, if money is passive, prices correspond to nybody's preferences only by chance; prefer-ices are expressed only in the administrative ders given. But if it is active it is engaged in rsuading consumers or ultimate factors to do ings; must it not then correspond to their eferences, not the planners'? The answer is ot only so, for there are two sides to every argain. In models (3) and (6) prices correspond consumers' preferences *in view of* ultimate ctors' preferences, and vice versa. Therefore in odel (4) retail prices correspond to consumers' eferences in view of planners' preferences and ce versa: *i.e.* the things that planners are nxious to provide but consumers not anxious to ay have low prices, the things consumers want uch but planners had rather not supply have gh prices, and the rest have moderate prices. hen intervenes the bulkhead of turnover taxes d subsidies, and the administrative allocation intermediate goods. Finally we come to the bour market, where mutatis mutandis we may y of wages what we said of retail prices. And this is the most that can ever be said of any set of prices.

WE may conclude that planners' preferences, outside a few broad categories, are absolutely worthless, and that the attempt centrally to estimate and impose consumers' preferences is still technically beyond our means. Moreover even if it were possible it would still only be a tremendous waste of bureaucratic effort, a duplication of the market process. And the realisation of these simple facts is growing on the Communist world outside Yugoslavia as well.

It is an ironic spectacle indeed. The lucubrations of armchair classical economists, now suspect and old-fashioned in the West ('he isn't dynamic'; 'he's never really understood the General Theory'; 'he assumes perfect competition'; 'he assumes full employment'; 'he really hasn't got beyond Robbins—it's too crude for words'), are acting like acid in the cracks of the Eastern monolith. Seldom was there a greater triumph of 'theory' over 'practice.' And why not? After all, the allocation problem *is* important; it *hasn't* been solved by central planning, it *is* neglected by Marxists; price = marginal cost *is* most of the answer to it, and a perfectly down-to-earth, practical answer too. We eye their growth; they eye our rationality.

Trade and Politics

SOVIET FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Gareth Wynn

HAD the Soviet leaders who confidently witnessed the launching of the Sixth Five Year Plan at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, known that before a year was out the Soviet Union would be obliged to promise immediate economic aid to Hungary, Poland, and Eastern Germany, they would hardly have retained their optimism. The immediate economic problem posed by the events in Poland and Hungary was as simple as it was urgent. If the internal economic disruption in Hungary was not to have repercussions throughout the bloc, it was essential to grant emergency aid to Hungary and to those bloc countries whose economies were seriously strained in certain sectors by the severance of trade links with Hungary. The remedy was applied. In October 1956, the Soviet Union granted Hungary 100 million rubles for the purchase of raw materials. This was supplemented by an offer of 100 million rubles from China in January 1957. Before 1957 was out, the Soviet Union pledged a further 1,050 million rubles to be used for the purchase of Soviet goods ranging from coal to industrial equipment. Poland's needs were no less pressing and in November 1956, 1,100 million rubles worth of aid was granted by Moscow. Eastern Germany too was underpinned to the tune of 1,040 million rubles agreed in 1957.

Thus in the course of a few months communist eastern Europe had become at worst an economic liability, at best a source of strain on Soviet economic resources. For this the Soviet leaders had themselves to blame. Even before the upheavals all was not well with the economies of eastern Europe. At bottom this was due to a too rapid increase in processing capacity unmatched by any comparable growth of the raw material and fuel sectors. Up to 1953 this disparity was partly mitigated by the willingness of the Soviet Union to supply the growing raw material needs of eastern Europe and to purchase an increasing quantity of finished goods. Thereafter Soviet reluctance to tailor its rôle to meet eastern Europe's growing requirements, the pressing need to raise living standards, and difficulties in extra-bloc markets exacerbated the economic troubles of the area. The Hungarian uprising and the consequent economic chaos provided the opportunity to press home these facts on the Soviet leaders. They were made aware, if they did not know already, that the origins of eastern Europe's economic dislocation were to be found in the existing pattern of economic relations between bloc countries, a pattern which they had done so much to shape. As if to meet the charges and pleas of its satellites, the Soviet government announced that it was 'prepared to discuss jointly with the governments of other socialist states, measures ensuring the further development and strengthening of economic links between Socialist countries in order to remove any possible infringements of the principle of national sovereignty, mutual advantage and equality in economic relations' (*Pravda*, 31 October 1956).

This was not so much an exercise in self-criticism as a belated realisation of the need for reappraising Soviet economic relations with eastern Europe. The rethinking has had its most notable effects on the trade links between the Soviet Union and its western neighbours. Three-year trade agreements covering the period up to 1960 between the Soviet Union and each of the European bloc countries have been concluded, and should go some way in alleviating the most pressing supply problems. If successful, these arrangements may provide the basis for longer-term solutions. The Soviet Union has now committed itself to the rôle of major supplier of eastern Europe's raw materials. In some cases, notably iron ore, pig-iron, aluminium, and copper, the Soviet Union will probably be the predominant if not sole foreign supplier of eastern Europe's needs, while eastern Europe will finance its growing dependence on Soviet raw materials by exporting an increased amount and variety of machinery and equipment as well

s manufactured goods. In one sector, foodstuffs, eastern Europe's ability to draw on Soviet ussia as a source of supply will probably minish. The repercussions on agriculture of e increasing emphasis on industrialisation roughout communist eastern Europe have eant a substantial rise in the import of foodstuffs, and although Soviet agricultural output planned to grow considerably in the near ture, the expansion of domestic requirements, oth human and animal, may well absorb all the increased production. On the surface, erefore, the net result of the 1956 upheavals as been an increase in the dependence of eastern urope on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless the tarkic industrialisation of these countries akes their economies less complementary to ch other; their individual economic links with Moscow may become stronger, but their economic relations with each other may decline, ith a consequent redirection of trade towards e West. In the long run, however, specialisation d international division of labour within the oviet bloc will probably limit the extent of the orientation of eastern European trade with the dustrial and primary producing countries of e West. If anything, the claim that 'the eople's democracies which, with the Soviet nion, form the new world market, find in at market all the goods required for their evelopment'[1] is even more false today than it as five years ago, but it should be remembered at the aim to create an independent bloc arket has never been abandoned.

THE Soviet leaders can ill afford a repetition of the events of October 1956, and the price hich they are now exacting for their assistance i those days is increased co-operation among e countries of the bloc and something more an lip service to the principles of international ivision of labour proclaimed at a meeting of e Council for Mutual Economic Assistance MEA) in East Berlin in May 1956. It is a policy hich has so far encountered much opposition, r it demands the sacrifice of economic autarky y the members of the Council and some loss of ational prestige. It might, moreover, reduce umania, Bulgaria, and Albania to the condition of mere raw material exporters. Although there is little evidence to suggest that the Council's efforts to promote division of labour are bearing fruit, the Council itself has come into greater prominence of late. This may be the outcome of the decisions taken at its eighth session in June 1957, whose main purpose was to consider the further expansion of economic co-operation between member states. According to V. Kaigl, head of the Institute of Economics of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, the CMEA is working out co-ordinated long-term plans for the development of the economies of member states covering the period until 1975; standing sub-committees have been set up for all important industries, as well as for agriculture, geology, transport, and foreign trade.[2]

Soon after the June 1957 meeting, and probably as a result of it, the Chief Administration for Economic Relations with the Countries of the People's Democracies (GUES) in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade was reorganised into the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES)[3] and placed under M. G. Pervukhin, who remained its chairman until replaced by S. Skachkov in February 1958.[4] The establishment of GKES is an indication of the increasing importance attached by the Soviet government to its economic relations with both communist and non-communist countries. So far as is known, none of the other bloc countries has established such a committee. This reflects the Soviet Union's unchallenged political and economic supremacy within the bloc, and suggests that in any bloc negotiations on trade GKES will be the arbiter and its influence on the policy of CMEA is unlikely to be anything less than decisive.

It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the Soviet leaders are at a crossroad in their economic relations with their communist partners in eastern Europe. After 1953, these countries, impelled by the logic of their industrial development, their growing need of markets for their manufactured goods, and their swelling food and raw material requirements, began to look outside the bloc. Between 1953 and 1956

[1] I. Medvedev, *New Times*, 7 November 1953.

[2] *Nova Mysl*, No. 6, 1958.

[3] *Pravda*, 25 July 1957.

[4] *Pravda*, 21 February 1958.

the trade of communist eastern Europe (excluding Albania) with countries outside the area grew almost six times as fast as trade between the countries of the area.[5] The implications were serious for the independent new world market of which the communists frequently boast. An attempt has been made to stop the rot by the simple expedient of creating a so-called multilateral clearing system. The system at present allows the balancing of purchases and sales between any two countries with a bilateral agreement, and as such has had very little positive effect on the trade of bloc countries with each other. In view of the Soviet government's interest in maintaining a firm hold on the eastern European economies, it is not surprising that its attitude to a truly multilateral clearing system, which could not but lessen Soviet authority in the matter of intra-bloc trade, has remained unequivocal. Any policy which reduces eastern Europe's dependence on the Soviet Union is unlikely to originate in Moscow.

THERE can be little doubt that the demands of eastern Europe on the Soviet Union have caused misgivings in China. Soviet Russia, for all its rapid expansion, can meet only a fraction of China's requirements in equipment, technical know-how, and materials. Nevertheless the Soviet contribution has been considerable. Trade between the two countries has been an important element in China's industrialisation, and aid has been substantial if compared with the amount extended to other communist countries. Chinese and Russian estimates of trade between the two countries differ substantially,[6] but according to Soviet sources[7] Sino-Soviet trade has grown from $576 million in 1950 to $1,282 million in 1957—a decline of $216 million from the 1956 figure. Although the Soviet Union is itself a net importer of machinery, in 1957 its exports of machinery and equipment to China, at $271 million, accounted for one half of all Chinese imports from the Soviet Union. Of this, equipment for complete enterprises totalled $209 million, *i.e.* over 75 per cent of Soviet machinery and equipment exports to China. In the same year the Soviet Union supplied complete industrial undertakings to three under-developed countries (India, Afghanistan, and Egypt) to the value of $47 million. Its ability to make a greater impact on the uncommitted countries of Africa and Asia by offering to erect and equip complete industrial enterprises is confirmed by the magnitude of its exports in this category to China.

It is probable that some thirty per cent of Soviet aid to the communist bloc has gone to China. In his budget report to the Chinese National People's Congress in June 1957, Li Hsien-nien, China's Minister of Finance, stated that during China's first Five Year Plan (1953-1957) the Soviet Union had extended loans amounting to 5,294 million yuan, *i.e.* 8,500 million rubles. The significant fact about Soviet aid to China, however, is that during 1956 and 1957 it dwindled to a mere trickle. Thus it would appear that the sins of Warsaw and Budapest were visited upon Peking.

Whatever their feelings about the Soviet aid going to eastern Europe, the Chinese could hardly have viewed with equanimity the aid going to non-communist Asia and Africa, and to Yugoslavia. Perhaps the virulence with which Peking has attacked the revisionism of the Yugoslav Communist Party has partly economic origins. China's support of Soviet policy in eastern Europe, and on the question of revisionism in particular, has recently been rewarded just when it seemed that virtue would have to be its own reward. In August it was announced that the Soviet Union would supply and equip 47 complete industrial enterprises. It is, however, uncertain what the Soviet Union's attitude towards China's insatiable needs will be. The Soviet leaders would hardly countenance China's industrial progress falling behind that of India, but they may not be convinced that Soviet aid on the scale to which the Chinese have been accustomed is vital to this end. The closer alignment of China with the bloc's economic structure is assured since the ninth meeting of the CMEA in Moscow in May 1958, but this may create as many problems as it solves.

There is less uncertainty about Soviet com-

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[5] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1957* (Geneva, 1958), Chapter VI, Table 1.

[6] For an explanation see Union Research Service, (Hong Kong), 2 September 1958.

[7] *Vneshnyaya Torgovlia SSSR za 1957 god* (Moscow, 1958).

mercial activities in the West. In recent years here has been a trend for the USSR to import more from the non-communist world and to export its own goods in payment. Recent statements suggest that from $615 million in 1950 Soviet trade with the non-communist world soared to some $2,200 million in 1957. The composition of this trade is more informative than the bare recital of statistics. In its trade with the West, as in its trade with the communist countries of eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, the second greatest industrial power in the world, is still a net importer of machinery. Apart from machinery, a sizable share of its imports from the West is composed of ships and manufactured goods. To the West it exports primarily fuel, foodstuffs, timber products, and raw materials. In this respect, therefore, Russia behaves more like an under-developed than an industrial country.

So rapid an expansion of trade with the West in such a short space of time prompts the question whether the Soviet Union has reached a stage of industrial development at which it is seeking to export those goods in which it has a comparative cost advantage and import those which it is uneconomic to produce domestically. Close examination supports the conclusion that the Soviet leaders have not abandoned their traditional attitude to trade with the West as a marginal operation to plug the gaps in domestic supply. Were this not so, Khrushchev, instead of ploughing up the virgin lands at immense cost, would have exported the tractors and combines used for this purpose and purchased grain on the world market. Communist planners are overwhelmingly interested in developing domestic industries and sources of supply, even where such development is economically unsound by Western standards. The smallness of Soviet trade with the West is not so much a measure of Soviet self-sufficiency of resources, as a clear indication that the Soviet Union is operating a highly efficient, politically determined 'embargo' system of its own. As long as this is true, Soviet foreign trade will retain its present character of bloc in-breeding, forgoing the obvious economic advantages of expanded trade with the West. This is not to say that Soviet trade with the West is uninfluenced by any economic yardstick or that it is uneconomic. On the contrary, the Soviet Union conducts its trade with the West on the basis of economic self-interest, but because that trade is a government monopoly it can be manipulated to fit into overall Soviet foreign policy. The political and economic ostracism of Yugoslavia in the years after 1948, the rapprochement in 1954, and the reversals of attitude in 1957 and 1958, bear witness to the possible extent of such manipulation.

The interdependence of Soviet external political and economic policies is shown also in the propaganda use to which the subject of East-West trade has been consistently put. The media for this propaganda vary, but the substance is largely the same—a statement of the Soviet Union's desire and willingness to increase its trade with Western countries. It is claimed that the Soviet Union places no barriers in the way of trade. While this is far from the truth, Soviet propagandists have been able in many cases to point to increases in Soviet trade with non-communist countries as evidence.

THERE are a number of sound economic and commercial reasons why the Soviet Union should trade with the world's primary producers. These countries are able to supply goods not produced at all, or only in insufficient quantities, by the Soviet Union, notably high grade cotton, wool, raw hides, rubber, oil seeds, rice, and non-ferrous metal ores, and provide in turn a market for such Soviet goods as rolled steel, petroleum, lumber, cement, machinery and equipment. The conclusion of trade agreements with these countries on a bilateral basis eliminates the need for buying the goods on world markets, which involves payment in 'hard' currencies and creates economic links with other governments. There has been a marked increase in both the number of trade agreements concluded and the volume of trade conducted by the Soviet Union with these countries in recent years, but in absolute terms the trade turnover (imports plus exports) remains small—in 1957 it was worth some $500 million, or six per cent of Soviet trade. In particular instances, however, the Soviet Union and the other bloc countries take the major share of the exports of these countries. At the present time, for example, well over fifty per cent of Egypt's exports go to the bloc.

From the economic standpoint it might be argued that there is nothing surprising in the present pattern of Soviet bloc trade with primary producers, that a non-communist Russia today would have similar trade patterns and partners. To admit this is not to say that Soviet trade with Asian, African, and Latin American primary producers is based on economic considerations only. To accept economic criteria as the only ones relevant to Soviet trade policy would be to ignore not only the past record but also Moscow's own conception of foreign trade as a political weapon. Soviet leaders themselves admit that they value trade least for economic reasons and most for political reasons. Because of this, Soviet economic activity in less developed countries, in spite of its limited size, has not unnaturally come to be regarded with suspicion in the West.

In normal trading conditions the development of Soviet bloc economic relations with primary producing countries would warrant less attention. Trading conditions during the last eighteen months have, however, been substantially less than normal. During 1957 and 1958 there has been a marked decline in the prices paid for primary products and producers have had to contend with rising import prices, with the result that many of them are now experiencing serious balance of payments difficulties which are having adverse effects on development programmes. Not all primary producers have suffered, it is true. Exporters of crude oil, copra and cocoa, for example, have been favoured by rising rather than falling prices, but their gains only serve to emphasise the fact that after the Suez crisis there was a slow but steady deterioration in the terms of trade of most primary producers. Some of the more seriously hit primary producing countries, particularly those dependent on a monoculture economy and single export, see little hope of a radical change. Indeed, if the long-prophesied transplanting of the American recession to Western Europe materialises, it may be the under-developed countries who suffer most. In such circumstances the advantages of bilateral trade with communist countries could well achieve greater importance. Already misgivings about the benefits of multilateral trade have been expressed. The *Economic Bulletin of Asia and the Far East* has put into words a growing feeling in primary producing countries: 'Bilateral bargaining,' it argues, 'has a distinct advantage over the other methods in so far as it guarantees a fairly stable price for the sale of primary products during a period of years .... It is clear that the task of a country engaged in a process of economic development would be greatly facilitated if it could expect that the prices of its export products would remain remunerative and comparatively stable.'[8] It is clearly in the Soviet political as well as economic interest to exploit this situation, and the growing concern which the Soviet Union has expressed for the primary producers at international economic meetings has strong political undertones. Zakharov, the Soviet representative at a meeting of the Economic and Social Council in Geneva in July, 1958 stated that 'the Soviet Union has full sympathy and concern for all those suffering from the consequences of the private enterprise system.'[9]

This sympathy and concern have not prevented the Soviet Union from exporting tin to the detriment of those primary producers, notably Malaya, Bolivia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Thailand and the Belgian Congo, who rely on tin exports for a large part of their foreign exchange earnings. Increased Soviet exports of tin during 1957 and 1958 coincided with the decline in American demand, with the result that tin has been in over-supply at the price of £730 a ton which was fixed as the floor price by the International Tin Council in March 1957. The Soviet Union's reaction to requests from the Tin Council either to restrict tin exports voluntarily or to join the Tin Council as a producer participant, was to offer to send an observer to the Council's meetings. Whether by deliberate design or not, the pressure of Soviet tin sales and the uncertainty of Soviet intentions in regard to future exports proved the last straw in a market already weakened by the recession in United States demand, and on 18 September the Tin Council announced that it could no longer support the floor price. The full effects of this decision have not worked themselves out, but the crisis in the tin market during 1958 has already resulted in

[8] Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Bangkok), May 1957, pp. 10—11.

[9] Quoted in *The Financial Times*, 25 August 1958.

oss of much needed foreign exchange income, nd in unemployment and hardship in those ountries for whom tin is an important export.

THE programme of aid upon which the Soviet Union has embarked in the less developed egions adds weight to the argument that Soviet nterest in Asia and Africa is not merely econmic. As with trade, the amounts involved are o far deceptively small. According to American stimates,[10] the Soviet bloc has since 1953 xtended to fourteen less developed countries bout £680 millions of aid (of which the Soviet Union is providing about £465 million). This igure includes the postponed aid to Yugoslavia, vithout which the total would be some £590 nillion. Of this latter figure about £200 million had been drawn by mid-1958. Thus the annual ate of Soviet bloc military and non-military aid as been no more than £50 million. The bulk f this aid has gone to the politically and strategially important countries of Indonesia, India, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Syria. The impression he Soviet Union seeks to convey is that there is o intention to 'exploit' by means of high nterest rates and that there are no strings ttached, but it takes a good deal more than umanitarian feeling or economic self-interest o explain Soviet aid. The terms on which it is ranted, repayments in produce or convertible urrency and interest at 2—2½ per cent, indicate hat there is little if any economic advantage for he creditors, and indeed, Mr. Khrushchev has dmitted that the industrial equipment and echnical services supplied could be more rofitably utilised inside the Soviet Union.[11] Moscow does not count the cost when the prize s the elimination of western influence in emergent ations. The aim is made explicit: 'In giving he former colonies economic aid, the Soviet Union thereby helps them to escape from the conomic enslavement of the imperialists.'[12]

Hand in hand with the pseudo-economic wooing has gone the openly political approach. By condemning colonialism and attempting to exacerbate the relations between newly-independent countries and their former colonial overlords, the communists have associated themselves with a sentiment very strongly held in newly-independent nations and those not yet sovereign, while the Soviet Union spells out the lesson of its own development. Thirty years ago, runs the Moscow line, the Soviet Union was an under-developed country. The tasks which faced it in 1928 are precisely those which face many of the less developed countries in 1958. Soviet experience, the argument continues, shows that the way forward is by nationalisation of industry and trade, planned use of profits and redistribution of national income in the interests of industrialisation, and the expropriation of the assets of foreign firms.

THE current rate of Soviet economic development and the economic ambitions prevalent throughout the less developed world, coupled with current uncertain world market conditions, present the Soviet Union with its best chance so far of establishing and expanding trade and aid ties with less developed countries. The recent annual expansion of Soviet gross national produce has been of the order of 7 per cent, while that of industrial production has been some 9 to 10 per cent. How much of this will go into domestic investment and consumption, and how much will be put aside for the Soviet Union's external economic needs, there is no way of telling. It would, however, be surprising if the present trade and aid activities were to lose the economic and political priority they have attained in the post-Stalin era. The economic needs of the less developed countries are enormous enough to tempt them into closer contacts with the Soviet Union, and the uncertainty of demand for primary products adds to the temptation. In seeking to maximise the economic and political gains of such a situation, the Soviet leaders will have to guard against the strain of too heavy commitments. So far there is little sign that they have erred in this direction. Indeed, in view of the annual economic advance of the Soviet Union, the aid commitments out-

(*Continued on page 70*)

[10] *The Sino-Soviet Economic offensive in the Less Developed Countries*, Department of State, Washington, 1958.

[11] 'Speaking generally from the commercial viewpoint, ur economic and technical aid to the under-developed ountries is even unprofitable for us . . . .' *Pravda*, 3 July 1958.

[12] E. Varga, 'Tendencies in the Development of Contemporary Capitalism and Socialism,' *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya*, October 1957.

ECONOMIC ORTHODOXY AND REVISIONISM

Alfred Zauberman

ON the surface all seems quiet in Soviet economic thinking. Dull exercises in the triumphant style, full of self-congratulations on past and present theoretical achievements, continue to pour into the pages of academic journals. Nothing has changed in the show of complacency and of determination to stay insulated from currents of contemporary non-Marxian economics.

To take at random two specimens of this depressing sort of intellectual performance from a single recent number of *Voprosy Ekonomiki:* One is concerned with Marx's economic teaching and its contemporary critics in the light of trends in capitalist economies; the other deals, so its title proclaims, with 'victories of the theories of scientific communism' and is focused on developments in the field of economic thought.[1]

The first treats its readers to a re-statement—in its crudest form—of the theory of the continuous absolute impoverishment of the proletariat. (Some time ago faint attempts were made to qualify this theory and reconcile it with the facts of economic life in leading Western industrial nations, but these seem to have been abandoned.) Statistical acrobatics try to establish that British real wages have fallen since the war, and all this leads to the conclusion that, notwithstanding the ferocious attacks by the apologists of imperialism, reformism, and revisionism, the Marxist-Leninist theory has gained an 'ever wider acceptance among the toiling masses of the world.'

Scarcely more refined is the argument of the second article. It too is directed against revisionism in economics, which 'aims at forcing on the communist movement the ideology of those right-wing socialists who have shifted in the field of economic theory to the Keynesian position.' Keynesian ideas—the writer goes on in the familiar vein—are the ideological weapons of the monopolist bourgeoisie in the period of the general crisis of capitalism: to graft them on to Marxist economics would be as risky and as futile as had been, in the past, revisionist attempts to combine the Marxian theory of value with the teachings of Böhm-Bawerk. The moral to be drawn is that intellectual isolationism is the only sound course to follow for Soviet Marxists. At any rate they need not look for inspiration beyond the fences of Marxian economics, for 'the post-war period is one of outstanding victories for Marxist-Leninist theory.' This is precisely what was vigorously questioned in the interesting Polish controversy on which a few words will be said presently.

NOT long ago Oskar Lange published in the Warsaw *Polityka* an essay on Marxian and bourgeois economics.[2] The courageous treatment of the subject, the cogency of argument, the weight of authority behind the name of the writer, all contributed to making Lange's articles an important intellectual event.

Lange starts by refuting the official communist tenet that post-Ricardian economics in the West has always been and will remain bourgeois apologetics. He starts from the proposition that economic thinking is class-conditioned. The neo-classics, from Marshall onwards, he argues, made a breach in 'vulgarised' political economy: marginalism has become the basis of petty-bourgeois criticism at the monopolist stage of capitalism: this paved the way for an analysis of monopoly, oligopoly, and imperfect competition. Welfare economics thus appears as a critique of monopolist capita-

[1] S. Vygodsky, *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1958, 5, pp. 20 ff. G. Kozlov, *ibid.* pp. 9 ff.

[2] *Polityka*, Nos. 9 and 10, 1958. See also the report of the discussion of Professor Lange's articles in the Polish Economic Association, held on 6 May 1958, *Zycie Gospodarcze*, No. 21, 1958.

sm from the angle of socio-economic rationality. Moreover, for a variety of reasons, the monopolist, in contrast to the early capitalist entrepreneur, has a distinct interest in an effective and correct analysis of the market, in the study of problems of elasticity of demand, etc., as a basis for his profit, price, and output policies. From similar motives the capitalist State, as it becomes more and more interventionist, looks for guidance to scientific economics. Last but not least, concentration of economic research and theoretical work in the academic milieu (the 'professionalisation' of economics), has been another factor favouring the return of bourgeois economics to its tradition of intellectual integrity.

Such is the canvas against which Lange sketches the evolution in contemporary Marxian economic thought. Here chronology is the villain of the piece: a renaissance in bourgeois economics happened at a time when the construction of socialism in the first socialist country was already nearing completion: at any rate its builders were affected by prejudices inherited from the apologetist phase of bourgeois economics. Their self-imposed isolation, however, condemned them to 'primitive empiricist methods.' Worse still, Soviet economics had turned into a defence 'of the interests of some social groups, interests in conflict with the requirements of further social progress': economic research has become the privilege 'of an esoteric group of people in high office' who in fact have been making little use of it. In a word, the shoe is now on the other foot. It is the turn of Marxist economics to fall into an 'apologetico-dogmatic' degeneration. From this there is only one step to Dr. Lange's plea for a selective borrowing from bourgeois economics of at least some of its modern tools and methods: only at its own peril can Marxism ignore the advances in contemporary economics.

LANGE'S articles have caused an enormous stir, and the opposition has rallied whatever forces it could for a counter-attack.[3] Its moderate wing is well represented in articles by Professor Wyrozembski, excellently written, but evasive where necessary.[4] He gives warning against the dangers of transplanting techniques that would smuggle into Marxism the alien concepts in which they are rooted. He derides the immature enthusiasm for marginalism in Poland at a time when it is subject to question in the West. And yet he joins Lange in crediting modern bourgeois economics with remarkable achievements in several important fields: in the theory of monopoly, in investigation into market equilibrium, etc.: he acknowledges the soundness of its quantitative treatment of processes, and above all of the Keynesian revolution; yes, he says, a true revolution, much as Marxists may sneer at the 70 years delay in its arrival at a macro-economic approach.

The few extremists of Professor Minc's persuasion go much further. As he sees it, bourgeois economics has been sinking deeper and deeper into apologetics. Bastiat's 'harmonies economiques' have been superseded by Keynes's 'general theory.' But perhaps the most remarkable thing about Minc is that not even he denies a 'dogmatic ossification' of contemporary Marxist political economy. In his view it is this malaise which is the breeding ground for revisionism.[5]

Looked at in the Soviet context, it is surprising that the Moscow guardians of orthodoxy listen to all this but do not thunder. It is true there has been Soviet intervention here and there on peripheral issues; the principal battlefield has been carefully avoided. Against the general background of the present revival in heresy-hunting, it seems remarkable that the big guns of the Soviet ideologues remain silent while the heart-searching goes on in Polish Marxian economics.

Perhaps the clue is to be found in some recent developments in Soviet thought which are worth recording.

Behind the façade of contempt for Western economics there can be observed the implicit

[3] They have also had strong echoes in Western Marxist writing; and were reproduced by the Italian *Politica ed Economia*, No. 3, and by the French *Cahiers Internationaux*, No. 95.

[4] *Zycie Gospodarcze*, No. 29, 1958. See also his contribution to the debate mentioned in footnote 2.

[5] Bronislaw Minc, *Polityka*, No. 24, 1958. See also his contribution to the debate mentioned above.

reception of some Western ideas, especially in the field of methodology and analytical techniques. Thus, as it appears, a special 'laboratory' of the Soviet Academy of Sciences has been busy for a year or so trying to fit into Soviet social accounting and planning the method of input-output tables, *i.e.* the method of analysis of basic proportions in the national economy so much in vogue in the West. (The Poles, who do the same with greater aplomb, miss no opportunity to rub in that the first elaborations of the method by the American economist Leontief were published in the Soviet Union in the twenties —a typical shield put up against possible Soviet heresy-hunters.) A recent paper by the head of the Soviet 'laboratory' stresses the virtues and merits of the method and the new vistas it opens, in combination—on Western lines—with the use of modern electronic computers, in the field of socialist planning.[6]

NO less interesting are some symptoms of the quiet assimilation of intellectual equipment in Soviet economic reasoning. Naturally, this too calls for a good deal of protective dialectic. Here is a case in point: An economist has prefaced his mathematical argument, published in a recent theoretical symposium, with a significant statement: 'Some may discover in this method traits of the school of "econometrics" and on this ground alone become suspicious of the whole argument. This would be a superficial judgment. What is essential is not the application of suitable tools of mathematics to intricate problems, but the substance hidden within this form. Marx's investigation into rates of profit, surplus value, and the composition of capital, does not become a deviation from Marxism because it is carried on by the use of mathematics. And in regard to substance it is impossible not to see the difference between the proof of the theorem in question .... and the stories infested with the ideas of marginal utility, produced by many econometrists.'[7] The explanation may bring a smile to the face of a Western reader, but for all its innocence it signals a bold break with prejudice that would have been unthinkable in the Soviet intellectual climate only a few years ago.

The reader will also notice the exorcism of the evil spirit of 'marginalism.' Yet, while this is still *de rigueur* among Soviet economists, a student of contemporary Soviet economic writing will detect a creeping infiltration of marginalism into some areas of an extremely important debate in Soviet economics, the debate on price in a socialist economy. This has shown one or two timid invasions of non-Marxian ideas not only in matters of method but even of substance. It appears that where the Poles move openly and on a wide front, admidst the clamour of loud polemics, the Russians are in fact groping and testing the ground, and putting out feelers, hesitatingly and not without confusion.

It may perhaps suit the Russians to have the issues of a rejuvenation of Marxian Soviet economics (especially the question of safe limits for borrowing from Western thought) thrashed out within the orbit, rather than at home. The practical requirements of Soviet economy, handicapped as it is by the present state of economics in the country, may be the compelling motive behind such an attitude.

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[6] V. Belkin, in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1957, 12, p. 139.

[7] A. Ya. Boyarski, in *Planirovaniya Statistiki* (ed. V. S. Nemchinov), Moscow, 1957, p. 80.

Beyond the Leisure Principle

DIVERSIONS AND DISTRACTIONS

David Allchurch

THERE is an exact equivalent in Russian for our word 'leisure,' but it is nowadays seldom used except for humorous or archaic effect. With its suggestions of idleness and frivolity, or at best of doing what you please instead of what you must, it does well enough to describe the lives of old-time gentry and modern parasites, or the off-work hours of bourgeois individualists. For the honest Soviet toiler 'rest' has supperseded 'leisure.' We urge our friends to enjoy themselves, have a good time, or take it easy, according to circumstances. The Russian exhorts his friends to 'rest,' whether in fact they are bound for the easy chair, the theatre, or the ski-run. If he is sententious by profession or inclination he may repeat the school-room incantation: 'Rest and gather strength for new labours and new successes.' The Soviet citizen has a constitutional right to work and to rest; and in the bulky literature on the subject rest is treated as above all a preparation for more work. There must, we read, be a regular alternation of work and rest on peril of disturbance of the conditioned reflex stereotypes, with a consequent reduction of working capacity and resistance to illness. Rest should be active, and its content should be a change of work, physical culture, social activity, or the satisfaction of cultural needs. This mixture of ideas from Pavlov with others more reminiscent of William Morris gives an unexceptionable prescription for the right use of leisure. Doubt sets in when we reflect that in the Soviet Union the state, with its somewhat arbitrary opinions on the legitimate needs of its subjects, and its rigid views on desirable forms of social and cultural activity, has a virtual monopoly in the provision of amenities for leisure.

SOVIET town-dwellers today enjoy more free time than they did even two or three years ago, and enjoy it more. The industrial working week is 42—46 hours, against 48 until early 1956. Since the Stalinist laws on labour discipline were modified, the worker no longer needs to rise hours too early for fear that a transport failure will earn him savage punishment. Compulsory after-work meetings are less frequent, and attendance less strictly enforced. Most industrial workers have at least a fortnight's annual leave, those who work in particularly arduous occupations get a month, and the normal allowance may be doubled in underdeveloped areas with severe climate. The pensions scheme of 1956 makes it possible for workers to retire at 60 (55 in the case of miners, workers in hot shops, and women) without serious hardship.

Changes in rural life have followed a different pattern. The peasant is usually required to work harder in the communal sector of the economy than he did a few years ago. The penalties for failure to put in the obligatory minimum of labour days remain unchanged. Some collective farm managements ignore and most of them scamp their obligation to provide for their superannuated members. On the other hand, peasant incomes have risen greatly as a result of Khrushchev's agrarian reforms, so that many peasants may feel that although they work harder they now have leisure instead of just time on their hands.

In this country, students, schoolchildren, and women without children under school age often enjoy more than the average share of leisure. In the Soviet Union all three groups are sadly underprivileged. Students do their reading and their written work, and if they are ambitious make their political observances, after a full day of compulsory lectures. It is now generally recognised that younger schoolchildren have in the past borne an excessively heavy burden of homework, but there is little prospect of relief for those who must enter the increasingly sharp competition for places in higher educational institutions. Able-bodied women usually have full-time jobs in addition to their domestic duties.

The inconveniences of every-day life fritter away far too much of the Soviet citizen's time, especially in the towns. Even Moscow is full, like Dickens' London, of people trudging surprisingly long distances, because public transport is inadequate. At home, you may have to wait your turn at a communal stove. The provision shops are too few and always crowded. Delivery services are almost unknown. Customers queue twice, first to pay and then to claim their purchases. Service in shops and restaurants is slow and sullen.

Current housing programmes will make life easier for millions within a decade or two, but so far the pressure on accommodation in the bigger cities has decreased only slightly since 1953. There have been improvements in marketing methods and shopping facilities—a wider range of ready-packed goods and some self-service stores—but only on a small scale. The expanding, though still inadequate, net-work of *stolovye* (public canteens), where service is quick and food cheap and reasonably good, is a great boon. Better still, the list of goods in short supply shrinks from year to year, and the labour of shopping with it.

The town-dweller's life then, though wearisome and uncomfortable enough by our standards, is far less exhausting and exasperating than it was. The social atmosphere is much less oppressive. Opportunities for simple enjoyment have increased: food is plentiful in most places and travel is much freer. For many people more spare time means above all a better chance to improve their living conditions, and the state goes some little way to help them, even providing loans and allocations of material for those who want to join in a communal building project or to build a family house or *dacha* of their own. Still, most people have more leisure than ever before, and they hanker after more varied and satisfying forms of relaxation and amusement.

THE Soviet citizen cultivates with an enthusiasm which we have most of us lost the simplest pleasures: eating, drinking, and rest, in the most literal sense of the word. Partly no doubt because hunger and weariness have been more familiar to him than to most of us in the recent past.

On Saturday nights, special occasions, pay-days (1st and 15th of each month) he makes if he can for the restaurant, which does duty as night spot, pub, and social club as well as eating-house. It is not an entirely satisfactory arrangement for anybody. Not for the couples jostling each other around the tiny dance-floor to the same old handful of Soviet ballads and faded Western pop-tunes in palm-court arrangements. Not for the drinker fixed to their bib-and-tuckered chairs over half-consumed token orders of food and a litter of cardboard cigarette ends, with each round more agonisingly slow and uncertain to arrive than the last. Certainly not for the bona fide diners who have to share with or follow a drinking party. Least of all for the angry and suspicious queue in the vestibule or outside the tactically locked front door.

Of course, you can dance elsewhere. Workers' clubs, houses of culture, the local officers' house and many other institutions organise dances. If you don't want to dance in an organised fashion you will find at the very least an open-air concrete floor, and in big towns a hall no barer nor less inviting than an English small-town palais, in the local Park of Culture and Rest. You can eat and drink elsewhere too: in cafés, tea rooms, beer halls, *stolovye*. Most of these establishments keep short hours, and their equipment is strictly utilitarian. Worse, they often have gravely deficient menus: vodka, always available in first-class restaurants, is not always sold in lesser eating houses, though you may get more expensive—and deleterious—cognac instead, or even 'viski' from the highlands of Armenia.

The determined drinker can fall back on a variety of informal and illegal arrangements. There are illicit 'pop-ins' usually selling home-made hooch. If you are hard up, there are obliging persons with a stock laid in against such emergencies, ready to exchange a bottle for a 'pledge,' which may be, as in a recent case reported by *Krokodil*, the clothes off your back.

But there is no substitute for the restaurant. There sit with his feet on a carpet, amongst pillars like glazed brawn or under a dropsical *empire* ceiling with a hubbub of music and talk about him and black-garbed waiters however sluggishly at his beck and call—this is the ordinary Russian's idea of luxury, ease, and glamour. The sophisticate may sneer at the 'merchant taste' of the furnishings and decorations: the dizzy chandeliers, the female statues in difficulties with their marble

ifts, the messy canvasses (bears in a wood, the ree fat, mounted Kievan warriors, a wishy-ashy view of some old Russian town from across s river). To the common man these things are an surance that he has come up in the world and is titled to his share of its luxuries. There is more it than this of course. Many of the lesser staurants are unpretentious, and even the eatest are less imposing than many a House of ulture. What they all have to offer is a sense of se and independence, of relative freedom from gulation, of asserting if only with partial ccess your consumer sovereignty, of spending eely and receiving service.

People make many complaints about the staurants, some of which are echoed in the press. ut the only really bitter complaint is that there e too few of them. Moscow has over thousand eating-houses, but only about irty of these are restaurants. In the provinces, e park in the summer and the railway station in e winter is often the only resort for an evening sociable eating and drinking.

For many Soviet citizens the restaurant is al-ost the only opportunity for conspicuous con-mption. There are many more occasions for nspicuous leisure, and the Soviet citizen eagerly ons its uniform, the pyjama suit, not only at oliday resorts, or at the *dacha* settlement, but on ain journeys or even in his own back-yard. yjamas are comfortable too of course, and save ear on everyday clothes, but in chilly weather ey may even be worn above an ordinary suit. Many a pyjama suit is economically removed and placed by non-symbolic attire—often singlet nd shorts—at bed-time.

Rest, in medically supervised therapeutic con-tions, is the officially favoured form of annual oliday. If you can obtain a pass you go to a *urort* and stay in a sanatorium if you need edical treatment, or a house of rest if your health good. In the Caucasus or the Crimea if you are cky, but more likely in some salubrious pine-ood or on some refreshing hill just out of town. Most resorts offer excursions, concerts, physical aining classes. But most of the time you will st, which means lying, sitting, or walking around your pyjamas. If you are at all susceptible medical suggestion, you will find yourself on a iet and drinking strong waters. It is all rather ke what Count Witte and Tsar Nicholas did at Bad Nauheim, and, for good or ill, not a bit like what Mr. Malik saw at Blackpool. Such holidays are popular enough, though of course more so with the elderly and middle-aged than with young adults. About five million people find a place in these establishments, and for every successful applicant there are probably a dozen who would be glad of the chance.

There are some facilities for organised tourism, and of course camps for the young. But most Soviet workers spend their annual holiday at home, or if they can afford it travelling for a change of scene. Shortage of accommodation in hotels and indeed on trains curtails opportunities for private travel. None the less, in the last few years the trains in summer have been crowded with people 'going away' for a week or two, often to stay with already overcrowded relatives, adding to the difficulties of railway travel by carrying with them bulky goods in short supply at their places of destination. And still, for most people, an annual holiday means no more than staying away from work, sunning themselves on the nearest river-bank, perhaps painting the town a little more lavishly than usual.

THE most important monument to the state's theory of leisure is the social and cultural club: called a Palace of Culture, a House of Culture, or merely a Club according to size and scope. There were nearly 130,000 of them in 1956, of which nine-tenths were small rural clubs. Two-thirds of the total belong to the Ministry of Culture; others, including most of the largest urban clubs, to Trades Unions, and roughly one kolkhoz in three has a little club of its own. These institutions provide facilities for political instruction, group cultural activities, hobbies, and, to a lesser extent, amusement without motive of self-improvement. In large towns the accommodation and equipment are impressive by any standards: a large library, comfortable reading rooms, at least one concert hall, rehearsal rooms for amateur dramatics and musical activities, a special children's section, often a cinema and a dance hall. If the numerous lectures on political and artistic subjects are hackneyed and ill-attended, instruction in hobbies (especially radio and photography) and amateur cultural activities are on a high level, and

quite popular. Small mining towns sometimes produce a folk-dance team which it would be hard to match outside the Soviet Union. There are thousands of amateur choirs of a quality which was common enough in industrial England and Wales thirty years ago but is very rare today.

It is uncertain how many people use these facilities, but official figures for participation in group activities give some indication. At the beginning of 1956 roughly 4.8 million people were enrolled for various group activities of which choral singing and amateur dramatics, each with more than a million participants, were the most popular.

Life in the Soviet Union would be duller without the clubs, but even in the towns figures suggest that comparatively few adults visit them except to see a film or a concert or to attend a dance. In the country, the clubs are often open only intermittently, and have a small range of attractions.

Like similar institutions elsewhere, the clubs attract more youngsters than adults, more women than men, the socially militant rather than the merely sociable. They are run by professional *kulturniki*, committed to raising the ideological and cultural tone of their flock, and they give little opportunity for popular initiative or informal enjoyment. Sometimes the masses, with their longing for gaiety and novelty, triumph over their sober-minded organisers, as the film 'Carnival Night' showed us. Sometimes, the *kulturniki* pander to popular taste. But for the most part the clubs offer the same synthetic sham-popular entertainment of which the Soviet man-in-the-street has long ago wearied.

THE Park of Culture and Rest gives visiting foreigners an excellent synoptic view of Soviet leisure activity. 'Parks' were originally just enclosures, and associations with 'park-land' should be forgotten. A really cultured Soviet park has little room for rough grass and copse. A ruble takes you through an elaborate classical gateway on to gravelled or cemented walks, flanked alternately with flower-beds and rows of hoardings bearing political messages. Here and there you may rest on a balustrade and enjoy a cultured view: flowers, fountains, statues: athletes modest in vest and drawers, the long-trousered proletarian male and the petticoated peasant maid threatening heaven with hammer and sickle, Lenin with his high exhortatory gesture (forward to the future) and Stalin, hand smugly extended (look what I have given you). There are rooms where you can read the newspaper or play chess, a dance hall or at least an open-air dance floor and open-air stage in summer, skating in winter, sometimes a cinema. On summer holidays troupes of dancers, usually amateurs in brightly national costumes, will attract a few bored starers and 'mass-workers' will try to involve a half-hearted public in open-air party games.

Less cultured amusements are not entirely forgotten. Big parks have at least one restaurant and even the smallest provincial park usually has a beer-hut. In summer the parks are favourite resorts for drunks and hooligans.

Very occasionally, the parks provide fairground 'attraktsiony.' The 'wall of death' recently enjoyed a run in Gorky Park, Moscow, and though few and far between, there are even Coney Island installations for administering retrospectively pleasurable shocks to the stomach and nervous system.

THE Soviet state yields to no English headmaster in its enthusiasm for sport, builder of strong bodies and disciplined characters. Last year, some 19 million people were enrolled in sports clubs, and 15 million of them regularly practised. Light athletics (with 3.5 million participants), volley-ball (2.5 million), ski-ing (2.5 million), and football (1 million) enjoyed greatest popularity. (Comparison of spectator statistics, if available, would probably show that these figures are affected by relative availability of facilities.) Members of sports clubs are expected to undertake rigorous training under state instructors, and to submit to a series of graded tests. The aim is to produce good all-rounders, and an expert in one sport is sometimes held back by his lack of interest in others.

The Soviet Union's international record in sport can surprise no-one who has marvelled at the proficiency of unknown athletes in little provincial clubs. But officialdom is dissatisfied with the condition of Soviet sport. There are three main complaints. First, that, because of organisational complications, facilities are inadequately used, so that, as *Komsomolskaya Pravda* put it, 'pitched battles are fought on vacant lots and in back-yards while stadia remain empty.' Second, that the 'consumer approach' is hindering the

rowth of mass participation in sport. Third, iat commercialism and the 'star cult' are pervert- ig the true ends of Soviet sport which may be immed up in the name of the national body in harge of sports standards: 'Ready for Defence nd Labour.'

STATISTICS for the development of the entertainment industries show interesting ontrasts with the pattern in the West. It is rather s though two phases of Western development— he movie age and the television age—had been elescoped, with a general shortage of facilities urther distorting the pattern.

There were many more theatres in 1941 (908) han in 1956 (503), and most of the missing 400 ere closed by 1951. The reduction is accounted or partly by the building of bigger and better heatres, partly by the conversion of obsolete or nsuccessful provincial theatres into cinemas. t the same time, while theatre audiences increas- d only by one-seventh between 1950 and 1955, nema audiences more than doubled during the ime period. They showed a further 50% crease between 1955 and 1957, while theatre udiences hardly increased at all.

There are now 6 or 7 million television sets in he Soviet Union. It is not difficult to imagine ow much more comfortable a cramped Soviet partment becomes in semi-darkness, with the mily hypnotically immobilised. The theatre has uffered severely from the impact of television, ne cinema hardly at all. Theatre-going is more pensive and time-consuming than a jaunt to the orner cinema. Perhaps more important, the nema offers nowadays a steady flow of new lms, while theatre repertoires are notoriously ale and in any case form the staple of television oadcasts. Jealous jokes about television can be eard on the Soviet as on the Western stage:

'*There's nothing on the telly nowadays.*'

'*Never mind, there'll be a second channel soon.*'

'*Then there'll be twice nothing.*'

But jokes of this sort are even less fair in the oviet Union than elsewhere. From year to year he theatre offers the same circumscribed reper- ire: hackneyed classics and modern plays which e little more than crudely dramatised slogans. heatrical people and cultural overlords alike umble about the poverty of the repertoire. ven a technically excellent company like MKhAT complained of falling attendances: a month after its 1956-57 season opened, MKhAT's average audience was only three-quarters of capacity, and the three perennial Gorky plays in the repertoire were only half filling the theatre. The Maly—home of Ostrovsky and of the best acting in Moscow—was in even worse plight.

Stale plays and bad new ones lower acting standards. Ilyinsky, perhaps the finest satirical actor in Europe, has complained about the lack of good fresh plays to stretch and tone up his talent. The more successful Soviet plays are often artistically parasitical. Sofronov's 'Money,' for instance, enjoyed a certain popularity because one of the Soviet theatre's grand old ladies, Pashennaya, gave a virtuoso reading of comic female rascality which owed nothing to Sofronov and everything to her experience in Ostrovsky. Young actors without a rigorous classical schooling can neither ape their elders convincingly nor lend a semblance of personality to the abstract creatures talking like newspapers who people the run-of-the-mill Soviet play. Frequenters of the opera and the ballet are of course less avid of novelty than the theatre-goer. The simpler sort revel in luxurious spectacle, the connoisseur is there to study fine points of performance. The true balletomane cares little more for the 'story' than does the *aficionado* for the name of the bull. None the less, there is a growing feeling amongst artists and public alike that many shows have gone on too long, that most of the new ones are not good enough, and that performances are becoming stale and perfunctory as a result.

The art director of the Bolshoi spoke recently of a 'certain stagnation,' and Western audiences who have succumbed to the magnificence of its spectacles and the incomparable technique of its stars can scarcely imagine the dreariness of a routine second-team performance at Moscow's greatest theatre.

In 1956-57 the repertoire was enlivened by a few revivals (including two or three old Meyerhold productions) and a curious assortment of Western importations. Some of these have since been swept from the stage by official protests, others have survived. There were eager audiences for plays as diverse as Lilian Hellman's 'Autumn Garden,' 'Dial M for Murder,' Priestley's 'Dangerous Corner,' Erdman's 'Mandate' (a witty romp from the Nep era), and Mayakovsky's

'Bedbug' (in the hilariously funny and ideologically suspect first production at the Satira Theatre). Under official pressure managements have since become more orthodox and cautious. The list of new productions for 1957-58 included no appetising novelties, and there was a depressing plethora of safe new plays about the war.

THE cinema has fared much better. 144 full-length films were produced, and 70 foreign films shown, in 1957. A few years ago Soviet films could not compete for popularity with the few allowed in from abroad. In the lean years many cinema-goers looked back to war-time importations (especially weepies like 'Waterloo Bridge') as the high point in their cinema-going experience. Even in 1956 'La Strada,' and less understandably 'Lady Hamilton,' caused more excitement in Moscow and Leningrad than any Soviet film. Any Western European film—they included a deliciously naughty old-fashioned farce from Austria, Italian films built around shots of girls removing their stockings in tenements—was a certain success. But from 1956 on Soviet studios have produced a series of love stories, musicals, and melodramas, made up to Western (often Hollywood) recipes which have won genuine popularity. Some of them have also achieved the difficult double feat of satisfying Soviet officialdom and impressing Western audiences. It is not at all sure, however, whether the cultural overlords will long tolerate the new type of Soviet films, with its healthy vulgarity, its skilful exploitation of romantic clichés, and its lack of ideological urgency. At a conference of cinema workers in May self-congratulation on quantitative increase was mingled with complaints of qualitative decline, and there is an increasingly strident demand for strong propaganda films on themes of labour heroism.

For the present a visit to the cinema is amongst the most pleasurable of leisure activities. The cinema-goer's one serious complaint is that he cannot go as often as he would like. Cinemas are too few and too small. Peasants may have to travel many miles to a mobile projection unit, which often shows films without sound. Even in big towns it is necessary to queue for advance tickets, and to sit in poky, unventilated, and often unheated rooms. There are not enough copies of new films to go round, and distribution is erratic, so that small towns and country places may receive the same old film over and over again. A few years ago the press regularly complained that some *kolkhozniki* saw nothing but episodes in the career of Tarzan year in and year out; and that saga of rampant individualism in a crowded natural setting may still be intriguing tight little collectives out on the featureless plain. But the state has impressive plans for more and better cinemas and a further great increase in film output. In ten years or so the quantitative needs of the Soviet cinema-goer may be fully met.

THE problem of leisure is perhaps more acute in the Soviet Union than in more leisured but less closely organised industrial societies. The state claims an unlimited right to regulate the use of leisure, and exercises it not to gratify man as he is, without damage to society, but to refashion him at all costs. Soviet man has proved highly resistant to refashioning, because the state works to a sociologically unrealistic blue-print. There is no reason to believe that Soviet man, in adjusting himself to more prosperous and leisured circumstances, will draw nearer to the state's ideal, nor yet that the state will become more accommodating to man as he is.

The state wants its citizens to 'rest in preparation for new work,' to make themselves 'ready for defence and labour', to 'raise their political and cultural level' until they fully identify themselves with its purposes and its prejudices. The individual wants to relax, to enjoy his free time freely, to please himself as a change from pleasing the boss. He may be disposed to seek his gratification in sport, in the arts, or even in politics. But all these fields of activity are circumscribed and subject to a distressing degree of official interference; politics so much so that no well-balanced person takes an active interest in it except for bread and butter reasons, the arts sufficiently to make their pursuit frustrating to people of critical intelligence and refined taste, even sport to such an extent that adults are more and more inclined to watch rather than to play.

In practice, of course, there has always been a compromise between the desires of the people and the 'interests of society.' The state fulminates against drunkenness—and keeps up a supply of alcohol which would be excessive in a reasonably sober society. The state deplores the consume

pproach in sport—and builds the colisea which ncourage it. The state disapproves of sloppy and ulgar entertainment—but tolerates and even ewards a few (scrupulously un-American) xponents of vulgar sentimentalism.

A compromise, or should we call it a tug-of-ar? During the period of social relaxation and deological confusion in 1956 and early 1957, the ublic had the cultural overlords off-balance, and he long haul back is still incomplete. For a brief pell magazines were readable, and eagerly ought; frivolous foreign films and plays drew ull houses; jazz and pop-songs broke into the orty-year long tinkle of balalaikas. 'Johnny,' Besame Mucho,' and home-made imitations like Perhaps' and 'My Boy-Friend is so Handsome', earningly mooed by respectable Soviet artistes nd recorded by state studios, vied in popularity vith the black marketer's X-Ray plate transcripts f foreign broadcasts. It is clear from the series f official pronouncements on the arts and enter-ainment in 1957-58 that the state has realised ow tame and tedious the Soviet public finds its ormal cultural diet; and equally clear that the tate has little idea what to do about it.

In the West we are uneasily conscious of the videning gap between highbrow and popular ulture; we may have doubts about the health of both, but there is no denying that both on the vhole satisfy their consumers. In the Soviet Jnion there is a single, synthetic official culture, which makes a few concessions to vulgar tastes nd far fewer to those of the elite. It has no rotten pots; it is just dead. Ehrenburg has asked autho-ity to recognise the existence of different levels of aste, and authority was unwise to reject his plea. As it is, both the uneducated and the elite are erribly vulnerable to foreign cultural influence. Soviet literature, written primarily for the censor, annot stand the limited competition even of he translations published in *Inostrannaya Liter-tura;* significantly, the provincial nonentities oisted to literary power by Khrushchev have egun to blame an excessively liberal translation olicy for symptoms of decadence in the work of young Soviet writers. The purveyors of popular entertainment are no less weary than their audiences of synthetic folksiness and hearty balladry; for want of fresh native material they relay Americana whenever their invigilators nod. Even more serious from the official point of view than the danger of foreign cultural penetration is the evidence that official culture is inadequate to its task of indoctrination by pleasurable means.

The state's answer to the problem of leisure is 'more of the same': more palaces of culture, theatres, cinemas, stadia, a 50% increase in the output of publishing houses within 5 years, and of course more lectures, study circles, carefully controlled opportunities for mass participation in public affairs. Improved amenities will obviously help to combat the worst abuses of leisure—drunkenness, hooliganism, petty crime—which flourish most vigorously in the more primitive industrial areas. More cinemas and clubs in the Komi ASSSR will mean fewer drunken knife-fights. But the quantitative approach can have only a partial success. It is increasingly clear that Soviet man is restlessly dissatisfied with approved forms of leisure activity even where amenities are adequate.

High living standards are in themselves the best though by no means a complete answer to the problem of leisure in industrial societies. But even if it had the means, the Soviet state would for political and ideological reasons be reluctant to put any considerable part of its population into militantly self-contained dwellings, seal them in envelopes of cash-conscious egoism, provide them with gardens to hedge off from the neighbours, clubs to keep exclusive, cars to get away in. For many years to come gradually increasing prosperity will probably aggravate the problem of leisure. Perhaps, as time goes by, the Soviet state will see the need to find more effective methods of satisfying and influencing a vast urban population with time on its hands and money in its pocket, uncomfortable at home, bored with permitted pleasures, increasingly eager for luxury, amusement, and excitement.

THE CONTINUING TEMPTATION

David Burg

'YOU'RE kidding! Its *Cahiers du Communisme* again, or something.'

'No, I tell you, real Western . . .'

'You're still kidding.'

'If you don't believe me go and look. I've got something better to do than try to kid you.'

'All right, I'll go. But watch out if you're kidding. You'd better keep out of my sight.'

So they went. And they looked. On the ink-stained black oilcloth of the Library tables, right next to the *Short Course in the History of the CPSU* in its dirty green bindings, shone the gaudy covers of *Cinémonde*, *London Illustrated*, *Life* . . . Brigitte Bardot combing her red hair . . . Audrey Hepburn smiling . . . the incredible luxury of bikinis and cars of inter-planetary design . . . half-naked bodies and come-hither looks. Nice little girl students flocked round copies of *Vogue* which had been read to rags, and twittered with delight as they helped each other make tracings of the fashion plates. The *Komsomol* secretaries found excuses: 'You see, it's sometimes necessary by way of relaxation. The Party and the government obviously had their reasons for allowing it.' Highbrows who could quote 'Fleurs du Mal' and 'Hollow People' by heart smiled contemptuously. What was Brigitte Bardot, after all? Just a sex symbol of mass civilisation. But they started seeing the symbol in their dreams, and the cars attracted them with their cosmic beauty . . . In autumn 1955 Western magazines and newspapers unexpectedly appeared in Moscow libraries.

In Moscow feelings towards the West are complicated and various. On the one hand there is temptation. The temptation of superficial glamour, of freedom, of wealth, and—strongest of all—the temptation of forbidden fruit. On the other hand—its menace. In the first place, there are capitalists in the West. And capitalists are a bad thing. This lesson has been thoroughly assimilated. In the second place there is a lively fear that this same West will suddenly attack, or perhaps be attacked, but in either case will start sprinkling atom bombs from the sky and everyday life—wretched, dreary and poor perhaps, but so laboriously pieced together—will be blasted to Hell. Everybody is afraid. Other feelings are unevenly distributed.

It was different in the last year under Stalin. The country felt the approach of a purge. Khrushchev in his secret speech at the Twentieth Congress told how Bulganin complained to him: 'I'm just on my way to see Comrade Stalin. We shall talk like friends. But where I shall be going when I leave him—home or to gaol—I don't know.' That was how everybody felt at that time.

You went to bed at night—five of you in one room maybe, but still you got into bed. But in the morning, who knows. You might be lying in a heap on the dirty stone floor of a 'solitary' cell, bruised all over from your first interrogation, too weak to crawl to your skimpy mattress on wooden boards. The sense of security, of normality, of settled existence had vanished. Those were the days when verses like this were written:

> We're Terror's volunteers, grim strollers,
> Of age and of country we think no more;
> Massed beneath the jolly colours
> Of chaos, ruin, and war.

In those days many people wanted war, as a relief of tension, a way out. *Besser Ende mit Schrecken als Schrecken ohne Ende.* Now life has changed a little. Freedom, of course, does not exist. And there are no guarantees of personal safety either. But personal safety itself has appeared, though no one knows for how long. With it has come ordinary life, the feeling that one's fate is somewhat less uncertain, and with this dread of war and of the West. Malenkov gave expression to this, while he was Prime Minister, in his statement that 'war would mean the end of civilisation,' and so did a peasant woman from

e little village of Bekhovo, where the river Oka osses the border between the Tula and Kaluga lasts, when she said to me: 'If anything starts e shall all be destroyed.' Khrushchev, however, iblicly declares that war will mean only 'the d of capitalism'—but nobody is likely to elieve this, for Western greatness and might e deeply imprinted in the Russian consciousss. For 150 years the Russians were told that eir's was a backward country. For 35 years merica was—and still remains—the target hich must be reached without fail—'caught up th and passed.' And when in 1949 it suddenly rned out that Russian science had always been front, and that Russians had invented absotely everything on earth, it became the subject whispered jokes like this one: 'Have you ard that the Russians discovered X-Rays in e 16th Century' . . . 'Impossible' . . . 'There's ocumentary proof. They've found a letter om Boyar Ivan to his wife. He writes to her: can see right through you, you bitch.' Even e organisers of the 'Russian priority' campaign alised its failure, and stopped it immediately ter Stalin's death. So pious awe of the West d dread of war with it are very widespread. t not hostility because the fascination of the est is very great and various.

For ordinary people—it is above all the scination of wealth, or putting it another way, high standard of living. At once I hear the ewildered question: how do ordinary people ow about it, when Soviet newspapers talk out 'the absolute impoverishment of the rking class,' strikes for a crust of bread, pitalist exploitation. To begin with, millions soldiers have spent some time in Germany, e 'people's democracies,' the Baltic States. e political commissars explained to them that asant houses were occupied by kulaks, and rkers' blocks by the petty bourgeois. Where d the workers live then? At first they tried to nvince the soldiers that the workers lived in ose tiny summer villas, each with its plot of ound, scattered round the outskirts of German wns, to which many Germans travel in summer a Sunday to dig the garden a bit and get nburned. It soon became obvious, though, that ese little houses were not regularly inhabited. the soldiers carried away from war ruined ermany and other countries memories of unheard of wealth and plenty. Then again, rumours penetrate into the Soviet Union, chiefly through foreign broadcasts in Russian, and through the magazine *America* with its 50,000 circulation. The broadcasts are jammed but people listen to them all the same. When I was roaming round the Soviet Union, I once came across a shepherds' camp 3,000 metres up in the Caucasian mountains, where from May to October twelve men pastured thousands of kolkhoz cows and calves. They lived on milk and hard tack. Killing cattle was forbidden, but they did it just the same, and made an entry in their report that a calf had rushed over a cliff. In this camp was a 'Rodina' battery set, permanently tuned in to the 'Voice of America.' I don't think they ever listened to anything else, except maybe once in a while to music from the local station. 'Why?' I asked. Their answer was: 'We've heard it all before.' Rumours which come in through the radio grow monstrously. I doubt whether there's a single person in Russia who is not convinced that every American worker has a car. The Soviet press even had to think up a special explanation, according to which apartments in the centre are very dear, so that the workers have to find shelter on the outskirts, but since public transport is bad, they are compelled to keep their children short of food and buy cars to get to work. One peasant woman on a train asked me whether it was true that all American women had eight pairs of shoes (she herself had none at all: only boots and *valenki*). Some people, especially in the provinces, think of the West as a sort of cloud-cuckoo-land: nobody works, and roast geese drop straight out of the sky into people's mouths.

Western broadcasts get quite a bit of help from the Soviet press. A section of the Soviet population has developed a reflex: never in any circumstances believe what the press says, always assume the opposite. In any case what the Soviet papers say about the everyday life of the man in the street touches reality at very few points, so that he is quite right not to believe them on other matters. The more *Pravda* writes about poverty and exploitation, the greater the attraction for him of the fabulously rich, cultured, and, above all, invariably well-fed life in the mysterious West. No figures, genuine or spurious, can change his mind. America has

become for him the earthly paradise which he once expected from the expulsion of capitalists and landlords. He has an almost religious belief in America, and figures are powerless against it. So then, prosperity is the biggest of the West's attractions for the long-suffering ordinary Russian. This is not a rhetorical exaggeration. In N. Zhdanov's story 'Journey Home' published in the Soviet anthology *Literary Moscow*, a peasant tells a visiting boss from the town: 'We don't live too badly. Can't complain. We've enough bread till February. They even brought us sugar twice last year.'

But for some the problem of bread and sugar is more or less solved. Indeed, for state officials and good engineers in big towns life is nowadays quite comfortable. You won't impress them with a full belly. But then there's a two-year waiting list for cars (which cost roughly twice the annual wage of an average worker). There is a shortage of separate apartments. Suits often look as though they were made for back-garden scarecrows, and state clothing factories do not change their styles for years on end. Then again, the newspapers are boring and talk of nothing but politics and maize; very very seldom are there a few lines 'from the court-room,' and never a word about anyone's private life. Light literature doesn't exist. You can't go abroad. In general, life is 'grey and uninteresting.' The numerous Soviet bourgeoisie find all this decidedly unsatisfactory. And true to Russian tradition they turn their eyes Westward. To the Russian petty bourgeois, life in his own country always seemed dreary, dull, and provincial. Whereas Europe was an inexhaustible fountain of delights. Expressions like 'European chic,' 'European polish,' were firmly established in the vocabulary of the semi-educated class long before the Revolution. There were always some grounds for such a view, and now there are more than ever. So then, the well-off Soviet citizen hankers after 'Europe.' He it is who crowds round diplomatic Cadillacs and Chevrolets on Moscow streets, lost in silent admiration. He it is who falls into line in thousand strong queues at GUM, waiting for the sale of an occasional batch of imported suits, in spite of their fabulous price. He hunts nylons for his wife in the rag-market, and pays thirty rubles for a hundred badly translated an badly typed pages of Agatha Christie. H children turn into *stilyagi* at seventeen.

The *stilyagi* have been described many tim in the West. It is quite easy to understand wh The visiting foreigner doesn't have to go lookin for them or 'observe' them. They themselv make the approaches and get into conversatio straining to the utmost their limited knowled of some foreign language, usually Englis There are two reasons: first, it is interesting talk to a being from another world, hear wh he has to say, and show off to him; secondl the possibility of finding yourself a new 'rag buying a foreign suit or nylon shirt on the chea is never out of mind. This second reason is th main one. The *stilyagi* want one thing abov all: to look different from the ordinary Sovi person. Foreign clothes are the best means t this end. A real cult of the West, a fetichist worship of the external forms of Western lif has arisen amongst the *stilyagi*. The We exists for them in two manifestations: as fashio and as jazz. The significance of jazz worship no less than that of the worship of Weste 'nice things.' The very word *stilyagi* comes fro the expression 'to dance in style'—meaning wit up-to-date steps and to jazz. The *stilyaga* ha only a foggy notion that there may be more i the West than 'nice things' and jazz. Th *stilyaga* is repelled by Soviet reality, and ofte expresses his hate with noisy bravado. But h sets against it a pretty vague picture of a lif consisting of beautiful things, from flashy tie to big cars, dancing to jazz, and certain strang customs. He genuinely deifies the West—land o electronic kitchens and nylon underwear.

How much enjoyment do they bring, and ho cheaply? By that yardstick the Soviet pett bourgeois measures all values and all achieve ments, Russian or foreign. When the first Sovie sputnik was launched, the satirical magazin *Krokodil* made the following joke. One *stilyag* to another: 'In New York they're already makin a sputnik cocktail, and all we've got is . . . In this 'all we've got' there is bottomless dis illusionment. The sputnik cocktail—that's th positive ideal. The ideal is sharply define Sputniks and the heavens at large do not interes the petty bourgeois. He is interested in ne cocktails. In the Soviet Union there are none—

the Soviet Union is a bad thing. In the West ere are—so the West is a good thing. The lure the West for the Soviet bourgeois is the lure outward glamour. Nothing else matters. metimes this idea is taken to weird and radoxical extremes. Youngsters in chequered irts shout hurrah for the American way of life, hough they seriously believe that America is n by shady businessmen, gangsters and litical phonies, just as the Soviet papers say. t what does all that matter, as long as you can ake money, ride round in shellpink cars, and ely dance rock and roll.

Still, there are those for whom freedom to ck and roll is not enough. They are rather fficult to classify. Should we call them intel-tuals? If so, where would be put the worker o wrote these lines:

In March somebody murdered Stalin,
In July Beria bit the dust,
But the worker's harness is just as galling
And the peasant groans fit to bust.

What should we do with those who proclaim e slogan 'a socialist revolution against the ti-socialist government,' or those who in mmer 1956 after Togliatti's unguarded remarks out certain symptoms of the degeneration of cialism in the USSR, sent him a letter for blication in *Unita* because they wanted thing to do with the 'bourgeois press?'

The Russian intelligentsia has always made o demands on history: for freedom, and for stice, both understood in an absolute sense. n the one hand—'call old Russia to the axe!' d on the other—'not one childish tear shall be ed!' The two ideas did not fit together very ll, but they managed to live on side by side, en in the 'reactionary' Dostoevsky.

In the space of forty years the Russian intelli-ntsia has almost completely changed its mposition, but a section of it has learnt actically nothing. It goes on in the same old y demanding from history absolute justice and solute freedom, and so, while it hates the oistic régime' in Russia, it regards the West th a mixture of enthusiasm and censorious istrust. The enthusiasm is above all for edom, the disapproval for injustice, injustice any kind—economic, racial, and of course at which springs from inequalities of birth. is part of the young intelligentsia has even preserved the terminology of fifty years ago, giving it a peculiar twist. The world is divided into conservatives, liberals, and radicals. Only the conservatives are now the supporters of the régime (or, in Western terms, orthodox communists), the liberals are its half-hearted opponents, or those who set against the loathsome Soviet system the slightly less loathsome West, and the radicals are themselves, those who want the absolute Good for Russia and mankind. I shall deal with the liberals later. First let us talk about the radicals.

'Neo-Bolshevism' takes note of the discrepancy between the slogan 'a society without violence and subordination' on the one hand, and life as it is today in the Soviet Union and the world at large, and draws from this discrepancy the conclusion not that the slogan is no good but that life is no good as it is. Hence the irreconcilable hostility of neo-Bolshevism towards Soviet society, a hostility dictated by loyalty to 'the original ideas of the revolution.' Hence also the extremely reserved attitude to the contemporary West. A considerable, perhaps even the larger part of the intelligentsia consists of those whom the neo-Bolsheviks call 'liberals,' endowing the word with a contemptuous Leninist shade of meaning. Now the liberals have a more positive attitude to the West than the neo-Bolsheviks, though they too have their reservations. In this sense they are closer to the mood of the Soviet masses, who are full of unqualified admiration for the West, than are the neo-Bolsheviks.

In 1950 or thereabouts, the case of the 'populists' made a sensation in Moscow and Leningrad (that is to say, people passed on the news in a whisper to those whom they could trust). I learnt about it much later, during the 'thaw,' from a 'returner from the other world'—the concentration camps. He had met some of the 'populists' there.

The 'populists' were students of the first post-war generation at Moscow and Leningrad universities. They were for the most part not callow youths but people with experience of life who had gone through the war and been demobilised. Most of them had spent some time in the newly acquired Soviet satellites or the Baltic states, and what they saw there shook them profoundly. They found prosperity, and a quite

different way of behaving, even in the presence of the terrible conqueror. There were opportunities to make the acquaintance of new and unfamiliar ideas for those who knew foreign languages, and to some extent for those who didn't, because there was plenty of non-Soviet literature in Russian in the occupied zones. All these impressions they carried home with them. Stalin had good reason to regard the Soviet troops stationed abroad as completely spoiled, to leave them there without replacement for years on end, and propose to withdraw them immediately to the rear in the event of a military emergency. Those who lived abroad for long could not have the slightest doubt that they had been and were being deceived.

When they got back to the capitals and became students, these people, people of the same generation who had shared the same experiences, started cautiously exchanging impressions, feeling each other out. A common attitude emerged. The questions asked were simple ones. Why does the people live better in the West than here? Why do they deceive us by saying that this is not so? It must mean that the Western system is better, in spite of the landlords and capitalists there. The fact that there are landlords and capitalists is, of course, bad and unjust. The main thing, though, is not abstract justice, but how the people live. The interests of the people, their well-being and security, should become the main yardstick for any system, and in the last analysis determine whether it is good or bad. We are populists, said the former officers, because we consider the defence of the people's interests more important than anything else.

The organisational history of the populists is obscure. It is unclear whether there was a real conspiratorial organisation, or merely comradely groups, and whether or not they went on from words to action. It is unclear whether the police arrested them all at once, or took them singly and later on concocted a single 'populist affair' because of their identity of outlook. But one thing is clear—in the camps they stuck together and felt themselves to be members of a single organisation.

The historical parallels for the populism of the late 1940's are however perfectly clear. They lie not so much in the populism of the 1860's—1880's, as in Decembrism. Just as the youth of the privileged class who saw Europe in 1812—1 were filled with resentful grief for their might but unhappy victorious motherland, so now th Red Army officers, when they saw that life ca be different, decided that 'we cannot go o living in the old way.' In both cases observatio of European life was the yeast which started ferment of revolutionary ideas, and in bot cases these ideas appeared not amongst serfs c the slaves in the concentration camps but i well-to-do and privileged circles, amongst th future 'masters of life,' while the masses remaine almost completely passive!

Children of the privileged class in revol against privileges which trouble their conscienc have always been stock figures of the Russia revolutionary movement. At the beginning o the 1950's such a revolt is even more understand able than in the twenties of last century: a lif full of undisguised falsehood, hypocrisy, an fear of arrest 'for nothing' was becoming mor intolerable every year. Against this backgroun European life, even in occupied countries, looke brighter than it really was.

As the war years receded further and furthe into the past, and the countries of 'people' democracy' were more and more sovietised impressions of European life, so vivid when the were fresh, began to fade. But legends grew u around the West, and attitudes to it in oppositio circles became more and more sharply differ entiated. There was on the one hand the neo Bolshevik point of view, and on the other a utterly unlimited worship of the West, ofte accompanied by anti-socialism. This frame o mind is, I think, characteristic above all of th technical intelligentsia and the officer class Their reasoning goes like this: We are told tha the construction of socialism is complete. Bu nobody is better off for it. In the West, unde capitalism, life is freer and more prosperou than here. Hence the conclusion: long liv capitalism, long live the West—the sun withou spot. This way of thinking—which merel rejects the Soviet system and sets up the West i contrast as model and exemplar, simply on th grounds that the West is something unlike th Soviet Union and is therefore bound to be good inasmuch as everything in the world cannot b bad—this way of thinking is certainly wide

spread, but mainly among the less cultured sections of the population whose judgment of the West is formed by rumours and foreign broadcasts in Russian, and who for the most part have a very vague conception of Western culture and of modern Western life in all its complexity. In more cultured 'liberal' circles, amongst the 'reading public' and especially amongst those with a command of foreign languages, attitudes towards the West are considerably more complicated and contradictory.

Whereas the 'neo-Bolsheviks,' with their negative attitude to the Soviet régime take an almost equally negative view of the West, admit that the West has certain advantages but at the same time consider that they are almost cancelled out by its defects, even in comparison with the Soviet system, the 'liberals' recognise that the West has enormous and unquestionable advantages in comparison with the USSR. The fact is that the 'liberals' do not make absolute demands on history. Nebulous visions of 'a society without violence, subordination and privileges' the 'liberals' relegate to the realm of political utopias and fantasies—fantasies which often disguise extremely sinister real aims. Naturally, Western society does not seem so 'backward' and 'reactionary' from this point of view as it does from the viewpoint of the orthodox Bolshevik ideal adopted from Lenin's *State and Revolution*. Western democracy ceases to be only a stepping stone towards a 'democracy of a new type' and acquires a completely independent significance. But if Western democracy with its legality, its political and spiritual freedom, seems to the 'liberals' almost an ideal form, this does not mean that they approve of absolutely everything in the West. The fact is that, as far as I can tell, a considerable part if not the majority of the liberals consider themselves socialists in the tradition of democratic and humanitarian socialism. They present demands for justice to Western as well as Soviet society, but they do not insist that they should be met at once and in full. Moreover, the basic injustice of the Soviet system—that it completely deprives man of his freedom and turns him into a helpless instrument of the powers that be, into one of the means of production—seems to the 'liberals,' unlike the neo-Bolsheviks, so far to exceed all the injustices of Western society (arising from property, race, etc.) that there is no occasion even to talk about any supposed advantages of the Soviet Union over the West.

Thus 'neo-Bolsheviks' and 'liberals' differ very substantially in their political evaluation of the contemporary West. But in one thing all young oppositionists are united—in their worship of modern Western culture and their enormous interest in it. It should be said that modern official Soviet culture is taken more seriously in the West than in the Soviet Union itself. Youth has the profoundest contempt for 'bespoke' culture and only in very recent years, as a result of the thaw, has interest in the spiritual output of Soviet society reawakened. If you have written a lying article or exhibited a dreary picture painted according to the rules of socialist realism, no-one will reproach you, because you may have on your studio walls a hundred magnificent canvasses which no hanging committee would accept. But if you take it into your head to boast about your fake you won't be forgiven. Contempt for Stalinised culture is explained by this fact, that people see in it falsity, a 'phoney,' a spurious imitation of culture and art. For the real thing people turn to what is called in the USSR the classical heritage, to the pre-Stalinist twenties, and to the contemporary West.

What is it in Western culture that attracts the Soviet intelligentsia and why? The simplest way of answering the first part of the question might be to say what in modern Western culture attracts hardly any attention at all. In my experience everything which reflects ecclesiastical and theological tradition arouses no interest. An interest in religious-philosophical questions was briefly kindled in a few minds by Georg Lukacs' remarks about the possibility of and the need for a dialogue with the Church, but it was I think quickly extinguished.

This attitude to religious philosophy is in my opinion not accidental. It is explained not merely by the atheism or agnosticism of most young intellectuals but also by their suspicion that people connected with the Church deliberately do not carry their thinking to its logical conclusions nor speak their minds fully. In other words, they do not create in conditions of spiritual freedom; but it is precisely inner freedom, the absence of standards imposed from

outside, the absence of 'the bespoke,' which the intellectual opposition above all prizes in Western culture. It is precisely the fact that Western culture is created, in the opinion of the Soviet intelligentsia, in conditions of freedom, that gives it the 'authenticity' so lacking in Soviet culture. 'Authenticity' means that a work of art or scholarship is the result of independent and untrammelled creative work, and not an adaptation of one's work to rules laid down in advance. In prizing 'authenticity' the Soviet intelligentsia prizes free, living human thought and creativity, and prizes them not more perhaps but probably more keenly than Western intellectuals, because these things are denied them. In any case the idea of 'the burden of freedom,' a burden which some Western intellectuals try to shift on to the Church and others on to the Party, is absolutely alien to Soviet intellectuals and indignation is the only feeling it awakens in them.

The Soviet intelligentsia is attracted to Western culture by its variety, its brilliance, its dissimilarity from Soviet culture. Arthur Koestler has somewhere prescribed regular reading of the Soviet press as a cure for communism in Western intellectuals. The tasteless cud of ideological formulas, far from satisfying spiritual hunger, is no longer even digested. For the author of these lines, reading even an interesting *Pravda* leader is hard labour, calling for a special intellectual concentration like that one brings to the solution of a mathematical problem. The eye cannot help skidding away from the too-familiar formulas, the mind wanders. Without a special effort the Soviet reader is no longer capable of consciously noticing the real content of such articles, just as people brought up in the West do not notice the actual content of an advertisement unless they turn their attention to it with a special effort of will. For this reason the dissimilarity of Western culture is enough in itself to attract attention, irrespective of what lies beneath the strange surface.

Finally, the interest in Western culture has an element of snob appeal: I know something that other people don't. From reading Malraux's *Voix de Silence* the Soviet reader gets an additional pleasure denied to readers in the West—a pleasure like that of the philatelist who adds some Guadeloupe 1826 to his collection.

The Soviet intelligentsia is not of course equally interested in the whole of Western culture and does not feel unqualified approval for all that is going on in the West. They are eclectic and their preferences depend on professional interests, political sympathies, and general outlook. There is probably more interest in artistic literature than in any other department of Western culture. This is not only because artistic literature is more accessible than philosophy, economics, or the graphic arts. It is also because literature gives not just ideas but also a picture of Western life and Western man. And Soviet man's interest in this is no less than Western man's interest in him.

It is natural also that everyone seeks in the West ideas and moods close to his own, and often finds them in the most unexpected places. I remember once finding myself in a meeting of friends at which someone read a paper on modern methods of logical analysis and the so-called 'Vienna' school of philosophers. When the speaker, a young specialist in Hegelian logic, had finished, a dyed-in-the-wool Marxist said: 'These thoroughgoing metaphysicians have more genuine dialectic than our thoroughgoing dialecticians.' That is not an isolated case. European thought when it penetrates into Russia always finds a lively response there, in spite of the obvious difference of outlook. Every new thought opens up new horizons for the Russian, delivers him from the magical power of formulas which have long lost all meaning, and raises higher that iron curtain which even Stalin did not manage to lower completely.

'Europe is our mother just as much as Russia—our second mother; we have taken much from her, and shall take much more, and we should not like to be ungrateful to her.' These words, surprisingly enough, belong to Dostoevsky. And Dostoevsky is right. In the eighteenth century Russia took from Europe, in the nineteenth she gave in return. Today Russia is 'taking.' She began by taking the idea of Marxist socialism. Now, in desperate struggle with those who use the Marxist idea to destroy all others, she is trying to take over the ideas of freedom and humanism. When she succeeds we may expect that she will once more find something to give to Europe.

Behind the new Education Scheme

JUVENILE UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE USSR

Anthony Maxwell

REPORTS in the Soviet Press over the last three or four years have shown that there is a pool of juvenile unemployment in the USSR.

The existence of a reserve of unused labour is a serious matter for the Soviet leadership. On ideological grounds it is impermissible; Soviet citizens are guaranteed employment, and indeed they should want to work for their country. On economic grounds it is undesirable, because, according to official data at least, the Soviet Union faces an all-over labour shortage which is likely to get worse in the next few years. Furthermore, the immediate social effects of juvenile unemployment can be unpleasant —a rise in delinquency and crime and a fall in *ideinost*. The aim of this article is to consider two specific groups of unemployed youth: the first is composed of those who are *voluntarily* unemployed for reasons connected with further education, the second of those living in the older industrial centres of European Russia and *involuntarily* unemployed, principally as a result of recent changes in labour laws.

Many more children than formerly are being given the chance to try the entrance exams of Higher Educational Institutions (*Vuzy* is the Russian abbreviation), whereas the number of places available has not increased proportionately. The result of this has been a growing number of unsuccessful candidates, and many of those who find themselves in sufficiently comfortable circumstances have preferred to wait a year, studying at home, and try a second time, rather than take up some manual work, as they are urged to do by the Party and government. The social implications of this bottle-neck are great. The so-called unemployed young people will tend to come from homes where their wages are not missed — where education is valued particularly highly; only poorer unsuccessful candidates will go straight into a factory or kolkhoz. Those who refuse to work for reasons connected with further education therefore tend to belong to the upper, more prosperous strata of Soviet society. 'Voluntary unemployment' here refers only to these potential full-time Vuz students, and not to the Soviet *jeunesse dorée* which does not want to work or study.

The problem has arisen as a result of Soviet education policy. In the first place there has been an enormous increase in the output of ten-year school-leavers, i.e. people holding a leaving certificate which gives them the right to continue their education. Since 1950 their number increased annually by as much as one-third of a million a year: the peak year was 1955-56, when no less than one and three-quarter million children, about one-third of the whole age-group, graduated from them. Since then numbers have been declining, because of the war-time drop in the birth rate.

The intake into the Vuzy has not kept pace with these startling increases. Moreover, the trends here are much more complicated. The number of acceptances increased steadily from about 200,000 in 1948 to a peak of about 300,000 for the session 1954-55. Since then it has fallen regularly, and last year was back almost to the 1948 figure.

From the end of the war up to the early 50s there were on average half as many again finishing ten-year school as there were places in Vuzy. It was about 1952 that the relationship between the output of the one and the intake of the other first altered appreciably, and the gap went on widening till 1955, when there were six times as many people leaving the ten-year school as there were places in Vuzy. Since then the situation does not appear to have changed very much. Although fewer are now finishing school with a leaving certificate, the intake into the Higher Educational Institutions is being cut back drastically, so there is no lessening of the pressure.

Since this reduction in Vuz intake is so im-

portant in maintaining the group of unemployed, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider it. Unlike the expansion of ten-year education, it is not being given any publicity in the Soviet press. The downward turn took place between September 1954 and September 1955. What happened then which could explain it?

There is evidence that the Soviet government realised that it had, in fact, been over-producing highly qualified specialists. On 30 August 1954, a Decree of the Council of Ministers and Central Committee of the Party was passed entitled 'On improving the direction and use of specialists of higher and middle qualification.' Some of its provisions showed that the planning of labour direction of graduates left a lot to be desired. In April 1957 the person in charge of planning Vuz intake throughout the USSR announced that 'until now only the output of specialists has been taken into account in the Five Year Plans, but when the Plans were being worked out their number was already determined by the contingents of students actually studying.' Training, he added, 'was not determined by the prospective development of the economy, but to a large extent by unwarranted and often unsound orders (for specialists) from Ministries and Departments.'

It is fairly clear what was happening. A clumsy system of planning had allowed the intake to swell beyond the needs of the economy. Komarov, a member of the Central Committee, said in September 1957, at a time when considerable reductions in intake had already been made: 'The level of development of higher and middle special education which has now been reached permits us to meet the requirements of specialists fully and in a planned way in all branches of the national economy and culture.'

Another factor to consider is that profound changes were taking place in the organisation of the industrial sector of the Soviet economy. In October and November 1954 a series of leading articles in *Izvestiya* and *Pravda* were devoted to attacks on specialists sitting in offices instead of going on to the production front: they should be redistributed. By March 1956 Khrushchev was able to announce that the administrative apparatus had been reduced by no less than 900,000 people. This, of course, is equal to nearly four years output of the Vuzy at the 1955 level—though probably not all of the bureaucrats left their offices.

The process, however, was to continue. Some Ministries were decentralised, and on 30 March 1957 Khrushchev announced the abolition of the industrial Ministries; this administrative reorganisation might well have furthered the process.

It seems obvious, therefore, that the reduction in Vuz intake was deliberate policy dictated by economic considerations.

It is difficult to determine the extent of this kind of voluntary unemployment, but estimates based on Soviet data suggest that in the summer of 1957 there were at least half a million disappointed candidates in the Soviet Union. What proportion of unlucky candidates in the past has remained out of work for a whole year is not known. All that can be said with certainty is that the total has been steadily increasing over the last five years.

How has this problem been treated in the Soviet press? Although it started first in 1952 or 1953, it was not until 3 April 1954, at the 12th Komsomol Congress, that it was officially mentioned. It was left to Shelepin, first Secretary of the organisation, to attack young people who stayed at home in the hope of getting into a Higher Educational Institution rather than going 'into production' (to use the Soviet expression). He called them *beloruchki*, or 'white-hands,' and this term was thereafter to be met with frequently in Soviet newspapers. Only six days later a very strong article appeared in *Komsomolskaia Pravda* announcing that 52 school-leavers in one Moscow district had not been able to get into a university or institute in 1953, and that 'very few of them have gone to work: the rest are just staying at home.'

Since then there has been a steady stream of articles condemning the *beloruchki* and urging them to go into factories and enterprises and continue their education on a part time basis. At a Writers' Congress in December 1954 one Polevoi said: 'Physical labour must be the general theme of our literature, because writers, by putting a halo around the intellectual professions, have drawn youth away from simple labour. Many young people, instead of staying

their kolkhoz or going to work on the railway . . . stay at home with their parents, and count on being accepted into a Vuz the following year.'

In April 1956, Khrushchev stated: 'Incorrect views have recently appeared amongst part of our youth on the place of labour in Soviet society. This finds expression in such facts as the following: certain young people say, on finishing the 10-year school, "we are educated, and so work in a factory, on a building site, or a sovkhoz or kolkhoz isn't suitable for us now." We must firmly condemn such incorrect and harmful views, as relics of the old ideas left to us by capitalist society.'

The absorption of juvenile labour into the economy tends to be something of a problem in any modern society, and the Soviet Union is no exception. The right numbers have to be trained in the correct occupations with regard to present needs and future developments, and the requirements are not easy to decide. In Britain and America the training of new labour is undertaken largely by private firms after consultation with the trade unions, although the actual forms of training vary. In the Soviet Union there is a dual system of training, in special schools and in enterprises. The present system was introduced in 1940. The general school leavers who go into the special schools for courses lasting from six months to two years are trained at State expense. These schools are run by the Main Administration of State Labour Reserves and are centrally controlled. Recently they have been preparing less than one-quarter of the total new skilled labour force. The majority of young people on finishing school (at 14 from the seven-year school or 17 from the 10-year school, as the case may be), find work for themselves as unskilled labourers or apprentices. To this extent a 'free market' for juvenile labour has existed.

If the director of an enterprise has some freedom in his choice of labour, he employs the kind which is cheapest, most efficient and settled: in a word he is guided by economic considerations. But since 1955 certain factors have combined to make juvenile labour—skilled and unskilled—less attractive for Soviet managers. In the first place, legislation restricted their hours of labour. From 1 January 1956, 14-16 year-olds were to work only a four-hour day, and 16-18 year-olds a seven-hour day, reduced in May to six. At the same time night shifts and overtime were forbidden for young workers. These regulations, which turned the clock back to the pre-1940 position, made them far more difficult to fit into the factory régime.

This was not all. In May 1956 a law was passed to the effect that workers between 16 and 18 were to be paid for a full eight-hour day, although they only worked six hours. (Most workers in Soviet industry are on piece work, and special provisions were made for the extra pay of juveniles in these circumstances.)

The cost of these new benefits for young workers was therefore thrown entirely on to the shoulders of the managements, and it is not surprising that many managers began to fight shy of juvenile labour.

The first report of juvenile unemployment directly connected with the new legislation appeared in *Trud* (16 November 1956). 'This spring, as soon as the new laws came out, officials started to get clever. They tried to find ways of getting rid of the six-hour workers.' *Trud* mentions one particular factory where a group of young workers was sacked for this reason, and lists cases where school-leavers were turned away from the factory gates. The standard question asked of them was, 'Who's going to work the extra two hours for you?'

The article in *Trud* was followed by a spate of others in the autumn of 1956 in *Komsomolskaia Pravda, Literaturnaia Gazeta,* and *Uchitelskaia Gazeta.* Dozens of individual cases were quoted, and generalisations made which covered tens of thousands of young people. The assault was renewed in the summer and autumn of 1957, and now *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* joined in to attack those directors who refused to employ people under 18.

The position with regard to apprentices, *i.e.*, young people, usually under 18, requiring special training at the bench, is even more difficult.

STRANGELY enough it is the Government policy with relation to Vuz entry which has

affected the attitude of managers towards trainees. Many unsuccessful candidates have been tempted to go to work during their long wait, but this was labour which was very mobile and essentially temporary. Managers quickly realised this, and although they might be ready to accept such labour for unskilled work they were not prepared to take much trouble to train them. Various methods of doubtful legality have been employed to get round the difficulty. Some managers cut down their planned quotas of apprentices, re-organising their plans to allow themselves a greater choice between these and skilled workers. Others seemed to have tried to solve the problem by employing more of this new mobile labour than was allowed for in the plans, but giving only hurried and superficial training. There recently appeared a report that directors sometimes give preference to applicants who had not managed to finish ten classes: these workers would not be able to get into a Vuz in any case. Finally we read of directors who employ 10-year school leavers on unskilled work only and refuse to train them for better jobs.

This is the point at which the line between voluntary and involuntary unemployment becomes blurred. The people who are not interested in spending their lives 'on production' and who want to work only until they get into a Vuz, have made the position for those genuinely interested in permanent employment more difficult.

There are also problems for those who desire to continue their studies part-time while they work. This group is very large in the Soviet Union; in 1955 about one-third of the total number of students in Vuzy were on evening or correspondence courses. The reduction in the intake into the full-time Vuzy which started in 1955 has not (as far as can be gathered), resulted in any marked increase in the number of part-time students. Yet the Soviet leadership has been doing everything possible to popularise it.

The facilities provided for this type of study tend to reduce the chance of getting a job because amenities are once again provided at the expense of the enterprise. Part-time students in the Soviet Union have long had special privileges, but these were greatly extended 1955. In January part-time students of High Education Institutes were allowed betwe twenty and thirty days extra leave a year, wi pay, for examinations and tests. At the e of the last course they were entitled to from o to four months leave, with one month on f pay, for final examinations.

Pravda (5 January 1955) gave two reasons f the new benefits: they were to encoura *praktiki* (semi-skilled employees occupyi specialist posts) to improve their qualificatio and they were to encourage 10-year scho leavers to go into enterprises and study wh they worked; in this way such employme was made more attractive.

The new measures greatly improved t position of part-time students, and made th task much easier; but some of their seconda effects were questionable. The new regulatio put a new burden on industrial managers a made them unwilling to accept workers w wanted to take part-time courses. *Prav* (19 July 1957) stated that directors of ente prises 'do not employ young people because th consider that part-time education is a lot trouble. Such directors say, "Look how ma part-time students we've got already. You nothing but write out leave passes for them take examinations. That's not much use to u is it?" '

These pressures have apparently led to a l of evasion of the laws covering the emplo ment and use of juvenile labour. Manage occasionally employ young people but d not give them the advantages to which they a entitled. It is easy to envisage a situation which a young person prefers to accept wo under these terms near his home rather than b unemployed or seek employment elsewhere.

Any estimate of the extent of juvenile unem ployment can only be very general, and this f several reasons. Journalists who deal with t subject do not distinguish between voluntar and involuntary unemployment. Record appear to be badly organised, and sometim even interested local bodies lack exact info mation. Finally, figures that reveal too muc are not of course published. But from a caref survey of about a dozen articles it is possible t come to the fairly safe conclusion that in son

the larger industrial towns (e.g. Gorki, ostov on Don, Tiflis) about 25% of the -year school leavers were several months thout work in 1955 and 1956. The situation s apparently as bad (or worse) throughout zakhstan and the Yaroslav Oblast, and in ite Russia 10% of the output of these ools were still without work after nearly a r. But there are one or two indications t these percentages began to fall by 1957.

In relation to the total labour force these ures are small, but when compared with the nual intake into the labour force they are siderable. Moreover, it must be borne in nd that in the years 1956 and 1957 10-year ool leavers formed well over half of each age up. Finally, a knowledge of Soviet statis- al practice suggests that any figures given not show the full extent of the unemployment.

What has the government been doing to nedy this evil? Up to 1957 there was a dency to rely on indirect political or psycho- ical pressure, both on youngsters unwilling to rk and on managers who did not want to ploy juveniles. Last year, however, there s a shift to direct administrative intervention en certain laws were passed to control the ry of youth into enterprises and make mission to a Vuz easier for candidates who d spent some time 'on production.' We ll first consider the earlier, more indirect asures.

One of the most important long-term solutions the poly-technisation of general education, ked with training in a given trade. Since the introduction of this principle into the Soviet ool in 1952 it has spread rapidly. Pupils do ious kinds of manual labour, and learn lled or semi-skilled trades which will be use- to them when they start looking for a job. ence lessons are also given a practical turn.

Looked at against the background of rapid nomic growth, polytechnisation can be best erpreted as an attempt to channel new labour o rapidly expanding industry with the least ste of time. The potential workman receives e first elements of his professional training ile he is at school, so the transition from ool to factory life is made easier and quicker.

The polytechnisation of general education d the specialised training which sometimes goes with it tend to reduce the involuntary unemployment because a director will be more ready to employ a young person if he thinks that the applicant knows what factory life is like, has already an idea of how to use certain tools, and has spent some time in a particular enterprise during the school practice periods. They may also reduce voluntary unemployment, since the hours spent doing this kind of work can influence the thinking of young people when they are at an impressionable age. If they have no decided preferences they may well decide to take the easiest course, and after leaving school continue doing the work they learnt there.

Along with polytechnisation of the 10-year school the party and state organs have been used extensively to get the unemployed to work. Pressure has been put on the stubborn elements, both managers and school leavers, who fail to comply with government projects.

THE Komsomol was of course an obvious channel for influence. The rôle of this youth organisation is clearly shown by Shelepin's statement at the 5th Plenum of its Central Committee. 'Komsomol organisations,' he said, 'should take more interest in finding work for juveniles and adolescents and in their living conditions: they should not tolerate any defects' (*Komsomolskaia Pravda*, 10 April 1956).

Very little has been published on the actual methods used, but it would probably not be far from the truth to assume that they are those reported by refugees, e.g. behind-the-scene conversations between the organisation secretary and a given member or his friends, appeal to personal interest or patriotism, and perhaps in some cases even threats and blackmail. The results of such efforts can be seen when mass meetings are arranged, and large numbers of young people express publicly their desire to start work immediately upon leaving school. Such a meeting was reported in *Komsomolskaia Pravda* (5 May 1956): 'Two hundred young people are finishing 10-year school in one district this year. Party and State workers, kolkhoz and M.T.S. managers came as guests to an evening gathering of school leavers. Everybody who attended decided to go and work on the fields, become tractor

drivers, etc.: 60 will work on farms, 50 in field brigades, and 60 will be mechanics. The 10-year school leavers of the district sent a letter to the last classes of Bashkir schools telling of their decision and calling on them to follow their example.'

Party and State organisations are also used to bring pressure to bear on managers who are reluctant to employ under-eighteens. About this there is rather more information. The local Party secretary may personally approach directors and get them to employ school-leavers whom they had formerly refused. Personal relations at the lower levels seem to be of great importance. In December 1954, unemployment was reported at Kursk and Kaliningrad (an isolated and unexplained case at this time), and the methods used there were later generally applied. After describing the juvenile unemployment the *Pravda* correspondent said: 'It was only necessary for the Kursk and Kaliningrad Party organisations to put in their weighty word for the situation to change radically and abruptly. It was quite simple. Directors of enterprises were assembled at Kursk and Kaliningrad party offices; there it was determined how many youngsters could be taken by each factory and plant. And then it became clear that these young people were needed everywhere.'

Komsomol organisations are also supposed to bring pressure to bear on recalcitrant managers, but the results seem less effective. One Komsomol secretary was quoted in *Pravda* (19 June 1957) as saying that he had recently tried to get two young people fixed up with work. 'However,' he reported, 'I didn't manage to do anything. The labour department of the enterprise had refused to take them, and from its own point of view it was right.'

Local party organisations have been called on to set up standing machinery to bring work-seekers into contact with employers. This takes the form of so-called Youth Employment Commissions attached to local Soviets, but the experiment does not seem to have been as successful as had been hoped. Many reports have appeared that the commissions were not doing their job. *Pravda* (19 June 1957) and *Izvestiya* (27 August 1957) admit that on the whole the commissions do not work.

The efforts to empty the pool of unemployment by persuasion and political pressure we clearly unsuccessful. The *Izvestiya* corre pondent asked: 'Who is dealing with proble of unemployment of under-eighteens? Ever body and nobody. Young people just go f help to the Executive Councils of local Sovie to Komsomol and Trade Union organisations' apparently, he implies, without much succe (27 August 1957).

By the end of 1956 the problem was st growing and new administrative measures we introduced. They were not, as will be see entirely unexpected.

AT the 20th Party Congress Khrushch made special mention of the gulf betwe the general school and universities on the o hand and practical activity on the other. Lat at the Congress, the Minister for Higher Ed cation took up the theme. 'The problem linking the Vuzy with practice and production put forward by Comrade Khrushchev mak certain changes necessary in the rules of admi sion to the Vuzy. It would now be more suitab to admit to higher education institutions trainin specialists for work directly on production, e. in agriculture and engineering, more peop who are already familiar with production an have been working for some time, and guara tee them conditions for preparing for th entrance exams.'

At the beginning of 1957 big changes we made. It was announced that 'up to 60 p cent. of the places in Vuzy would be give to people who had worked not less than tw years in production.' In September 1957, 2 per cent. of all new students did in fact ha this qualification.

This new legislation may well have fa reaching effects on Soviet higher educatio It was not, it seems, aimed solely at a fe hundred thousand *beloruchki*. It was to be determined effort to break down once and fo all the aversion to manual labour of the mo intelligent young people, which is probabl natural in any society. It is also in line with th present policy of encouraging the expansion the skilled labour force in preference to th of specialists, as reflected in the reduced intak into the Vuzy and the proposed expansion the Labour Reserve School System.

There is some evidence to show that the new ules of admission to Vuzy have not been ntirely effective. According to one or two ecent articles, there are still numbers of school-eavers who would rather try to get into a Vuz the following year in the old way than o into production, even though their chances f a place must now be considerably reduced.

As to involuntary unemployment, *Pravda* 25 September 1957) devoted an editorial to the uestion of measures for bringing stubborn anagers into line. The main innovation as far s we are concerned was the *Bronia*, or quota ystem for juvenile labour. Each enterprise as to take a certain number of young people n its new labour intake. This number was to e fixed locally by State organs, the *Sovnarkhozy* and State Labour Reserve Offices, and was to be an obligatory minimum. The Youth Employment Commissions were to carry on their work but there was to be more comprehensive central planning of the labour direction of school-leavers.

The *Bronia* was not new: it had been used (for similar reasons) in the early twenties. Yet some reports have shown that it is being fought by many managers, and at the moment it seems very doubtful whether by itself it can solve the problem of involuntary unemployment. On the other hand, the broader implications of a general extension of planning over the 'free market' in juvenile labour are great. Is the ultimate aim the abolition of this 'free' sector and an all-embracing system of labour direction covering every urban school-leaver?

Postscript by the Editors

After this article had been written *Pravda* 1 September 1958) published Khrushchev's emorandum to the Presidium of the CPSU's entral Committee proposing another far-aching educational reform.

Some of the indiscretions of the First Secretary ake it clear that voluntary juvenile unemploy-ent is one of the factors behind the new ducational scheme. The reluctance of school-raduates to enter the labour market, as well s the difficulty in finding suitable jobs, have eriously troubled the Soviet authorities. hrushchev stated that in 1957 more than 0,000 of those who graduated from the 10 ear secondary schools did not enter higher ducational establishments. But the drive to hieve higher social status is as strong as ever Soviet society. As the educational system is e major avenue of upwards social mobility, e pressure on the part of children and parents travel its full length is unrelenting. Khrush-ev admitted that 'Manual labour is being ade for the children into a sort of scarecrow.' ut parents do more than instil into their ildren such 'un-socialist' attitudes:

> 'It is often not enough to pass the examinations well to get into a university. Here too the great influence of parents is felt. That is why one can often hear youngsters trying to enter the universities say that after they have passed their examinations, their parents will also have to compete, thereby in many cases deciding everything. That creates an inequality of opportunity . . .'

To make good these defects Khrushchev proposes to introduce a scheme of 'socially useful labour' after seven or eight years of school-training, for all children 'without exception.' But in another passage of the speech he says that 'we have to provide in our national educational system for specially gifted children . . . having as an exception special secondary schools, where they may get the education necessary for further studies in the higher educational establishments.' Whether this will be combined with the earlier idea of boarding schools for specially selected children and teachers 'in the suburbs, in the countryside, in healthy wooded areas' is not quite clear yet. What is clear is that boarding schools as a universal method of education is not progressing very quickly (attendance in such schools increased from 75,000 in 1956 to 180,000 in 1958, out of some 30,000,000 school-children in the Soviet Union). Moreover, on Khrushchev's own admission, 'only about 80% of children have completed the seven-years schools, even taking into account those who remain for two years in one form. That

means that we are still far from having realised the principle of compulsory seven-years education.' In such circumstances the proposed expansion of boarding schools generally gives way to measures for dealing with more immediate problems.

The immediate purposes of Khrushchev's scheme are obvious: the co-ordination of educational and economic development, the solution of the problem of juvenile unemployment, the provision of industrial N.C.O.s, and the creation of social mobility for political reasons and of economic mobility for economic reasons. The method chosen is in effect the introduction of state direction of juvenile labour. The problem of selection for higher educational establishments will remain, and with it the 'battle for status.' It may be shifted to another institutional level, in which children and parents will try to find new loopholes. Both the selection of talent and the efficacy of education may suffer from a rigid implementation of the new scheme of distributing 'socially useful labour.' The necessity to grant exceptional opportunities for 'socially useful' talent creates a chronic dilemma for the Soviet educational system, connected with its expansion but not solved by it. The necessity for an elite cannot be reconciled with the myth of a classless society even by the most elaborate system of labour direction. The struggle for pre-eminence begins at the cradle in most industrial societies, including the Soviet

(*Continued from page 45*)

side the bloc are small though politically effective.

Predicting the future course of Soviet external economic activities is hazardous, but past experience, which shows foreign economic policy to be an integral part of Soviet foreign policy, allows of certain assumptions. The need to raise the standard of life in Soviet Russia will play an important part in the allocation of resources; of equal importance are bloc co-ordination and the achievement of an economically unified communist bloc through the agency of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, in whose activity the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations has an authoritative voice. It can be assumed that the Soviet Union wishes to shed its recently acquired function of economic milch cow to the Eastern European satellites as soon as possible. Whether it will be able to do so in respect of China will depend on China's political importance in the Russian scale of values. In the uncommitted countries Mr. Khrushchev has announced, Soviet activities will expand: 'We are going to help the peoples of the under-developed countries increasingly year by year, with the further growth of our economic might. If they ask, we grant credits, supply equipment on account of these credits, we send our scientists, engineers, agronomists, physicians and so forth.'[13] Towards the industrial West, Soviet Russia will continue its dual policy of co-operation and competition. There can be no doubt about its final aim. By virtue of its complete control over the allocation of resources, the Soviet Union will seek to undermine first one then another market or economy as part of the programme of Communist expansion.

[13] *Pravda*, 13 July 1958.

Ex Oriente Lux

EASTERN POLICY AND EASTERN STUDIES

The Stalinist Legacy

AFTER 1945 the emergence of the East European 'Popular Democracies' and the beginnings of the 'cold war' in Europe overshadowed the changes in Soviet policy in the East, which were complementary to the 'hard line' preached by Zhdanov, and others, for Europe. Though considerable importance was accorded to the class struggle in the West and the fight for national liberation in the East, Stalin was convinced that lasting, decisive progress could be made only in territories under the direct control of the Soviet army. As most of Asia was outside its reach, no spectacular progress was expected in these parts, and the victory of the Chinese Communists came in effect as a considerable surprise to the Kremlin.

The line adopted vis-à-vis the national movement in Asia resembled in some respects the Comintern policies of the 'third period' (1928—1934). Considerable stress was put on the national liberation movement in Asia, but it was argued that this movement would succeed only under communist leadership. The national bourgeoisie and the more radical petty-bourgeoisie were said to be incapable of leading the nationalist movement; they were potential traitors, if they had not actually already betrayed the national interests of their respective countries. 'The history of the national liberation movement in recent years has shown that the petty-bourgeois nationalists are incapable of representing the interests of their countries. They are satisfied with formal independence.'[1] The independence achieved by many Asian and African countries after the second world war was described as a 'sham.' A few Soviet specialists disagreed; Varga ventured the opinion that Indian independence would after all make a certain difference. They were sharply rebuked. According to the official Soviet version of 1949/50 such countries could not really follow an independent line in world politics; there were two camps only, the camp of socialism headed by the Soviet Union, and the camp of imperialism and reaction under the leadership of the United States; a third possibility, a neutral camp, was not admitted. As the leaders of the national movement in Asia had not joined the 'socialist camp' they were automatically classified as followers of the enemy camp. This extremely rigid concept was somewhat modified in 1952, but a radical change came only after Stalin's death. It is true that even at the height of the cold war the Soviet attitude to Asia was slightly more flexible than during the 'third period.' Some efforts were made to collaborate with non-communist movements and leaders (for instance in the framework of the 'Partisans of Peace'); but there was little enthusiasm for collaboration with the new national governments in Asia. All that can be said is that Soviet and communist policies were not entirely consistent (even Zhdanov occasionally talked about peaceful co-existence!).

Soviet writings about Asia in the late forties and early fifties were still full of denunciations of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, of Aung San, Thakin Nu and the Burmese AFPFL, of Nahhas and the Wafd. They were equally bitter about the left-wing socialist groups in the national movement. One expert on India confessed that 'several experts, including the present writer, had adopted a mistaken position in appraising the "leftist" leaders during the mid-thirties. They had been described as the real leaders of the revolutionary wing which had emerged at that time within the Congress party. This had been a most unfortunate mistake—who in 1951 could possibly regard Nehru as anything but a reactionary?'[2] Five

[1] I. I. Potekhin: *Sovetskaya Etnografiya* 2, 1950, p. 26, seq.

[2] V. V. Balabushevich, *Zapiski*, Vol. X, pp. 46–47.

years later the same writer was to admit that he had been wrong in 1951, rather than in 1935, but it would be unwise to regard this as the last word.[3]

GENERALLY speaking, the Middle East was not accorded a prominent place in Soviet political thinking in the first decade after the second world war. Several books and a few dozen articles were published, and two (irregular) series of 'learned communications' on the East were put out, but this could hardly be regarded as a systematic attempt to revive the study of the modern Orient. This reflected the lack of political interest, for which a variety of good reasons could easily be found: In contrast to Western Europe (or China), there were no big Communist parties in the Middle East. (Even the working class and Communist groups that did exist were virtually ignored. There were Russian translations of books about the situation of the peasants in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq, but not a single work on trade unions or political parties in the Arab world.) The ruling classes (or parties) were believed to be hostile to the Soviet Union; even if they professed sympathies they were distrusted. Years later the experts were willing to admit that they had under-estimated the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and Western imperialism. Strict adherence to dogma had temporarily blinded them to new facts and developments. But, as subsequent developments were to show, they had, at worst, lost a few years—no lasting damage had been caused.

A self-imposed barrier to Soviet activities in the Middle East was the 'hard line' followed in the post-war years vis-à-vis the Jewish and the Muslim minorities in the USSR. The official attitude towards the Jews in Stalin's last years has been the subject of much comment and need not be described in detail; it was sometimes argued that the drive was directed not against Jews as such, but against Zionists, although the great majority of those victimised as 'Zionists' (from Slansky and the Moscow Yiddish writers downwards) had been active anti-Zionists all their life. This, naturally, affected relations between the Soviet Union and Israel.

Relations with the Arab states, Turkey, and Persia, were, however, also impaired, though perhaps in a less direct and dramatic way, following Soviet drives against the pan-movements (Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turanianism, Pan-Iranism) in their Muslim territories. The opposition to these 'deviations' can be traced back to the twenties, but at that time it had been mainly confined to the political field, and the whole issue had been handled with caution. The drive for ideological purity in the forties went much further; it began as a critique of 'bourgeois nationalist historiography' in Central Asia and the Caucasus, but subsequently affected many other spheres as well.

This 'bourgeois-nationalist deviation' was one of the concomitants of the theory of Soviet patriotism as developed in the middle thirties. It will be recalled that Soviet historiography underwent important changes at that time: many of the traditional Russian heroes, who had all but disappeared from the textbooks during the first two decades of Soviet rule, were solemnly reinstated. Most historians of the minorities drew the seemingly logical conclusion that the national heroes of their peoples ought to be rehabilitated too, regardless of whether they had been friends or enemies of Tsarist Russia. This, however, proved to be a mistake, for according to the new line the positive character of Russian rule went back not merely to 1917 but far beyond. Russian occupation of Central Asia and the Caucasus had not been a 'lesser evil,' but an act of great historic and positive significance. As a result, all the national leaders of the minorities who had resisted this historic process had not really been fighters for national liberation but reactionaries, or paid agents of British Imperialism who had unsuccessfully tried to resist the wave of progress in Asia.

One of the first landmarks of the drive against these pan-movements was the official criticism of a history of the Kazakh Soviet Republic in 1945,[4] but the campaign reached its climax with

[3] V. V. Balabushevich, *Sovremenny Vostok*, 1957, 1, p. 174.

[4] M. Morozov in *Bolshevik*, 1945, 6. For a survey of the campaign against the 'pan movements' see Vincent Monteil *Essai sur L'islam en URSS* (Paris, 1953, Supplement: 1954), and Alexandre Bennigsen, 'Les peuples musulmans de l'URSS et les Soviets,' in *L'Afrique et l'Asie*, No. 20, 1952, and No. 21, 1953.

famous article published in *Bolshevik* in y 1950 by the then first secretary of the erbaijan party, Bagirov, on the character of iridism and Shamil, its leader.[5] Few Central an writers escaped criticism; even Gafurov, o was to play a prominent part in the ren-sance of Soviet Orientalism after 1955, was rply attacked for having suggested in his *tory of the Tajik People* that the Tajik revolts inst Tsarism in 1898 and 1916 had been gressive in character. (He subsequently rote his book, stressing the reactionary racter of these uprisings.)

AN-TURANIANISM (or Pan-Turkism) was perhaps the movement most frequently acked. O. Yusupov, first secretary of the bek Communist party, declared in a speech t was to be echoed by many others that ere are among our historians and writers se who deny the existence of a specific Uzbek ture. For them there is only one culture—Turkish culture.'[6] Pan-Turanianism was an ention of the enemies of the people, who nted to detach the Uzbeks from the Soviet ion, to enslave them, to make them tools of glo-American designs for a new war. Simi-y, Pan-Iranism was attacked as an attempt draw Tajikistan into the Western orbit. h-Islamism was regarded as a device of the stern warmongers to establish a Muslim te (or bloc of states) reaching from Turkey to kistan. Pan-Arabism was thought to be a newhat lesser danger, but only because there e very few Arabs in the Soviet Union. sically, the movement for Arab unity was as phatically rejected as the other pan-move-nts. According to the official formula, a ted Arab nation could not be realised under perialism and colonial division; the idea was rely exploited by American and British perialism, which envisaged it as a springboard imperialist aggression in the Near East.

After Stalin's death these attacks were toned down though not discontinued. While the campaign against the pan-movements continued, a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Near Eastern peoples was unlikely. Though the Arab nations had never shown much interest in the fate of the Muslim minorities of the USSR, public opinion in Turkey and Persia was concerned about events in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Soviet republics. The drive against Pan-Islamism posed a serious problem to Soviet Eastern experts; it was difficult to engage in an intensive campaign against Islam in the USSR while professing friendship for all Muslim people abroad. There was no need (as subsequent experience has shown) to discontinue anti-Islamic propaganda altogether, but after 1954 it became necessary to co-ordinate Soviet Islamic policy at home and abroad.

THE transition from an attitude of hostility to one of collaboration with the national movement in the Middle East was a gradual one. There were some signs of a less rigid policy in 1952, but the real thaw came only after Stalin's death; in 1954, communists in Syria again came out squarely in favour of a national front. In Egypt the change came only in 1955. A Marxist-Leninist re-appraisal accompanied these friendly overtures; the new rulers of Egypt and Syria were said to represent new and more progressive political and social forces, which had made a re-examination of the Soviet and communist position imperative. The struggle for national liberation and the revolutionary situation in the Middle East in general became the subject of much comment. The political implications of this change in line can hardly be exaggerated: It led to the great Soviet break-through in the middle fifties. To put this highly important re-appraisal into proper perspective, two important reservations ought, however, to be made. The Soviet re-orientation in the Middle East in 1954/5 did not come as the result of any startling new discovery made by Soviet Middle Eastern experts, nor did a new Marxist-Leninist analysis *precede* the change. The Middle East experts modified their approach after, not before, the politicians did. They continued to write in a critical vein on the Arab national movement for months after Mr. Shepilov and Soviet diplomacy had professed feelings

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Bolshevik, 1950, 13. The most detailed survey of the mil controversy in English is Paul Henze's 'The mil Problem' in (W. Z. Laqueur, ed.) *The Middle t in Transition* (London, 1958).

Kisil Osbekistan, 2 March, 1949, quoted in Monteil, 19.

of friendship for Colonel Nasser and Arab radical nationalism outside Egypt. If there had been a Leninist re-appraisal of the Middle Eastern situation, it was carried out by the diplomats and the Presidium rather than by the experts—who merely followed the lead that had been clearly given by autumn of 1955. The second reservation concerns the extent of the 1955 re-assessment. It did not affect, as is sometimes mistakenly believed, the entire Middle East. There was no radical change in the approach to Turkey or Persia, and relations with Israel deteriorated. It was the Arab world that emerged in Soviet eyes as the great progressive force in the Middle East. Such a judgment was not wholly inconsistent with the tradition of Marxism; Marx and Engels in their time had regarded some peoples (not merely governments) in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe as progressive, others as reactionary. It was, in a sense, only logical that peoples who opposed Soviet policies in the Middle East should be regarded as reactionary, whereas the Arabs, who agreed to co-operate and professed their pro-Soviet sympathies, became the great hope of the camp of peace and progress in the Middle East.

II. The turn to the East

The thaw of 1953 could not fail to affect Soviet attitudes towards Asia. Even if Stalin never went to the logical end in drawing conclusions from his own doctrine of ever-sharpening conflicts leading on to war, he failed to make the most of a policy that was basically no more belligerent than that followed by his heirs, nor was there any serious effort on his part to effect rapprochement with the national movements (and the national governments) in Asia. He did not recognise a 'zone of peace,' a 'third camp,' or a neutral bloc, though the emergence of a group of neutral, unattached states, mainly in Asia, had been one of the most significant developments of the post-war period. This was left to his successors, who modified Soviet policy in Asia in a spectacular and most successful way in the period between Stalin's death and the 20th party congress three years later.

Important as the change was, it was neither sudden nor unprecedented. There had been some evidence of a growing appreciation of the import ance of the national movement in the East in 195 and no sharp turn was made immediately aft Stalin's death; most of the books and pamphle on Asian affairs published in Moscow in 1954/ gave little sign of a basic re-appraisal; t substantial modifications came only after t 20th party congress. Neither Malenkov n Khrushchev thought the non-communist Asi national movements and governments any mo socialist in content than their late teacher h done, nor their leaders such as Nehru, Sukarn and Nasser any more socialist in purpose. B they took a more realistic view of the situatio in Asia; they did not underrate the tensio and contradictions between these Asian countri and the West, and thought it pointless to anta onise the non-communist East by demandi acceptance of the communist credo all along t line. They were in favour of assisting the mov ment towards neutralism in these countries— even if it involved substantial help for a politic movement that was not controlled by the co munists. For they were confident that in t long run, in a perspective of several decade or perhaps less, communism would in any ca prevail in the East, as the result of the inn momentum of social, enconomic, and politic developments, and of the inability of the prese ('national') leadership of these countries t cope with the urgent social and economic tas facing them in the post-independence era. The relied on the growing strength and prestige the Soviet Union (and China) in Asia, and o the increasing dependence of the neutral countri on the Soviet bloc. In the nineteen twenti Soviet support for the national movement in t East had involved the risk that the nationali allies would follow their own way (as Kem did) or even turn against the Soviet Unio (Chiang Kai-shek). But with a decisive shift i the balance of power, this risk had diminishe and perhaps altogether disappeared: In face c Soviet strength it was extremely unlikely that Sukarno or a Nasser would dare to turn again his allies; if he did, the outcome would hardl be in doubt.

There were no radical differences betwee Khrushchev and Stalin with regard to the lon term prospects of communism in the East. B Khrushchev and his colleagues grasped th

mediate potentialities of the situation, and re ready to make far greater concessions to ure the goodwill and the collaboration of the ional movement; as a result they revolution- d the entire world situation in the middle ies. And yet the change was not altogether precedented. There had been attempts in past, almost as far-reaching, to co-operate h the national movement in the East. If y had been less successful, this was not the lt of the Soviet leaders. Conditions in Asia re not ripe for such an alliance; the Asian ders had not been willing to seize the hand stretched from Moscow. In the middle ies Soviet approaches coincided with revo- ionary trends inside the Middle East and uth-East Asia, which made the grand alliance sible.

THE broad outlines of the Soviet re-orien- tation in Asia after 1953 soon became vious; the details, the ideological justification, re left to the experts. This involved a tem- rary retreat from the concept of the hegemony the proletariat in the national movement in East, and, consequently, a re-discovery of the gressive rôle of the 'national bourgeoisie.' e Soviet Middle East expert, writing as late as 55, still asserted that 'only the proletariat can d the national-liberation movement'; the ional bourgeoisie had tried at times to put lf at the head of the movement, but, wavering d inclined to compromise with imperialism, had shown itself incapable of leadership. In dition, the Arab national bourgeoisie was atively weak both politically and econom- lly.[7] Less than two years later, however, the ne expert wrote that the active and wide- ead participation of the national bourgeoisie he national liberation struggle was a character- c feature of the anti-imperialist struggle in the ab world, that the national bourgeoisie had wn much stronger of late, whereas the letariat (the 'leading force' of 1955!) was y *beginning* to play the rôle of van-guard in the ional liberation struggle.[8] This re-valuation highly illuminating; it was not, of course, based on any new statistical data on the relative strength of the social classes in the Middle East. Similar interesting changes in attitude emerge from a comparison of the two discussions of Soviet Orientalists (in spring 1955 and autumn 1956) about economic developments in Asia and the rôle of the national bourgeoisie.[9] Some Asian experts argued that certain basic tenets had to be revised in the light of *new* facts that had recently emerged. Others, such as the late I. M. Reisner, maintained that the 'new facts' were not really new and that the study of the contemporary East in the Soviet Union had merely been impeded by compulsory adherence to the dogmatic *obiter dicta* of the late Josef Stalin.

These discussions were intended to deal with the national movement in Asia in general, but they soon turned into a debate about the character of the 'national bourgeoisie'; some amplification of the dilemma facing Soviet Asian experts may therefore be necessary at this point. The great new insight gained by 1956 was that though the capitalist system in the world as a whole was in a state of general crisis and decay, the bourgeoisie of certain (Eastern) countries such as India, Indonesia, or Egypt could still play a progressive rôle. The Soviet experts did not think in terms of economic growth; it would have been absurd to argue that countries such as Indonesia or Egypt had made, or were likely to achieve in the near future, greater economic progress than the United States, Western Europe, or Japan. The Soviet Orientalists had in mind the social and political aspects of the problem: In the West, they argued, the bourgeoisie had exhausted its usefulness and the limits of its potentialities in the organisation of production. But in the economy of the East there were still remnants of feudalism, and the struggle against them was the 'progressive task' of the national bourgeoisie. In addition, the national bourgeoisie in the East was compelled to strengthen the state-capitalist sector in their national economies, for the private sector was not strong enough to carry out the urgent assignments of

L. Vatolina in *Sovremenny Vostok*, 1955, 2, p. 66.

L. Vatolina in *Arabi v Borbe za Nezavisimost* (Moscow, 7), p. 14, p. 18.

[9] See *S. V.* 1955, 4, pp. 31–42 and 138–146 for the 1955 discussion; an abridged version of the 1956 discussion (which lasted several months) is given in *S. V.* 1957, 1, pp. 174–184.

economic development. Furthermore, the industrial proletariat would be strengthened as the result of the economic projects of the national bourgeoisie, which, like the bourgeoisie in 19th century Europe, was acting, consciously or unconsciously, as the accoucheur of new social forces and the grave-digger of the old order.

These various assumptions led the Soviet experts to the conclusion that the national bourgeoisie (including even the 'monopolist bourgeoisie'!) in the East was progressive in character, and therefore a potential ally of the Soviet Union, whereas no such alliance could possibly be envisaged with the bourgeoisie in the West. It was a neat scheme, but open to serious objections even from purely Marxist-Leninist premises. All the arguments about the prevalence of feudal elements in the East, and the struggle against them, had been known to Stalin, Zhdanov, and the ideologists of the 'third period,' who had nevertheless reached very different political conclusions, namely, that the national bourgeoisie was unable and unwilling to eradicate these fuedal remnants, and that they were more afraid of the native proletariat than of foreign imperialism. If they had been mistaken in this appraisal, they had erred by underrating the political rather than the economic conflicts between the national movement in Asia and the West. If the later experts took a more favourable view of the national bourgeoisie, it was the result of taking cognizance of political rather than economic trends. Some of their current assumptions could, of course, be well-founded, as, for instance, the expectation that a policy of *étatisme* would gradually pave the way for a non-capitalist social order. (It did not work that way in Turkey, but it could have different, and from the communist point of view more desirable results in other Asian countries.) All participants in the 1956 discussion maintained that in the present stage of development the interests of the national bourgeoisie coincided with the general economic and political interests of the people, its social and economic progress, but it was also argued that this 'coincidence' could not be complete or lasting. No answers were provided to two important questions: What independent action should be taken by the 'progressive forces' against the 'national bourgeoisie' if the harmony of interests was not complete? And when, under what conditio would the 'national bourgeoisie' cease to fu its 'progressive function?'

How far can this new definition of the natio bourgeoisie and its historic rôle be applied this form to the Middle East? The 'natio bourgeoisie,' to recall the traditional definiti are the local industrialists, the merchants a bankers who want to promote capitalist develo ment in their own country. But it could hard be argued that such a class is in effect in pow in the United Arab Republic, and does, to a important degree, influence the policy of government. Some Soviet experts have realis this difficulty and have used such *ad hoc* ter as 'military intelligentsia,' of which it is dou ful whether Karl Marx would have approv If the rulers of the United Arab Repub represent any specific social class, it is of cou the lower middle class rather than the 'natio bourgeoisie.'[10] This in its turn poses anotl serious problem: The 'military intelligents (or lower middle class) fulfilled a progress rôle by doing away with the 'feudal remnant But in doing so it exhausted its own usefulne For the bourgeoisie, by definition, can fulfil progressive rôle only so long as it is engaged a struggle against a more antiquated soc order and form of production. Once it h achieved this task, it ceases to be progressi But the United Arab Republic and its rul obviously retain their progressive character the time being, and the reason, again, is to found not in the economic infra-structure, b outside. The struggle of the United Ar Republic against the West continues not becau of any direct economic clash between 'Weste imperialism' and the plans of the national bou geoisie of Egypt and Syria for the development their economy, but for very different reaso Which again illustrates the difficulty of attempti to explain current developments in the Mid

[10] Most Soviet writers distinguish between the pe bourgeoisie and the 'lower national bourgeoisie.' members of the latter are defined as exploiting hi labour, whereas the former are independent produc mainly artisans or (comparatively) well-to-do-peasa who do not employ outside labour. The former clas believed to be both more progressive and more reacti ary than the latter: The element of exploitation is abse but its roots lie in a pre-capitalist mode of production.

st in strictly orthodox Leninist terms—even the revised version of 1956.

SPRING 1955, the spring of Bandung, was the great divide in the Soviet attitude towards national movement in the East. Up to that date 'struggle for national liberation' had been ported in Moscow but in the traditional ms of 'proletarian hegemony,' agrarian rest, and, at best, a national anti-imperialist nt that developed *in opposition* to the govern-nt. Some of the hostility to the ruling urgeois nationalists' had disappeared after 53: 'Western Imperialism' rather than the ive reactionaries was regarded in Moscow as main enemy. But co-operation with the ional movement and its leaders on a wide le was certainly not yet envisaged; the ional bourgeoisie had its quarrels with the st, to be sure, but its opposition to imperial-n was thought to be inconsistent; in view of very 'class character' it could not be regarded a reliable ally.

Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy were not, wever, unduly restricted by these traditional ological considerations when they were faced new and highly promising realities in the st. 1955 brought not only the Bandung nference but also Khrushchev's and Bulganin's to India and the arms agreement with ypt. As a result, a visible gulf opened between Soviet government's efforts to improve ations with Asian and African political ders and the tone of writing favoured by the re or less scholarly journals in the USSR. an hardly be supposed that the Soviet Eastern erts were blind to what was occurring in the litical field, and yet they continued to subject Soviet government's Asian and African erlocutors to criticism in the approved hodox manner—possibly in the belief that political changes were merely tactical and l not require any doctrinal modification. ere was at first apparently a tacit assumption t communists could co-operate with Nehru hout necessarily retreating from the stand en vis-à-vis the Indian national movement the past. But this proved to be a mistaken sumption; collaboration with the national vement in the East became a matter of long-m strategy in 1955; ideological justification d to be provided for current policies and past history, too, had to be rewritten. It was clearly impossible to embrace the slogans of the national movement in Asia while subjecting to abuse the past leaders of this movement and their ideas. One month after Bandung an unsigned editorial in *Kommunist*, (1955, 8, pp. 74 et seq.), first stated that Soviet writers had been guilty of exaggeration in denouncing movements such as Kemalism in Turkey and Gandhism in India.

There was a regrettable, but perhaps unavoidable time lag in compliance with the new line. Throughout 1955 and in the early part of 1956 books and pamphlets continued to appear that were permeated with the old 'militant' spirit, but little damage was done. The writings of the Soviet Eastern experts had never been followed with great attention in countries such as India or Egypt; they were and remained largely unknown outside the Soviet Union. As far as Cairo and New Delhi were concerned, the sympathetic declarations and friendly actions of Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Shepilov mattered more than the tone of books or articles published in Moscow.

It was easy enough for the experts to adhere to the new line, but more difficult to provide an explanation in Marxist-Leninist terms. Part of the ideological justification had been provided in the discussions on the economic rôle of the national bourgeoisie, but this debate had left some of the more important political problems unsolved. Above all, there was the issue of the future in the Middle East and other parts of Asia. For all its friendship and sympathy, Moscow obviously did not regard the existing state of affairs as the final stage of development. However desirable the trend towards state capitalism, and the foreign policy of the 'national bourgeoisie,' these were regarded only as transitional phenomena on the way towards a Popular Democracy, Asian style, and eventually towards communism.[11]

[11] State capitalism, though preferable to 'monopoly capitalism,' was not necessarily regarded as a stage in the peaceful transition to socialism. Gafurov, the chief party spokesman on Eastern studies since 1956, criticised those Soviet scholars who regarded the growth of the state sector in the economy of certain Asian countries as the starting point for a socialist transformation of the economy. It was wrong to assume (according to Gafurov) that socialism could be built under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, in Asia or elsewhere. B. G. Gafurov in *Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, 1957, 9.

III. Oriental Studies

The new interest in Asia was reflected in the publication of new periodicals and books, in the establishment of new organisations to study the contemporary East, in meetings and conferences, in public speeches, editorials in *Pravda* and *Kommunist*, and in many other ways. Soviet Oriental studies, for so long the Cinderella of Soviet Scholarship, became almost overnight a respectable discipline of great importance. Some modest beginnings were made in 1950 when Oriental Institutes had been established at the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow, and the Uzbek Academy of Sciences in Tashkent. But these new institutions apparently lacked both resources and specialists, and showed no marked intention to tackle the problems of the contemporary East. The almost total neglect of Near and Middle Eastern questions continued, and was noted by Soviet as well as foreign observers. A real impetus was given to Soviet Eastern studies only in April 1955—the month of Bandung—with the publication of the new central organ of Soviet Orientalists *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*. At the same time, the Soviet press appealed for an intensification of the work of Eastern experts. These appeals for a new beginning started, as a rule, with a reference to the great achievements of Russian Orientalism in the Tsarist era, and in the early Soviet days, and ended with the complaint that the work done recently was quite insufficient in the light of new exigencies. Nobody referred to the reasons for the eclipse of Soviet Eastern studies after the middle thirties. Soviet Orientalists were criticised on many counts: For neglecting Eastern languages and committing ideological mistakes, for a low scientific level, for ignoring entire areas of the East (such as the Arab countries and Africa), for not training enough 'cadres' and not establishing research and training centres in the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics. At the Twentieth Party Congress Mikoyan said: '. . . another institute within the framework of the Academy of Sciences studies the problems of the East. All that can be said of it is, that while the entire East has awakened, the Institute goes on dozing contentedly. It is about time that it should lift itself to the standard required in our day.'[12] Mikoyan also noted with astonishment and regret that the 139-year-old Moscow Institute of Eastern Studies (the former Lazarev Institute) had been closed at a time when Soviet economic, cultural, and political ties with the East were developing rapidly.

Following this intervention on the very highest level the study of the contemporary Middle East received a strong impetus.[13] Within less than eighteen months Soviet orientalists were summoned to an All-Union conference in Tashkent, a new monthly periodical was started, many books published, and new research centres had been created. It was obviously a case of 'accelerated growth' and if the quality was somewhat deficient, the very fact that so many activities could be started in so short a time was in itself a triumph of improvisation. This wave of interest in Asian studies was reflected in the personal fortunes of some of the leading scholars in the field: A. A. Guber, an expert on South East Asia, became head of the national committee of Soviet historians, E. M. Zhukov was appointed secretary of the history department of the Academy of Science

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[12] *Pravda*, 18 February 1956.

[13] An Institute of Eastern Languages was opened at Moscow State University in September 1956. In its second year the Institute had 80 students. Eastern languages are also taught at the Eastern faculty of Leningrad State University, the Central Asian State University in Tashkent, the Azerbaijan State University in Baku, the State University in Kazan, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Institute of International Relations, the Soviet Army Institute of Foreign languages, etc. The current trend is away from the traditional historical-philological emphasis and towards the spoken language combined with an interdisciplinary approach to contemporary problems; '. . the aim is to prepare specialists who have a mastery of the languages of the appropriate countries and a deep knowledge of all aspects of their economy, history, and culture' (*Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta*, Historical-Philological Series, No. 1, 1956, p. 156). In addition, attempts have been made since 1956 to teach Eastern languages in Soviet schools, beginning in the second grade (from the age of eight years). Among the schools in which this programme has been applied were Boarding School No. 23 in Moscow (Hindi and Urdu), two boarding schools in Leningrad, five schools in Tashkent (Hindi, Urdu, Chinese, and Arabic), two schools in Stalinabad (Persian and Arabic). Several schools in Baku teach Persian and Arabic; three schools in Samarkand and Bukhara provide courses in Persian and Urdu, and Persian is taught at School No. 70 in Ashkhabad. Initial difficulties such as the absence of textbooks have apparently been overcome and a future expansion of the programme seems likely (*Inostranie yazika v shkole*, 1957–1958, passim).

d B. G. Gafurov, who is now in charge of stern studies, became, on the death of Anna nkratova, the only Soviet historian to be a mber of the Central Committee of the party, is attaining a position of undisputed thority among his colleagues. Some of the ding figures in this Orientalist revival had started ir careers in the Institute of Red Professors and d worked for the periodical *The Revolutionary st* in the late twenties (for instance A. A. iber and I. Potekhin), but most had entered the ld only in the post-war period. Of considerable erest is the attempt to use specialists of Central ian origin in leading positions. The case of bodjan Gafurovich Gafurov is of some signi-ance: Born in a little village near Leninabad in 09, this young Tajik university teacher special-d in the history of his own people, but subse-ently chose a party career and for several years ld the post of first secretary of the Communist rty in the Tajik Republic. His transfer to oscow to supervise the reorganisation of Eastern dies was a further promotion. Another party gnitary of Central Asian origin, Mukhitdinov, ve the principal address at the Soviet Orienta-s Congress in Tashkent in June 1957.[14]

The appearance of this first generation of lead-g cadres of Central Asian origin, completely vietised, was undoubtedly a great achievement. ere had been a similar attempt in the early enties to promote Communists or fellow-vellers to key positions in the field of Soviet stern studies (and Eastern politics), but it had t been a success. The Narimanovs, Sultan lievs, and Ryskulovs had not been men of ser stature or lower cultural level than the ukhitdinovs and Gafurovs of 1958, but they had en less reliable politically and tainted with tionalist deviations'; their Communism had been based on feelings of sympathy rather than a firm schooling in Leninist ideology. The Gafurovs and Mukhitdinovs are not perhaps, great ideologists with original ideas of their own, nor are such thinkers needed, for the ideas were already given and the main problem was to apply them in the East. But they are competent, and apparently quite reliable, and if doubts were expressed about the level of the new leadership, it could rightly be argued that this was the first generation of Soviet native cadres, and that neither Rome nor Tashkent had been built in a day.[15]

THE reorganisation of Soviet Eastern Studies got under way in summer 1956, but it was only in the following year that the first results could be seen; the number of scientific personnel at the Institute for Eastern Studies in Moscow rose from 185 to 338 between January and December 1957 (450 if we include those preparing for the Soviet equivalent of a Ph.D. thesis). Nevertheless at the All-Union conference in Tashkent in 1957 Mukhitdinov and Gafurov noted that contemporary events were still neglected. There was still undue emphasis on the distant past; at the conference itself only two papers (out of a dozen) dealt with the current stage of the national liberation struggle in the East.[16] Maisky, the former Soviet diplomat and now an Academician, said at a meeting in Moscow in 1958 that Soviet Orientalists had no reason to rest on past laurels in view of the stormy developments in the countries of the East.[17]

Like so many other projects in the Soviet Union, Eastern studies were reorganised according to a five year plan. Among the newly-founded establishments were Oriental Institutes in Tashkent (September 1957) and Baku (March 1958). There was no clear division of labour between them, but Tashkent appears to con-

N. A. Mukhitdinov (born 1917) is now the youngest mber of the Soviet party presidium, and the first Com-nist of Muslim background to have attained this ition. He worked in the co-operative movement ore the war, made his way through the party hierarchy, became first secretary of the Uzbek party Central mmittee in 1955. Mukhitdinov's meteoric rise (he ned the Communist party only during the war) is bably unique in the recent history of the Soviet Union. was apparently favoured, on more than one occasion ing his career, by a singularly fortunate set of circum-nces. His speech at the first All-Union conference of stern experts was subsequently published as a booklet: *ovym uspekham Sovetskovo Vostokovedeniya* (Moscow, 7).

[15] It is difficult to judge Gafurov's qualities as a party boss and as an Orientalist in his specialised field. But the mere fact that the same man could be first party secretary in the Tajik republic and present a competent paper at an international Orientalist Congress (in Munich, 1957, on the Samanide state in the IX and X century) is an impressive achievement. It was, in addition, important to have the Soviet Union represented in Asia by men who were themselves of Asian, rather than Great Russian or Jewish origin.

[16] *Pravda Vostoka*, 11 June, 1957.

[17] *Voprosy Istorii*, 1958, 5, p. 187.

centrate on Persian and Afghan studies, whereas the Baku centre is reported to give more attention to the Arab world. Preparations have also been made for the opening of Institutes in Tiflis and the capitals of the smaller Central Asian republics.

Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, a bi-monthly started in 1955, has remained the main scientific organ of Soviet Orientalists, dealing with both current issues and historical, linguistic, and economic topics. Until 1957 it was edited by V. A. Maslennikov, an economist; in summer 1957 I. S. Braginski, an historian, took over. In July 1957 an illustrated monthly *Sovremenny Vostok* ('Contemporary East,' edited by Gafurov) began to appear; it deals almost exclusively with current topics, with the accent on politics. Both in form and in content the contributions to this new magazine are quite different from the old style Leninist essays published in *Novy Vostok* or *Revoliutsionny Vostok* thirty years ago. Today's articles are much shorter and altogether in a lighter vein. Instead of internal polemics and discussions, there are interviews with Asian and African political leaders, and travellers' tales. At the same time the two series of learned papers continued to appear under the auspices of the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences, and the newly-founded publishing house for Eastern literature put out specialised studies such as *The national revolutionary movement in Iraq in 1920/21*, or *The situation of the Egyptian peasants on the eve of the revolutionary upheaval of 1952*. Some of the work done in 1954/55 (for example by Vatolina on Egypt and Belaev on the Arab League) had apparently to be shelved because of the change in line, but this hardly mattered in view of the steady growth in the number of publications. Among the more noteworthy contributions were surveys such as *Contemporary Persia* and *Contemporary Syria*, providing political, historical, and economic source material. There is no authoritative modern history of the Eastern countries; the two-volume history published by Moscow University was written before the line changed and is therefore unusable.

Some countries (and subjects) benefited more than others from the revival. New branches in the central research institute included departments for Africa and South East Asia, and one for the analysis of current economic trends in Eastern countries. (Up to 1957 Africa had been the monopoly of the Institute of Ethnography at the Academy of Sciences.) Many new books on the Arab countries have been published since 1955, but comparatively little on Turkey and Persia and nothing on Israel. Translations have also appeared of Egyptian and other Arab writers (mostly of 'progressive' persuasion).

The great increase in output is undoubted; it is more difficult to pass judgment on the quality of this new literature. Ideological limitations apart, many of these new books are of doubtful competence; they are frequently based on secondary and not always relevant sources, giving the impression that the authors have not yet mastered their subjects. (There were some exceptions such as the competent little book by E. A. Lebedev on Jordan published in 1956 and A. N. Kotlov's study (1958) on the revolt in Iraq in 1920. This is based on a very thorough study of both Western and Arab source material; the number of footnotes is in the German (or neo-American) tradition.) A steady improvement can however be noted, and the level of political and social analysis compares not unfavourably with the work done outside the Soviet Union. They are more interested in politics, economics, and social affairs than many of the Western experts and their Marxist-Leninist ideological equipment is perhaps better suited to cope with the revolutionary situation in the Middle East than the empirical approach of many Western students.

(Continued from page two of cover)

ply declares that Lenin's philosophical views e no particular significance for the under- ding of Leninism. Meyer also asserts mptorily that Lenin's attitude to philosophy determined exclusively by political considera- s, that his philosophical views are inconsistent. n such a fundamental work as *Materialism Empiriocriticism* was allegedly written "for political motives" and in many places nconsistent with the ideas set forth in the *osophical Notebooks*.

his in itself characterises Meyer's approach eninist teaching, which he tries to deprive of ientific methodological basis. Meyer denies deep, organic unity of all aspects of Leninist ry, and ascribes to it a pragmatic approach to ity. He attempts to show the inconsistency of inism, trying hard to find non-existent "con- ictions" in Lenin's views, and to convince his lers that Leninism is not a well-knit science. lis favourite method of falsification consists ttributing to Lenin, views which he did not i, and then "convicting" him of "contra- ions," "variations," etc. . . . From a scientific nt of view Meyer's book has no value whatso- , as its content and methodology are anti- ntific. However, this book has a certain rest in another respect: it helps to trace the e kinship between the contemporary revision- and the ideologists of the bourgeoisie. If one pares the arguments used by the one and the r in the struggle against Leninism, an almost plete coincidence is revealed . . . In solidarity n Meyer and his like, the revisionists "are ng to erode the revolutionary soul of rxism, to undermine the faith of the working s and the toiling people in socialism". . . .' *prosy Filosofii*, 1958, 7, pp. 170-174).

is Nikolaevski

Boris Nikolaevski has been for a number of ades a bitter enemy of the Soviet people, has icipated in various anti-Soviet libellous lications; he is one of those who in every way to hinder the establishment of a united front ween the Communist and Socialist parties . . . . chief charge which Nikolaevski levels against iet historians is that for them political, Party siderations take precedence over scientific s. There is no need to prove in detail the nsistency of these libellous fictions. It is ign to Communists to contrast politics, the Party spirit, and science. Their approach to historical facts is distinguished at one and the same time by a consistent Party spirit and a deep scientific sense, genuine objectivity indissolubly linked with each other . . .' (*Voprosy Istorii*, 1958, 5, pp. 121-122).

James Conant

'In the struggle against the new the apologists of capitalism are reviving the old, the reactionary, the medieval. In order to refute Marxism-Leninism they are ready to assert that science is altogether impossible. The point is reached when the well-known American scientist J. Conant in his lectures at Columbia University stated frankly that scientific theory represents not a reflection of reality but simply the "way of behaviour of the scientists," and that "the world around us is in essence unexplainable." Conant openly expresses his solidarity with the advocates of mysticism, with their assertions that "the whole world, including ourselves, is only a God's dream, and all our prayers and ceremonies are only attempts to make *him* more sleepy, so that *he* will not wake up and cut short our dream" (cf. J. B. Conant, *Modern Science and Modern Man*, N.Y., 1952, p. 96). And this is the attitude not of a theologian, or a speculative philosopher, but of a fairly well-known specialist in chemistry!' (*Kommunist*, 1958, 7, p. 61).

Frank Hoyle

'The idea of creation of matter from nothing is defended by the German physicist, P. Jordan, the British astronomer, F. Hoyle, and the British mathematician, H. Bondi. Hoyle, for instance, proclaims: "New material is constantly being created . . . From time to time people ask where the created material comes from. Well, it does not come from anywhere. Material simply appears, it is created. At one time the various atoms composing the material do not exist and at a later time they do . . . . The average rate of appearance amounts to no more than the creation of one atom in the course of about a year in a volume equal to St. Paul's Cathedral" (F. Hoyle, *The nature of the universe*, 1950, p. 104). Thus, if the frequency of appearance of Hoyle's phenomena is a bit disappointing, the place he indicates for their "appearance" is quite suitable: where should miracles happen in England if not in London's largest church?' (*Voprosy Filosofii*, 1958, 8, p. 31).

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